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„We don´t see things as they are, we see them as we are.” 
Anais Nin 
1 Introduction – Individual differences in change blindness 
“Driver misses stop sign, hits police car” (Parks, 2015) - such a headline appears in the 
news nearly every day: A car driver does not notice a motor cyclist ("Übersehen!," 2015) or a 
bicyclist ("Autofahrer übersieht," 2015). A pilot overlooks another airplane (Schnitzler, 
2010), a high-voltage line (Engelberg, 2014), or even a ferris wheel ("Pilot übersieht 
Riesenrad," 2011). As demonstrated by these unfortunate incidents, failures of human 
perception happen frequently. Change blindness refers to the phenomenon that sometimes 
observers do not notice changes in the visual environment when they co-occur with some 
other visual disturbances (Simons & Levin, 1997). For example, drivers might be distracted 
by mudsplashes on the windscreen and, hence, miss the sudden appearance of an overtaking 
vehicle, resulting in a car crash (cf. O'Regan, Rensink, & Clark, 1999; Simons, Franconeri, & 
Reimer, 2000). 
The history of research on change blindness dates back to the 19th century. In his book 
Principles of Psychology, W. James (1890/1950) refers to the inability to detect changes and 
discusses the conditions under which objects are discriminated from each other in human 
perception. Training and personal interest may be identical in their effect as large perceptual 
differences. In the further historical course, research on change blindness can be divided into 
three different periods (Rensink, 2002). In the first phase, initial scientific interest developed 
in the 1950s and 1960s with works, e.g. by French (1953), Ditchburn (1955), Kahneman 
(1968), or Shepard (1967). Change blindness was typically induced by a temporal gap or a 
saccadic eye movement. For example, French (1953) showed that increasing the number of 
dots and the spatial distance between them leads to a reduced discrimination of abstract dot 
patterns. Together, these studies were the first to empirically demonstrate that observers have 
great difficulties in detecting changes. The scientific observations of the first phase, however, 
were not integrated into a general explanation of change blindness (cf. Rensink, 2002).  
In the second phase, research on change detection was extended (cf. Rensink, 2002). In 
the 1970s and 1980s, it was shown that observers are blind to changes under a variety of 
different experimental conditions, e.g. they did not detect changes of letters (e.g., McConkie 
& Zola, 1979; Pashler, 1988) or of abstract patterns through dots, circles, or lines (e.g., 
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Bridgeman, Hendry, & Stark, 1975; Phillips & Singer, 1974).  These studies paved the way 
for a theory on visual short-term memory that is limited in its capacity. However, this theory 
could not be integrated, however, into a basic rationale about change blindness (cf. Rensink, 
2002).  
Finally, in the third and still ongoing phase, research on change blindness was expanded 
to a variety of paradigms (cf. Rensink, 2002). For example, in real life experiments, even 
major changes, such as the exchange of a whole person, were not detected by a great number 
of participants (e.g., Levin, Simons, Angelone, & Chabris, 2002; Simons & Levin, 1998). In 
a laboratory setting, a variety of experiments investigated how changes of abstract patterns 
(e.g., Rensink, 2000b), of photographs (Simons, 1996), or in short films (e.g., Levin & 
Simons, 1997) were detected or went unnoticed. In contrast to the first and the second phase 
of the research on change detection, an attempt was made to find a universal framework for 
explaining the causes of change blindness (e.g., Rensink, 2002; Simons & Levin, 1997; 
Simons, 2000; Simons & Rensink, 2005). It was stressed that change blindness is an 
important phenomenon which may help to understand attention and consciousness in visual 
perception (cf. Simons & Ambinder, 2005). Most researchers agree that visual selective 
attention is a process which is necessary for successful change detection (e.g., Eimer & 
Mazza, 2005; Rensink, O'Regan, & Clark, 1997). Moreover, also post-perceptual processes, 
i.e. a later stage of the conscious evaluation of a change for ongoing action planning and 
decision making, are fundamental for the aware detection of changes (Koivisto & Revonsuo, 
2003; Rensink, 2000a). 
Recently, researchers have begun investigating individual differences in change 
blindness (cf. Simons & Ambinder, 2005), such as in age (e.g., Costello, Madden, Mitroff, & 
Whiting, 2010), in cultural differences (e.g., Masuda & Nisbett, 2006), or in expertise 
(Werner & Thies, 2000). For example, football experts detected more changes in domain-
related, semantic photographs of action scenes and scenes of playing formations than novices 
(Werner & Thies, 2000). Together, these studies confirmed the existence of individual 
differences in change blindness, assessed by a variety of different paradigms. Nevertheless, 
these differences have not yet been analyzed sufficiently (cf. Rensink, 2002; Simons & 
Ambinder, 2005). Two main questions concerning individual differences in change blindness 
remain. First: Do systematic individual differences in change blindness exist? It remains 
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unclear whether change blindness is a trait, i.e. a variable that is consistent across time, 
different situations, and different methods (McCrae & Costa, 2003; Steyer, Ferring, & 
Schmitt, 1992). This question has a high practical implication. Individual differences in 
change blindness may be related to performance in real life task that demanding the detection 
of changes in a variety of circumstances, e.g. in navigation, surveillance, or driving (cf. 
O'Regan et al., 1999; Simons & Levin, 1998). In regard to driving, e.g., it is important to 
know for the prevention of car accidents why some people do not notice changes on the road, 
whereas others detect them more readily. Second: How can individual differences in change 
blindness be explained? It remains disputable which underlying cognitive processes 
contribute to the explanation of individual differences in change blindness. Both, attentional 
processes and post-perceptual processes may explain these differences. 
The present work is structured as follows: First, the phenomenon of change blindness 
and its underlying processes are introduced in detail. Second, the work focuses on individual 
differences in change blindness and the current research issues are clarified. Third, I will 
introduce its methodological procedure, adapted for the research of individual differences in 
change blindness.  Fourth, the results of these research questions are reported and discussed in 
two main chapters: a) cognitive processes of change blindness and b) individual differences in 
change blindness. Fifth, the present findings about individual differences in change blindness 
are applied to the example of cognitive aging. Finally, a general discussion summarizes all 
observations.  
2 Change blindness 
In a visually rich environment we do not perceive all the details of objects or scenes 
from one view to the next (e.g., Henderson, 1997; Rensink, 2000b). Consequently, it may 
happen that observers miss changes in a visual scene when they occur simultaneously with 
some other visual disturbances. This phenomenon is known as change blindness (e.g., Simons 
& Levin, 1997). In a typical change blindness experiment, an original image is presented in 
rapid succession with a slightly modified image. This change usually produces a transient 
motion signal attracting the observers’ attention automatically. The motion signal of the 
change can be completely masked, e.g. by saccadic eye movements (e.g., Grimes, 1996), by a 
blank (Rensink et al., 1997), by the occlusion of the change (e.g., Simons & Levin, 1998), by 
shifts of the entire display (e.g., Blackmore, Brelstaff, Nelson, & Trościanko, 1995), or by 
 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN CHANGE BLINDNESS                                                               8 
 
 
film cuts (e.g., Levin & Simons, 1997). As a consequence, observers often have difficulties to 
integrate visual information from one view to the next and to detect changed visual 
information. Change blindness may also occur when the change is not presented during a gap, 
a saccade, or a shift. For example, gradually changing stimuli often go unnoticed (e.g., 
Simons et al., 2000). Furthermore, changes may be missed when irrelevant stimuli, like 
mudsplashes that are presented simultaneously with the change, reduce the salience, i.e. the 
way how a stimulus is outstanding relative to other stimuli, of the motion signal of the change 
(e.g., Schankin & Wascher, 2007, 2008; O'Regan et al., 1999). 
First of all, the term change should be defined precisely. Change “refers to the 
transformation over time of a single structure” (Rensink, 2002, p. 250). Change can be 
differentiated from difference and motion (Simons & Rensink, 2005; Rensink, 2002). 
Difference is described as a poor resemblance between two structures that may also occur at 
the same time (Rensink, 2002). Consequently, both change and difference refer to a 
comparison of similarities between structures. A motion of a quantity usually appears 
continuously in real-life and can be characterized by the relocation of an object (Rensink, 
2002). More precisely, change may come with a motion or it may appear suddenly. These 
often related terms, however, can be separated experimentally (Rensink, 2002).  
Moreover, change blindness has to be differentiated from similar phenomena, which 
also focus on the role of capacity limited systems, that are crucial for the perception and 
processing of stimuli in the environment (cf. Rensink, 2002): repetition blindness (e.g., 
Bavelier, 1994; Kanwisher, 1987), the attentional blink (e.g., Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 
1992; Shapiro, Raymond, & Arnell, 1997), and inattentional blindness (e.g., Mack & Rock, 
1998; Simons & Chabris, 1999). Repetition blindness describes the struggle of observers to 
detect the second one of two identical targets that are presented in rapid and repeated 
sequence (Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (RSVP); Chun, 1997; Kanwisher, 1987). 
Repetition blindness occurs because observers are not able to perceive two targets as 
episodically different (Dux & Marois, 2009). In contrast, change blindness also appears when 
changes are not presented in rapid and repeated sequence. The attentional blink phenomenon 
includes a temporary attentional lapse due to the inhibition of a second changed target (Dux & 
Marois, 2009; Shapiro et al., 1997). In particular, when two distinct target items are shown 
successively, separated by about 500 ms, observers often cannot identify the second target, 
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although they do not have any problems when it is presented alone. Change blindness, 
however, also appears when changes are shown after this critical psychological refractory 
period of attention. In a typical inattentional blindness paradigm, participants perform a task 
while simultaneously and without their knowledge an irrelevant, but clearly visible object is 
presented in their visual field (Simons & Chabris, 1999). A majority of observers does not 
notice the existence of this critical, but unexpected object (Simons & Chabris, 1999). In 
contrast to this incidental task, change blindness tasks have been labelled intentional (Simons, 
2000): That is, change blindness does not investigate if the existence of an object has been 
noticed, but observers actively search for a change which has been announced before. 
3 Explanations for change blindness 
The question remains, why changes are often missed. There are five possible 
explanations for change blindness (Simons, 2000): First, the original representation, i.e. the 
encoding of the visual details of a scene, might be overwritten or substituted by the changed 
representation. Second, only the first impression of the original scene is represented, whereas 
an encoding of the changed scene fails. Third, the visual environment can be seen as a 
memory store and visual information is only abstractly encoded by the observer. Neither the 
original scene, nor the modified scene is represented and nothing is stored. Fourth, a missing 
comparison process between the initial and the modified scene might cause change blindness, 
because nothing is compared. Fifth, the features of the original scene and the modified scene 
are combined in an erroneous feature combination. Thus, change blindness is prevented when 
the comparison process of both the correctly represented original scene and of the changed 
scene is successful (Simons, 2000; Simons & Rensink, 2005).  
But which specific cognitive processes are responsible for a correct encoding of both 
scenes, i.e. the original scene and the changed scene, and a successful comparison process so 
that changes are detected? According to Rensink (2000a), who gave a theoretical overview 
about the processing of stimuli, change detection can be separated into three different aspects 
of vision: First, seeing a change includes its representation in visual perception. As the outside 
world is not stably represented in detail, seeing is a dynamic process making a holistic 
structure available when necessary. Second, sensing of a change was defined as the 
nonattentional processing of visual information without conscious awareness (Rensink, 
2000a). For example, in a study about the unconscious processing of visual changes, 
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participants were asked to detect a positional or identity change of letters and number, which 
served as stimuli (Niedeggen, Wichmann, & Stoerig, 2001). Observers sensed the presence of 
a change before they could consciously detect or identify it. Third, focused visual attention is 
necessary for post-perceptual processes, such as scrutinizing the change. The emphasis of the 
present work is on attentional processes and on post-perceptual processes in change detection.  
Since the 17th century humans have been taking interest in the phenomenon of attention 
(Mole, 2013). According to the Enlightenment philosopher René Descartes, attention that is 
described as a “surprise of the soul”, is allocated to “rare and extraordinary” objects 
(Descartes, 1649/1996, p. 109). In the 18th century, the definition of attention as “state of 
mind which prepares one to receive impressions” by Kames (1796/2005) reveals that it was 
conceived to control cognitive, perceptual input. Also in contemporary definitions, this 
selectional function was defined as one important aspect of attention (e.g., Goldhammer, 
2006; Posner & Boies, 1971; Desimone & Duncan, 1995): Selected stimuli are preferably 
processed in comparison to irrelevant stimuli, because selective or focused attention is 
characterized by a limited processing capacity (e.g., Broadbent, 1958; Posner & Boies, 1971). 
With reference to this, one of the most important, theoretical approaches was made by 
Broadbent (1958), fundamental for ongoing research (cf. Mole, 2013; H.J. Müller & 
Krummenacher, 2008). It was suggested that perception worked like a selective two-serial-
system, limited to one channel and in also in its capacity, similar to a bottleneck. Attention 
controls this bottleneck by determining the connection and the passing of the stimuli from a 
large capacity, pre-bottleneck system, which exclusively selects stimuli due to simple 
physical characteristics, to a reduced capacity, post-bottleneck system. Following empirical 
findings, however, that showed that also not attended information can be processed were not 
compatible with this theory (e.g., Moray, 1959; Treisman, 1964). Together, in an older 
standard view, attention was regarded as serial, high-speed mental spotlight scanning the 
visual field (e.g., Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980).  
Findings from visual search studies were fundamental for further conclusions about 
selective attention (e.g., Jonides & Yantis, 1988; W. Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Treisman, 
1982). In a typical visual search paradigm, participants are asked to detect a target, e.g. a blue 
letter, usually presented among task-irrelevant, distracting stimuli, e.g. red and green letters 
(e.g., Treisman, 1982). Visual search studies have shown that the competition in selective 
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attention is biased by automatic, stimulus-driven bottom-up mechanisms (e.g., Jonides & 
Yantis, 1988) and goal-driven top-down mechanisms (e.g., W. Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). 
Via bottom-up mechanisms, stimuli are separated from their background. The observers’ 
attention is automatically attracted by perceptually salient stimuli in a homogeneous array of 
distractors in a fast and exogenous way. In contrast, top-down mechanisms guide observers’ 
attention in a deliberate and controlled manner toward information that is relevant for their 
individual goals. Based on these findings, the standard view on attention as a mental spotlight 
was fundamentally doubted in an innovative review that integrated these behavioural and 
further neuropsychological findings into biased competition theory (Desimone & Duncan, 
1995). This theory states that visual selective attention may not be regarded as a mental 
spotlight, but as an emergent property which is influenced by parallel interactions, such as 
bottom-up and top-down mechanisms, in a competitive way. Stimuli compete for limited 
cognitive processing capacities and for the control of behaviour. 
In the context of change detection, it has been broadly suggested that focused attention 
is one major process which underlies successful change detection (e.g., Beck, Rees, Frith, & 
Lavie, 2001; Eimer & Mazza, 2005; Rensink et al., 1997; Simons, 2000). That is, only 
changes in the focus of selective attention can be reported consciously, as attention is 
necessary for an aware representation of a change (e.g., O'Regan, Deubel, Clark, & Rensink, 
2000; Rensink et al., 1997). This role of selective attention in change detection is also 
supported by neuroimaging studies. They indicate that both dorsal frontoparietal regions and 
extrastriate ventral visual areas are involved in conscious change detection (e.g., Beck et al., 
2001; Huettel, Güzeldere, & McCarthy, 2001). Former ones are involved in selective attention 
(e.g., Coull, Frith, Frackowiak, & Grasby, 1996). Both stimulus-driven bottom-up 
mechanisms and goal-driven top-down mechanisms affect the allocation of attention in 
change detection. For example, when the presentation time of the blank was enhanced, change 
detection performance decreased (Phillips & Singer, 1974), most likely because the salience 
of the motion signal became smaller (bottom-up). Furthermore, varying the way how 
observers search for a change had an effect on change blindness (top-down). For example, 
Rensink et al. (1997) investigated how a manipulation of the interestingness of an object in a 
visual scene affected change detection performance. Interestingness had been rated before in 
an independent experiment. The observers were presented changes of objects either with 
marginal interest or with central interest. Participants had great difficulties in detecting 
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changes of marginal objects in comparison to central objects. Similarly, Lamme (2003) 
showed that change detection performance was greatly improved when the position of 
possible changes were indicated by a preceding cue. However, when participants had no 
information about the potential occurrence of changes, they remained completely change 
blind (Schankin & Wascher, 2008). Thus, change detection was only possible when some 
additional knowledge was provided to the observers. To conclude, attention, which can only 
be allocated to a few items at a time (e.g., Rensink, 2000b; Cowan, 2000), is the key process 
for successful change detection. 
Post-perceptual processes are a later phase of conscious stimulus evaluation (cf. 
Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2003). They are influenced, e.g., by working memory mechanisms, 
which temporally store and process information for ongoing more complex cognitive 
operations, e.g. reasoning (Baddeley, 1992). Incoming stimuli have to be evaluated with 
regard to previous representations in working memory. This actualization of the mental 
representation through new information is called working memory updating (cf. Ecker, 
Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Chee, 2010; Morris & Jones, 1990; Yntema & Mueser, 1962). In 
driving, e.g., a conscious visual representation of the oncoming traffic is persistently updated 
by every look in to the side mirror (Gugerty, 1997). Working memory updating may or may 
not involve the need to retrieve the initial information, the transformation of old information 
through new representations, or the complete substitution of old information (Ecker et al., 
2010). Post-perceptual evaluative processes are also important for ongoing decision making 
and action planning (Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2003; Rensink, 2000a). In abstract terms, a 
decision can be defined as a goal-oriented process which “weighs priors, evidence, and value 
to generate a commitment to a categorical proposition intended” (Gold & Shadlen, 2007, p. 
536). Decision making is based on a variety of sources of information: Prior is the probability 
for a true hypothesis based on the prevalence of previous occurrences, e.g. the frequency of 
the presentation of a stimulus before specific evidence can be accumulated about it. Values 
affect the decision making process by weighing it in one or the other direction by subjective 
costs or benefits. A decision variable aggregates these different sources of information. 
Eventually, a decision is made when sufficient sensory evidence is accumulated and, as time 
passes by, the boundary of a certain criterion is crossed (O'Connell, Dockree, & Kelly, 2012). 
In this case, perceptual experience has reached access consciousness, i.e. it is reportable and 
applicable for reasoning and action planning (Block, 1995, 1996). Finally, a decision may be 
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transformed into an action, e.g. in an explicit answer to a question or the pressing of a 
response button. Theoretically, a change in any or all of these post-perceptual processes may 
also affect change detection performance.  However, there is less research about post-
perceptual change processing than about attentional change processing. It has been suggested 
that post-perceptual evaluative perceptual processes may also play an important role in 
change detection performance (Eimer & Mazza, 2005; Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2003; Rensink, 
2000a; Rensink et al., 1997). For the decision whether or not a change has occurred, the 
original image and the altered image have to be encoded and compared, then the comparison 
of these two images has to be consciously evaluated as a change (Block, 1995, 1996; Eimer & 
Mazza, 2005; Simons, 2000). Working memory updating may affect this evaluation process. 
For example, it was concluded that only when visual memory updating exceeds a certain 
threshold, a change can be reported consciously (Hollingworth & Henderson, 2004). This 
interpretation is in accordance with other research pointing out that only when a certain 
criterion is crossed, a threshold-bound decision whether a change has occurred or not is made 
(O'Connell et al., 2012).  
4 Electrophysiological correlates 
Measuring the brain activity helps to gain further insight into the underlying processes 
in change detection and change blindness (cf. Beck et al., 2001). Event-related potentials 
(ERPs) allow a high temporal resolution for a fine-grained analysis of neurocognitive 
processing. The emphasis of the present work is, firstly, on the N2pc, an ERP waveform 
reflecting the spatial allocation of selective attention (e.g., Eimer, 1996). Second, post-
perceptual processes are reflected by the P300 or P3 component (e.g., Verleger, Jaśkowski, & 
Wascher, 2005).  
The N2pc is one component in the ERP which reflects observers’ allocation of visual 
selective attention (e.g., Eimer, 1996). It is extracted from the ERP by subtracting the activity 
ipsilateral from those contralateral relative to the position of a change about 200 to 300 ms 
after stimulus onset. The N2pc indicates that observers’ have directed their selective attention 
to a particular location in space (Eimer, 1996; Luck & Hillyard, 1994a, 1994b). Initially 
investigated in visual search studies, it was suggested to reflect the selective processing or 
attentional filtering of target stimuli (e.g., Eimer, 1996; Luck & Hillyard, 1994a, 1994b; 
Woodman & Luck, 1999, 2003). For example, Eimer (1996) investigated the conditions under 
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which an N2pc component is observable. A lateral target stimulus was presented among a 
varied number of distractors in a visual search task. An N2pc was elicited by the target in 
three different conditions: when the target (a letter) differed in its form with respect to the 
distractors (line patterns), when the target (blue or green) was distinguishable with regard to 
color from the irrelevant stimuli (yellow), and even when the target (a position word, e.g. left) 
differed in its semantic meaning from the distractors (a color word, e.g. white). The N2pc also 
mirrors effects of bottom-up and top-down mechanisms on the allocation of attention (e.g., 
Zhao et al., 2011; Mazza, Turatto, & Caramazza, 2009). Bottom-up influences mainly become 
visible in the latency and/or the amplitude of the N2pc component (e.g., Mazza et al., 2009), 
whereas top-down mechanisms are reflected by the N2pc amplitude only (Eimer & Kiss, 
2008, 2010; Kiss & Eimer, 2011).  
The attentional processing of targets in visual search is very similar to attentional 
change processing (Busch, Fründ, & Herrmann, 2010). For example, in the context of change 
detection, the N2pc component was analyzed while participants had to detect and 
subsequently to identify changing objects, e.g. an umbrella or a watering can (Busch, Fründ, 
et al., 2010). An N2pc was only elicited when the identity of the objects could be correctly 
reported, whereas it was absent when changes remained completely unnoticed. This 
observation is in line with the majority of studies that found an N2pc for stimuli reaching 
visual awareness, e.g. when participants reported changes of facial expressions (Eimer & 
Mazza, 2005), of simple bars (D. Schneider, Beste, & Wascher, 2012), or of colored dots 
(Schankin & Wascher, 2007). Few researchers have shown that an N2pc of a smaller 
amplitude may also occur in undetected changes (Schankin & Wascher, 2007, 2008; 
Schankin, Hagemann, & Wascher, 2009), whereas others could not replicate this finding (e.g., 
Busch, Dürschmid, & Herrmann, 2010; Eimer & Mazza, 2005). It was suggested that the 
N2pc can be seen as an indicator of an attentional process that is necessary for awareness 
(Schankin & Wascher, 2008; Schankin et al., 2009).  
Effects of post-perceptual stimulus processing are reflected by relatively late ERP 
components. The P3 is a peaking positivity about 300 ms after stimulus onset with a large 
amplitude. It was first described by Sutton, Braren, Zubin, and John (1965) as reaction to an 
unexpected task-relevant event. A distinction can be made between two subcomponents of the 
P3: the novelty P3 and the classical P3b (e.g., Comerchero & Polich, 1999; Courchesne, 
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Hillyard, & Galambos, 1975; Polich, 2007). The novelty P3, which is maximal at 
frontal/central electrodes, reflects the attention-driven evaluation of new stimuli and is 
typically elicited when new stimuli, e.g. deviant letters, are presented among standard stimuli 
(e.g., D. Friedman, Cycowicz, & Gaeta, 2001). In contrast, the P3b, which has a maximal 
amplitude at parietal and central midline scalp sites, is enhanced for deviant stimuli, actively 
searched for by the observer (e.g., Polich, 2007). This component, which is in the focus of the 
present work, will be referred to as P3. The oddball-paradigm, i.e. when an infrequent target 
stimulus is presented among a sequence of other irrelevant stimuli, is a typical P3 eliciting 
paradigm (cf. Polich, 2003). Moreover, the P3 is also evoked by a variety of different tasks 
(cf. Kok, 2001), e.g., by single-stimulus paradigms (e.g., Polich & Heine, 1996), by 
recognition tasks (e.g., Courchesne, Courchesne, & Hillyard, 1978), or by complex perceptual 
operations (e.g., Ullsperger, Metz, & Gille, 1988). The P3 has most commonly been 
interpreted as reflecting context or working memory updating (e.g., Donchin & Coles, 1988; 
Verleger, 1988). Moreover, its amplitude size is influenced by the meaning of the eliciting 
stimulus, i.e. by the emotional value, by task difficulty, or by interacting effects of stimulus 
probability and task relevance (Kok, 2001). More recently, it has been stated that it reflects a 
memory process, elicited by stimulus evaluation, necessary for a behavioral response, which 
helps to transform a decision into action (Kok, 2001; Verleger et al., 2005).  
In the context of change blindness, a greater P3 amplitude reflects successful change 
detection, as indicated by a variety of studies (Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2003; L. Li, Gratton, 
Fabiani, & Knight, 2013; Niedeggen, Wichmann, & Stoerig, 2001; Polich, 2007; Turatto, 
Angrillia, Mazza, & Driver, 2002). For example, when participants had to detect visual 
changes to letters either in identity or in position, the detection of a change was accompanied 
by an enhanced positivity in the P3 latency range, whereas for undetected or no changes no 
such effect was recorded (Niedeggen et al., 2001). This change blindness effect on the P3 
amplitude was also replicated in similar research (e.g., Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2003). It was 
concluded that the P3 component mirrors late processes of change evaluation, necessary for 
ongoing decision making and action planning, e.g., of the communication of the detected 
change (cf. Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2003). In accordance with this, O'Connell et al. (2012) 
investigated the role of the P3 component and the formation of decisions via accumulated 
perceptual evidence. Participants were asked to detect gradual reductions in contrast of a 
continuously presented flickering annulus. ERP analyses showed a single, centro-parietal 
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positivity which grew in amplitude with accumulating sensory evidence and peaked 
simultaneously when participants responded. The amplitude of this positivity increased with 
higher change detection probability. The authors concluded that the positivity, which can be 
equalized with the P3 component, mirrors a goal-oriented decision making process, 
determined by threshold-bound accumulation of perceptual evidence. 
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You have your way. I have my way. As for the right way,  
the correct way, and the only way, it does not exist.  
Friedrich Nietzsche 
5 Individual differences 
What makes a person individual? Individuality can be described as “the particular 
character or aggregate of qualities that distinguishes one person or thing from others” 
(Individuality, n.d.). Within a scientific context, McAdams (1995) provided a theoretical 
framework for an exhaustive overview of individual differences. He suggested that individual 
differences are based on three different, but loosely related levels that help to define 
individuality of a person. The first level includes traits hinting at a dispositional portion of 
individual differences. The second level covers personal concerns, e.g., personal values and 
motivational goals, defense, or coping strategies, specific abilities in a certain domain, 
missions in life, or values that have to be related to the time in which the person lives and his 
or her cultural background. Level one (traits) and two (personal concerns) can be generalized 
to all societies. In contrast, level three describes the individuality and the history of a person, 
mainly relevant for adulthood and almost exclusively characteristic of Western adults. In sum, 
identity is considered as unique, purposeful, and meaningful, based on a life story which 
integrates the past, present, and anticipated future.  
No description of a person is complete without describing the trait level (McAdams, 
1995). Allport (1937/1961) established the concept trait in psychology. He stressed that a trait 
is characterized by a high generalizability and consistency of behaviour and marked by 
biophysical evidence. Allport’s idiographic view, which focused on the uniqueness of a 
person, was fundamental for still ongoing research on traits. Later approaches dropped the 
somatic basis and emphasized the importance of stability for the description of abstract traits 
(cf. Hagemann & Meyerhoff, 2008). It was stressed that traits include linear, dimensional 
constructs, detached from conditions or context (McAdams, 1995). Consistent traits differ 
systematically across persons and have to be differentiated from states that are 
intraindividually unstable over time, e.g. different levels of fatigue or stress (Cattell, 1973). 
States and traits do not describe two different categories, but opposed poles of one dimension 
(Cattell, 1973). Current approaches agree that a trait can be defined as a variable that is stable 
across time, across different situations, i.e. different states, and across distinct methods (e.g., 
McAdams, 1994, 1995; McCrae & Costa, 2003; Steyer et al., 1992). 
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An attribute can be characterized as a trait when the decomposition of its variance 
relies to a greater portion on differences between persons than between situations (Cattell, 
1973). Structural equation modeling has formalized this consideration (e.g., Hoyle, 1995). To 
improve the understanding of state-trait measurements in psychological measurement, 
research on structural equation modeling was extended to longitudinal data (cf. Hertzog & 
Nesselroade, 1987). In particular, by applying the latent state-trait (LST) theory, it is possible 
to separate effects of the person, of the situation, and of the interaction between the person 
and the situation (Hagemann & Meyerhoff, 2008; Steyer, Schmitt, & Eid, 1999). Following 
classical test theory, the core of LST models is based on two main variance decompositions: 
First, the variances of the manifest variables can be decomposed into the variances of the 
latent states and of the measurement errors. And second, the variances of the latent state 
components can be decomposed into the variances of the latent state residuals and of a latent 
trait. Several repeated measurements are necessary for the separation of trait effects from 
situational effects. Furthermore, so-called latent method factors, which describe the influence 
of different methods, can be integrated into the model. Finally, it is possible to evaluate the 
influence of the trait, of the state, of the method, and of the measurement errors through 
standard LST indices (cf. Deinzer et al., 1995; Steyer et al., 1992). Together, LST theory has 
the advantage that it allows for the description of the latent variables without measurement 
errors or other unwanted influences (cf. Bollen, 1989). 
What do we know about individual differences in change blindness? Past research 
indicates that a majority of persons does not detect visual changes when those co-occur with 
some other visual disturbances, whereas other persons are not change blind (cf. O'Regan et 
al., 1999; Simons & Levin, 1998). It is known that observers extremely overrate their change 
detection performance (Levin, Momen, Drivdahl, & Simons, 2000). This metacognitive error 
is called change blindness blindness. Thus, simply asking persons for their own ability to 
detect changes is not possible; change detection performance has to be measured objectively. 
Therefore, research on individual differences has a high practical relevance, e.g., for driving, 
navigation, or surveillance (cf. O'Regan et al., 1999; Simons & Levin, 1998). A variety of 
heterogeneous studies indicated that individual differences in change blindness are associated, 
e.g. with age (e.g., Caird, Edwards, Creaser, & Horrey, 2005), with dispositional anxiety 
(McGlynn, Wheeler, Wilamowska, & Katz, 2008), expertise (Werner & Thies, 2000), or 
cultural differences (Humphreys, Hodsoll, & Campbell, 2005). For example, older adults 
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detected less gradually appearing changes in driving scenes, that were taken from inside a car, 
than younger adults (Batchelder et al., 2003). Moreover, changes of photographs of womensʾ 
white Caucasian faces were detected faster by white Caucasians than by Indian Asians 
(Humphreys et al., 2005). The latter showed a better change detection performance for 
photographs of womensʾ faces of their own race in comparison to a foreign race. These 
studies serve as first empirical evidence for the existence of individual differences in change 
blindness, assessed with a variety of different experimental methods. Nevertheless, research 
on individual differences in change blindness is still in its infancy. The findings have never 
been put together into a holistic framework. 
Moreover, it is unclear which underlying processes are associated with individual 
differences in change blindness. Former heterogeneous research has shown the existence of 
individual differences in attentional processes. For example, various studies confirm that 
people high in trait anxiety are faster in allocating their selective attention towards threatening 
stimuli than low anxious individuals (e.g., Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998; Byrne & 
Eysenck, 1995; Mogg & Bradley, 2002). According to hypervigilance theory (Eysenck, 
1992), anxious individuals are more distractible by any stimulus compared to nonanxious 
individuals, regardless whether a threat-related, emotional stimulus is presented or not. In the 
context of change detection, individual differences in attentional change processing might 
facilitate or complicate the detection of changes (McGlynn et al., 2008). For example, adults 
with high dispositional anxiety performed worse in detecting changes in real-world scenes 
without a snake when these scenes were preceded by scenes with a snake. According to the 
authors, anxious participants had more difficulties in disengaging their attention from fear 
eliciting scenes than non-anxious participants. Thus, individual differences in the allocation of 
selective attention may guide the way how changes are seen and encoded (McGlynn et al., 
2008). Overall, it has been suggested that, from a theoretical point of view, individual 
differences in change blindness might result from capacity limitations of attention (cf. Cowan, 
2000; Masuda & Nisbett, 2006; Rensink, 2000b; Simons & Ambinder, 2005).  
The spatial allocation of attention is reflected by the N2pc component (e.g., Eimer, 
1996). Also the size of the N2pc amplitude differed systematically between persons. 
Individual differences in the N2pc were mainly investigated in spatial cueing tasks, i.e. the 
occurrence of a target is preceded by a visual cue indicative of the target’s location in the 
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visual field. For example, the N2pc mirrored individual differences in self-esteem (H. Li et 
al., 2012). Participants had to report luminance changes of the fixation cross while social 
rejection cues, i.e. disgust faces, appeared simultaneously. The N2pc amplitude was enhanced 
when social rejection cues were presented for low self-esteemed adults compared to 
participants with high self-esteem. Moreover, in another spatial cueing task, differences in 
trait anxiety were visible in the size of the N2pc amplitude (Fox, Derakshan, & Shoker, 
2008). When pictures of angry faces were presented, the N2pc amplitude was only enhanced 
for highly anxious individuals in comparison to low anxious individuals. To conclude, the 
N2pc amplitude might reflect individual differences in selective attention (cf. Eimer, 1996). 
Second, individual differences were also observed in post-perceptual process. For 
example, past research has presumed a relationship of individual differences in cognitive 
abilities with working memory updating (e.g., Ecker et al., 2010; N. P. Friedman et al., 2006) 
or with working memory capacity (e.g., Ecker et al., 2010; Schmiedek, Hildebrandt, Lövdén, 
Wilhelm, & Lindenberger, 2009). These differences might be associated with individual 
differences in general decision making competencies, even in real-life circumstances (cf. 
Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2007). On a conceptual level, one can say that in 
decision making, evaluative processes require an analysis of the qualitative fit of the decision 
with a specific individual goal in a feedback circuit (Gold & Shadlen, 2007). This 
performance monitoring is also linked to individual learning mechanisms. Furthermore, 
individual experiences or individual memory differences may affect priors and values, which 
themselves have an influence on the decision making process (Gold & Shadlen, 2007). In the 
context of change detection, individual differences in working memory updating or in 
decision making might explain possible differences between persons. 
In line with this, the size of the P3 amplitude, reflecting post-perceptual processes (e.g., 
Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2003), also differed between persons in a multitude of studies. For 
example, in a clinical context, depressed patients showed an increased P3 amplitude 
compared to healthy participants (Kayser, Bruder, Tenke, Stewart, & Quitkin, 2000). The size 
of the P3 amplitude can even be treated as a predictor of a predisposition to alcoholism 
(Porjesz et al., 1998). Moreover, it was related to participants’ personality. For example, the 
size of the P3 amplitude depended on participants’ extraversion (e.g., Brocke, Tasche, & 
Beauducel, 1997; Daruna, Karrer, & Rosen, 1985; Stenberg, 1994). The  relationship of the 
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P3 amplitude with participants’ age is especially well-studied. Across an abundance of visual 
tasks, the P3 amplitude became smaller with increasing age (Fjell & Walhovd, 2003, 2004, 
2005; L. Li et al., 2013; Lorenzo-López, Amenedo, Pascual-Marqui, & Cadaveira, 2008; for a 
review see D. Friedman, 2008). In the context of change detection, it was suggested that for a 
final decision whether a change occurred or not, the starting level of the perceptual 
accumulation process might vary as a function of individual differences (O'Connell et al., 
2012). 
The first main purpose of the present work was to systematically investigate individual 
differences in change blindness. As a second main aim, I intended to explore the underlying 
processes of individual differences in change blindness. Research on neurocognitive 
processes indicates that there are at least two processes which may prevent change blindness: 
the attentional change processing (N2pc) and post-perceptual processes (P3). Increased 
knowledge of these processes would allow for better explanations of change blindness and 
how it can be controlled in real life situations. To address these main research issues, three 
studies were carried out. 
First, attentional processes and post-perceptual processes were fundamentally 
investigated in change blindness. Visual selective attention is necessary for successful change 
detection (e.g., Rensink et al., 1997). Attentional allocation is modulated by stimulus-driven 
bottom-up mechanisms (Jonides & Yantis, 1988) and by goal-directed top-down mechanisms 
(W. Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). The allocation of attention is reflected by the N2pc 
component in the ERP (e.g., Eimer, 1996). It is unclear, however, how attention is allocated in 
change blindness. Therefore, bottom-up mechanisms and top-down mechanisms were 
manipulated separately to investigate the allocation of attention in change blindness and 
change detection, as reflected by the N2pc component (manuscript 1). Also post-perceptual 
mechanisms, i.e. a later phase of stimulus evaluation, necessary for ongoing decision making 
and action planning, play an important role in change blindness (e.g., Koivisto & Revonsuo, 
2003). Post-perceptual processes in change blindness are reflected by the P3 component in the 
ERP (e.g., Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2003). However, how post-perceptual processes affect 
change detection remains questionable (e.g., Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2003). Hence, it was 
analyzed how varying task demands affected post-perceptual processes, as reflected by the P3 
amplitude: In particular, manipulated task demands should affect working memory updating 
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by the encoding of the motion signal of the change (cf. Verleger, 1988) for an aware 
representation of the change or the decision whether a change or not has occurred (cf. 
O'Connell et al., 2012). In this part of the present work, I will anticipate some findings from 
manuscript 3.  
Second, based on these fundamental findings, another study intended to answer the 
question whether systematic individual differences exist in change blindness (manuscript 2). 
This study investigated the trait-like characteristic of individual differences in the sensitivity 
for changes. It was hypothesized that the sensitivity for changes is a consistent trait that can 
be defined as a variable which is stable across time, different situations, and methods (cf. 
McAdams, 1994, 1995). Therefore, the portion of variance which was due to a trait, due to the 
measurement occasion (state), or due to the experimental method was assessed by means of 
latent state-trait models (cf. Steyer et al., 1999). Moreover, it is important to know which 
cognitive processes contribute to individual differences in change blindness. First, it is 
unclear, how exactly spatial attention is allocated in change blindness. Thus, the allocation of 
attention was analyzed, reflected by the N2pc amplitude (cf. Eimer, 1996). In particular, I 
suggested that the effect of individual differences on change detection was biased differently 
by the way how observers search for the change (top-down) and by the number of distracting 
mudsplashes (bottom-up). Second, also post-perceptual mechanisms, as indicated by the P3 
amplitude (cf. Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2003), should contribute to the explanation of individual 
differences in change blindness, e.g. reflecting individual differences in working memory 
updating or decision making (cf. Gold & Shadlen, 2007; O'Connell et al., 2012). In particular, 
individual differences in post-perceptual change processing should be more pronounced in 
highly demanding tasks. 
Third, I intended to apply these observations on individual differences in change 
blindness and their underlying mechanisms to the example of cognitive aging (manuscript 3). 
Former research has consistently reported an age-related decline in change detection (e.g., 
Rizzo et al., 2009). To a certain extent, this age-related decline in change detection 
performance was caused by attentional-processes, as reflected by the N2pc component 
(Wascher, Schneider, Hoffmann, Beste, & Sänger, 2012). It remains unclear, however, how 
differences post-perceptual processes contribute to the explanation of age differences in 
change blindness. Therefore, the present work concentrated on a later stage of change 
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processing. In particular, it was hypothesized that the negative relationship of age and the 
sensitivity for changes depended at least partially on differences in post-perceptual processes, 
as reflected by the P3 amplitude. An additional mediation analysis was performed to 
investigate this research question. 
6 Methods 
A longitudinal design allowed the investigation of the consistency of individual 
differences in change blindness across several measurement occasions. Overall, four 
measurement occasions were conducted. At measurement occasion one, two, and three, 
behavioral data and electrophysiological data were recorded while the change blindness task 
was conducted. At measurement occasion four, however, further measures were collected to 
assess the discriminant validity of the change blindness measures. Manuscript 1 and 
manuscript 2 are based on data from all three measurement occasions, whereas manuscript 3 
refers to data from measurement occasion one only. 
Seventy-four paid (8€/hour) volunteers from a community sample participated at 
measurement occasion one (38 women, 36 men, age between 18 and 73, mean age 40.1 
years). 60 volunteers from the same sample (33 women, 27 men, aged between 18 and 73, 
mean age 40.5 years) participated at all four measurement occasions. However, in manuscript 
1, only participants with at least 30 percent of correctly detected changes (.30 ≤ hit rate ≤ .82) 
were included in the analysis to ensure a high signal-to-noise ratio by averaging across a 
sufficient number of trials for the N2pc per participant.  
In change blindness tasks, it is possible to vary the degree of realism of the presented 
stimuli, depending on the research issue (Rensink, 2002). Simple stimuli are well-suited for 
the research of individual differences in change blindness as unwanted influences of other 
processes, e.g. of knowledge or interest, can be controlled for (cf. Jensen, Yao, Street, & 
Simons, 2011; Rensink, 2002). Moreover, change blindness paradigms may vary with respect 
to the number of repetitions of the change (cf. Rensink, 2002; Simons, 2000). In a forced 
choice / one-shot detection paradigm, the original and the modified scene are only presented 
only (e.g., Phillips & Singer, 1974; Simons, 1996, 2000). Hence, the presentation time of the 
stimuli is controlled and the accuracies for change and no-change trials as well as reaction 
times for correct and incorrect responses can be computed. Furthermore, influences of eye 
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movements, effects of long-term memory are minimalized, and different experimental 
manipulations can easily be compared to each other (Rensink, 2002). In contrast to the use of 
other techniques, e.g. a blank screen, the presentation of mudsplashes, which are presented 
simultaneously with the change, has the advantage that confounding effects of iconic memory 
should stay unaffected (cf. Schankin & Wascher, 2008).  
In the present work, simple stimuli were presented on a computer screen. They 
consisted of 81 dots arranged in a 9 x 9 matrix and presented on a black background. Forty of 
the dots were colored light gray, 40 dots were colored dark gray, and the dot in the center of 
the matrix was colored either green or blue. In a forced choice paradigm, change blindness 
was induced by white squares which served as mudsplashes, whose number (four, six, or 
eight) varied between conditions. An experimental trial is displayed in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Example of an 
experimental trial (taken from 
Bergmann, Schubert, 
Hagemann, & Schankin, 2015). 
After a fixation cross (1000 
ms), matrix S1 appeared 
(400 ms), followed by matrix 
S2 with a possible luminance 
change (100 ms), simul-
taneously with the mudsplashes. 
S2 remained on the screen for 
another 400 ms without 
mudsplashes. Afterwards, 
participants indicated whether 
they had seen a change or not. 
Finally, an inter-trial interval 
(ITI) of 2000 – 3000 ms 
appeared. In this example, six 
mudsplashes were presented. 
Copyright ©2014 by Springer Science 
+ Business Media, adapted with 
permission, license number 
363706025444 and a license for the 
full text from 21st December 2015. 
Each trial began with a fixation cross in the center of the screen, followed by the first 
matrix and then by the second matrix, simultaneously with the mudsplashes. Participants were 
instructed to indicate whether they had seen a possible luminance changes at six predefined 
positions or not by pressing a key. 
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There were four different experimental conditions: First, in the LOW-NUMBER-OF-
MUDSPLASHES condition (also referred to as 4-MUDSPLASH condition in manuscript 2) four 
mudsplashes were presented. Second, the HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition (also 
referred to as 8-MUDSPLASH condition in manuscript 2) included the presentation of eight 
mudsplashes. Third, in the NOT-HIGHLIGHTED condition (also referred to as BASELINE 
condition in manuscript 2) six mudsplashes were shown. Fourth, in the HIGHLIGHTED 
condition, again six mudsplashes appeared and, in addition, change positions were 
permanently highlighted in red color (cf. Figure 1). In manuscript 1 and 3 the four conditions 
were summarized in two different analyses: The manipulation of attentional processes was 
investigated by varying the number of mudsplashes in a bottom-up analysis (LOW-NUMBER-
OF-MUDSPLASHES vs. HIGH-NUMBER OF MUDSPLASHES condition) and by varying highlighted 
change positions in a top-down analysis (NOT-HIGHLIGHTED vs. HIGHLIGHTED condition). 
Similarly, task demands were manipulated: A decreased number of mudsplashes as well as 
highlighted change positions should simplify the task 
EEG was continuously recorded from 25 Ag-AgCl electrodes, placed according to the 
international 10–20 system. During recording, all electrodes (F3, Fz, F4, T7, C3, C4, T8, Tp9, 
Tp10, P7, P3, Pz, P4, P8, PO7, PO8, O1, Oz, O2) were referenced to Cz. Fpz was used as 
ground. The  N2pc was extracted from the ERP by subtracting the activity ipsilateral from 
those contralateral relative to the position of a change. The amplitude was measured as the 
mean activity at posterior electrodes about 300 ms after change onset (cf. Eimer, 1996; Luck 
& Hillyard, 1994a; Schankin & Wascher, 2007, 2008). The P3 amplitude was measured as 
mean activity in the time window from 400 to 600 ms after change onset. Data from a 3 x 4 
electrode grid (F3, Fz, F4; C3, Cz, C4; P3, Pz, P4; O1, Oz, O2) were entered into further 
statistical analyses. 
For the decision whether or not a change has occurred, signal detection theory (Green 
& Swets, 1966) constitutes an appropriate theoretical basis (cf. Gold & Shadlen, 2007). 
Observers’ accuracies in change detection were computed by means of this theory. To 
distinguish between differences in sensitivity and response bias, d’ (= z [p(hit)] – z [p(false 
alarm)]) and c (= -0,5*[z (p(hit)) + z (p(false alarm)]) were computed. Greater values of 
sensitivity d’ show an increased sensitivity for changes. Greater values of response bias c 
indicate a more conservative response behavior compared to a more liberal responding.  
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In manuscript 1 and 3, I will summarize the results by reporting only effect sizes 
calculated by means of Hay’s ω or Cohen’s d. In manuscript 2, several different LST models 
were set up, separately for sensitivity d’, for the N2pc amplitude for detected changes, and for 
the P3 amplitude for detected changes (cf. Steyer et al., 1992). In each LST model, we used 
four manifest variables (LOW-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES, HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES, 
HIGHLIGHTED and NOT-HIGHLIGHTED condition) at three different measurement occasions, 
extended by three method factors (M-1 model; cf. Eid, 2000). Provided that the model fits 
were acceptable, the portion of variances of the manifest variables that are determined by their 
latent components was analyzed with the help of standard LST parameters (cf. Deinzer et al., 
1995; Steyer et al., 1992). First, a coefficient of trait specifity (also referred to as consistency) 
describes the portion of variance which is due to the trait (T) [σ²(T) / σ²(Y)]. Second, a 
coefficient of occasion specifity [σ²(S) / σ²(Y)] includes the influence of the measurement 
occasion (S) and the person-situation interaction. Third, a coefficient of method specifity 
[σ²(M) / σ²(Y)] describes the influence of the experimental method (M) and the person-
method interaction. Fourth, a coefficient of reliability, which reflects the systematic, error-free 
measurement of the latent variables, can be quantified as sum of these measures [σ²(T) + σ²(S) 
+ σ²(M)/σ²(Y)]. For a more detailed description of all data analyses, please see the methods 
and results section of manuscript 1- 3. 
7 Cognitive change processing 
First of all, it was investigated which cognitive processes are fundamental for change 
blindness and change detection. Past research has indicated that both attentional processes 
(e.g., Rensink et al., 1997) and post-perceptual processes (Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2003) play 
an important role in change detection. Thus, a change in one or in both of these processes may 
lead to change blindness. The first aim of the present work was to assess how systematic 
manipulations of these cognitive processes affected change detection. 
7.1 The allocation of attention in change detection and change blindness (manuscript 1) 
First, it was assessed how attention is allocated in change detection and change 
blindness. How stimuli are selected depends on both stimulus-driven bottom-up mechanisms 
and on goal-driven top-down mechanisms (for reviews see, e.g., Burnham, 2007; Corbetta & 
Shulman, 2002). Manipulating the salience of the change (e.g., Rensink, O'Regan, & Clark, 
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2000) or the way how observers search for the change (e.g., Rensink et al., 1997) influences 
change detection. We suggested that varying bottom-up mechanisms and top-down 
mechanisms separately might shed light on the question how attention is allocated in change 
detection and why change blindness occurs. In the present study, it was hypothesized that 
reducing the number of mudsplashes and thus increasing the salience of the change (bottom-
up) as well as guiding observers’ attention onto possible change positions by highlighting 
them (top-down) should increase participants’ sensitivity for changes. These manipulations 
should also be reflected by the N2pc component in the ERP as an indicator of selective 
attention (cf. Eimer, 1996). We suggested that bottom-up and top-down mechanisms tap 
distinct neurocognitive processes. Reducing the number of mudsplashes should prepone the 
N2pc latency and decrease the N2pc amplitude (bottom-up), whereas highlighting change 
positions should only enhance the N2pc amplitude (top-down; cf. Brisson & Jolicœur, 2007; 
Kiss & Eimer, 2011; Mazza et al., 2009). 
The results partially support our suggestions. Figure 2 of manuscript 1 displays the 
mean values and standard errors of the behavioral data. Successful change detection depended 
on both bottom-up and top-down mechanisms. More irrelevant distractors perturbed the 
allocation of attention onto the changes, ω² = .79 (bottom-up). Guiding attention onto the 
change before its occurrence facilitated change detection, ω² = .92 (top-down). 
Figure 4 of manuscript 1 shows the differences waveforms of the N2pc component. An 
N2pc was observable only for detected changes, d = .87 (bottom-up), d = 1.50 (top-down). 
Different features of the N2pc were reflected by the experimental manipulation. Thus, 
different mechanisms of attentional allocation were affected. The N2pc peak latency, ω² =.15, 
and the onset latency, ω² = .14, were delayed when the number of mudsplashes increased 
(bottom-up). Highlighted stimuli elicited an N2pc component with earlier peak latency, 
ω² = .37, and greater amplitude, ω² = .13 (top-down). Together, the selection function of 
visual attention is explainable by limitations in capacity and/or in time. Bottom-up influences 
are only affected by the speed of the attention that is allocated onto a change. However, top-
down mechanisms that also affect the speed of information processing may additionally 
decrease the effort which is necessary to allocate attention onto the change (cf. Gazzaley et 
al., 2008). It is still unclear, however, how ongoing post-perceptual processes influence 
change detection.  
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7.2 Post-perceptual change processing 
Second, it should be explored how post-perceptual processes, i.e. a late phase of change 
processing, necessary for ongoing decision making and action planning (Koivisto & 
Revonsuo, 2003), were affected in a change blindness task. Post-perceptual change processing 
is reflected by the P3 amplitude in the ERP (Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2003). In the preceding 
study, we could show that more distracting mudsplashes or highlighted change positions in 
comparison to not-highlighted positions led to an increased sensitivity for changes. Thus, the 
difficulty of the task and therefore task demands were successfully manipulated by varied 
characteristics of the stimuli (cf. Pringle, Irwin, Kramer, & Atchley, 2001). We hypothesized 
that task demands had an effect on post-perceptual processes. In particular, less mudsplashes 
as well as highlighted change positions should lead to an increased sensitivity for changes, 
reflected by a larger P3 amplitude (cf. L. Li et al., 2013; Pringle et al., 2001; Verleger, 1988). 
The results show that the P3 amplitude was greater for detected changes than for 
undetected changes reflecting an aware change detection (cf. Eimer and Mazza 2005; 
Koivisto and Revonsuo 2003; Schankin and Wascher 2007; Turatto et al. 2002). This change 
blindness effect of the P3 amplitude was enhanced when task difficulty was easier, i.e. for 
highlighted change positions in comparison to not-highlighted change positions, ω² = .12, and 
when the number of mudsplashes was reduced, ω² = .01. Moreover, the P3 amplitude, which 
was averaged across detected, undetected, and no changes, was increased when change 
positions were highlighted in comparison to not-highlighted change positions, ω² = .23. And it 
was greater when the number of mudsplashes was decreased, ω² = .12. In line with former 
research, we conclude that the size of the averaged P3 amplitude decreased with task 
difficulty, reflecting working memory updating (e.g., Verleger, 1988), possibly elicited by the 
transient motion signal of the change, or a goal-oriented aware decision process whether or 
not a change has occurred, determined by threshold-bound accumulation of perceptual 
evidence (O'Connell et al., 2012). Together, two processes were identified which were 
manipulated by the present change blindness task:  attentional processes and post-perceptual 
processes. It is still, unclear, however, how these processes contribute to individual 
differences in change blindness. 
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8 Interindividual differences in change detection and change blindness (manuscript 2)  
The second main aim of the present work was to assess whether individual differences 
in change blindness are a trait-like characteristic. A trait can be defined as a variable which is 
independent from the situation and the measurement method (e.g., McAdams, 1994, 1995). 
Methodological influences, e.g., different experimental conditions, situational variations, e.g. 
observers’ varying degree of fatigue, or unsystematic measurement errors, i.e. random 
mistakes, may also contribute to individual differences in change detection. So far, no attempt 
has been made to integrate these assumptions into a single explanation. With the help of LST 
models, the trait specific variance of the sensitivity for changes, of the situation, of the 
method, and of measurement errors were estimated (cf. Steyer et al., 1992).   
The first aim of the present work was to assess whether the sensitivity for changes was 
a trait. The LST model for sensitivity d‘ we set up fitted well with the data, χ²(60) = 72.6, 
p = .128, CFI = .74, RMSEA= .06. Figure 2 displays this model. 
 
Figure 2. Latent state-
trait model for sensitivity 
d’. The variance of the 
observed variables in the 
four conditions (Low 
Muds = LOW-NUMBER-
OF-MUDSPLASHES 
condition, High Muds = 
HIGH-NUMBER-OF-
MUDSPLASHES condition, 
Not High = NOT-
HIGHLIGHTED condition, 
High = HIGHLIGHTED 
condition) was 
decomposed into 
situation (S1–S3), method 
(M1–M3) and 
measurement error (e). 
The variance of the 
situations was 
decomposed into state 
residuals (SR1–SR3) and 
into the latent trait (Trait 
d’). 
Together, the results show that the sensitivity for changes is a stable trait, i.e. a person 
is consistently able to detect changes better than others, across different situation and 
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measurement methods. 63% to 86% of the variance in the manifest measure of the sensitivity 
for changes was due to consistent individual differences in a latent trait (except for the 
HIGHLIGHTED condition). 0% to 14% of the variance was due to the situation, 0% to 10% of 
the variance was explainable by the experimental method, and 2% to 23% of the variance was 
attributable to measurement errors (cf. Table 6 in manuscript 2 for standard LST parameters). 
Trait specifities were comparable to the Big Five personality traits (cf. Deinzer et al., 1995). 
Low effects of the situation are attributable to observers’ varying degree of motivation or 
fatigue (cf. Sänger & Wascher, 2011).The increased effect of the experimental method can be 
explained by a decreased task difficulty due to differences in attentional and post-perceptual 
processes (for a discussion see below). Low method specifities and high reliabilities suggest 
that technical measurement problems played a subordinate role for the assessment of 
individual differences in change blindness. Moreover, the sensitivity for changes showed a 
convergent and discriminant validity with respect to standard measures of personality and 
intelligence. One exception here is a small positive association between individual differences 
in the sensitivity for changes and general intelligence. This finding may tentatively suggest 
that measures of individual differences in change blindness and intelligence tap at least in part 
the very same cognitive process. 
Second, another purpose of this study was to assess which neurocognitive processes 
contributed to individual differences in change blindness. Therefore, it was analyzed whether 
individual differences in successful change detection were associated with attentional 
processes (N2pc) or post-perceptual processes (P3). We set up two LST models, separately 
for the N2pc amplitude and for the P3 amplitude changes (please see manuscript 2 for figures 
of the LST models). Both LST-models were accepted as they fitted (marginally) with the data 
(N2pc, χ²(61) = 65.9, p = .311, CFI = .95, RMSEA = .04; P3, χ2(57) = 94.4, p = .001, 
CFI = .95, RMSEA = .11).  
When attentional processes were analyzed, 11% to 46% of the variance in the manifest 
measure of the N2pc was due to individual differences in a latent trait. 22% to 29% of the 
variance was explainable by the experimental method, but only when attention was guided 
onto possible changes in a top-down way in the HIGHLIGHTED condition (in all remaining 
conditions the method specifity was zero). Moreover, a positive relationship between 
individual differences in the N2pc and in the sensitivity for changes was found, r = -.49. 
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These findings suggest that individual differences in the allocation of selective attention 
contribute to individual differences in change detection (cf. Eimer, 1996). In particular, the 
effect of individual differences in the sensitivity for changes was decreased when observers’ 
attention was guided onto potential changes in a top-down way.  
When post-perceptual processes were analyzed, 46% to 83% of the variance in the 
manifest measure of the P3 amplitude was due to consistent individual differences in a latent 
trait. 8% to 9% of the variance was explainable by the experimental method, but only when 
task difficulty was very low in the HIGHLIGHTED condition (in all remaining conditions the 
method specifity was zero). There was a positive relationship between individual differences 
in the P3 and in the sensitivity for changes, r = .41. Thus, post-perceptual cognitive processes 
are also related to individual differences in change detection. In particular, the influence of 
individual differences in the sensitivity for changes was slightly decreased when the task was 
easiest in the HIGHLIGHTED condition.  
Moreover, a stepwise regression indicated that the inclusion of the N2pc amplitude as a 
first predictor allowed explaining 19 % of the variance in the sensitivity for changes, whereas 
the amount of explained variance increased significantly to 29% after inclusion of the P3 
amplitude as a second predictor. This observation suggests that the N2pc and the P3 
component essentially tap distinct neurocognitive processes which both contribute to and 
amplify the individual sensitivity for changes.  
In sum, the preceding section of the present work showed that a) individual differences 
in the sensitivity for changes are due to a trait, i.e. that one person is systematically more 
sensitive to detect changes than another person, across different situations and methods, b) 
that these individual differences in change detection are explainable to a great extent by 
attentional processes and by post-perceptual processes, c) that the influence of individual 
differences on the sensitivity for changes decreases when observers’ attention is guided onto 
possible changes in a top-down way, and d) that individual differences in the sensitivity for 
changes are also less pronounced when decision making whether or not a change has occurred 
is easier (cf. Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2003; O'Connell et al., 2012). Next, I will apply these 
observations to the example of cognitive aging.  
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9 Individual differences in change blindness due to cognitive aging 
In Germany, it has been discussed for years whether older adults should pass a second 
late driving test (e.g., Stockburger, 2012). It is well known that with increasing age people 
have more difficulties to drive a car safely. In driving, the detection of changes, e.g. of traffic 
signs or of the oncoming traffic, plays an important role. This example illustrates that 
cognitive aging might also be related to increased change blindness. Indeed, empirical 
evidence indicates that older adults have more difficulties in detecting changes than younger 
adults (e.g., Rizzo et al., 2009). This might be due to a variety of impaired cognitive 
operations, which are associated with advanced age (Craik, 1994). Behavioral studies 
revealed that cognitive functions, such as selective attention, inhibitory control of distracting 
inferences, a less efficient working memory, or a decreased working memory capacity 
deteriorate with normal aging (D. Friedman, 2008; Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Craik & Salthouse, 
2008; Dempster, 1992; Dobbs & Rule, 1989). For example, older adults have difficulties in 
ignoring irrelevant stimuli (Kok, 2000). This reduced inhibitory control may also contribute to 
an age-related decrease in the efficiency of working memory operations (Hasher & Zacks, 
1988). Past research recorded a cognitive decline from the age of 60 in several working 
memory operations, e.g., in digit span forward or backward tasks reflecting working memory 
storage capacity (Dobbs & Rule, 1989). This age-related decline was also explained by a 
reduced flexibility of cognitive processing operations (Dobbs & Rule, 1989). 
In the context of change detection, it remains unclear, however, which specific 
processes underlie the age-related decrease in change detection performance. Theoretically, a 
change in any or all cognitive processes may lead to a decline of change detection 
performance in normal aging. In the present work, I will focus, firstly, on age differences in 
attentional processes, and second on age differences in post-perceptual processes in change 
blindness. 
9.1 Age-related differences in the attentional change processing 
The enhanced liability to change blindness in older adults (e.g., Costello et al., 2010; 
Rizzo et al., 2009) might be based on deficits in attentional deficits. Indeed, studies that 
focused on the impact of aging and attentional processes in change detection have shown that 
change blindness increased with age (Caird et al., 2005; Rizzo et al., 2009; Wascher et al., 
 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN CHANGE BLINDNESS                                                               33 
 
 
2012). If spatial attention played an important role in explaining age differences in change 
detection, this should be reflected by the N2pc component. This was the case in a recent 
change blindness study by Wascher et al. (2012). In this study change blindness was induced 
by a short blank between two subsequent visual frames. Two bars presented left and right to a 
fixation cross served as stimuli. A change was defined as following: a) The luminance of one 
bar changed, b) the orientation of one bar changed, c) the luminance and the orientation of the 
same bar changed, and d) the luminance of one bar and the orientation of the other bar 
changed in the perceptual conflict condition. Participants were instructed to press the button at 
the location, either where the luminance change occurred and to ignore the irrelevant 
orientation change in one block, or where the orientation change occurred and to ignore the 
irrelevant luminance change in another block. Only in the perceptual conflict condition an 
N2pc was observable, which was increased toward luminance changes for older adults 
compared to younger adults under both instructions. That is, older adults showed an increased 
attentional orientation towards luminance changes. According to the authors, older adults 
were not capable to compensate their initial attentional distraction by the more salient 
stimulus. They seemed to have more difficulties in maintaining an intentional allocation of 
attention toward relevant characteristics of the stimuli than younger adults. 
9.2 Age-related differences in the P3 amplitude in change blindness (manuscript 3)  
Not only attentional processes, but, also evaluative, post-perceptual processes may 
explain age-related differences in change blindness. However, the effect of aging on post-
perceptual cognitive processes has never been assessed before. Post-perceptual processes are 
reflected by relatively late ERP components, such as the P3 (e.g., Koivisto & Revonsuo, 
2003). The P3 is one component in the ERP, which is consistently affected by age. Across a 
variety of studies, its amplitude was decreased for older adults (e.g., L. Li et al., 2013; 
Lorenzo-López et al., 2008). Therefore, it was concluded that deficits in working memory 
updating cause age-related cognitive dysfunctions, which might also affect ongoing decision 
making and action planning in change blindness. Age differences in the change blindness 
effect on the P3 amplitude, i.e. the difference between detected and undetected changes, 
should mirror differences in post-perceptual processes of conscious change evaluation (cf. 
Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2003). In the present study, a group of middle-aged adults was 
included to analyze a trajectory of age effects in contrast to most previous aging studies. The 
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main aim of the present study was to investigate whether the negative relationship of age and 
the sensitivity for changes was mediated by post-perceptual processes, as reflected by the 
amplitude of the P3. Age-related differences in the sensitivity for changes and in the P3 
amplitude may also depend on task demands, which affected the difficulty of the task (cf. 
paragraph 7.2. of the present work).  
There were two central age-related findings. First, behaviorally, the sensitivity for 
changes decreased only in older age, ω² ≥ .206. (This age difference was visible in particular 
when task demands were lowest, i.e. when change positions were highlighted. Presumably, 
older adults benefited less from highlighting change positions than middle-aged or younger 
adults). Electrophysiologically, however, the change blindness effect on the P3 amplitude, i.e. 
the difference between detected and undetected changes, was present in younger participants, 
ω² ≥ .38, but already absent in middle-aged participants, ω² ≤ .01 (cf. Figure 5 of Manuscript 
3; Bergmann et al., 2015). Thus, the interpretation of the P3 effect as reflecting an aware 
identification of the change or processes necessary for the report of a change do not fit the 
data very well. Alternatively, we suggest that this effect on the P3 amplitude can be 
interpreted as reflecting observers’ subjective confidence in their own ratings (cf. Eimer & 
Mazza, 2005). Consequently, younger participants’ increased confidence in their own ratings 
might have caused a greater P3 amplitude in comparison to less confident middle-aged or 
older participants. 
Second, there was no general age-related decline in the P3 amplitude when averaged 
across detected, undetected, and no changes, ω² ≤ .00. That is, a general change in post-
perceptual cognitive processes that are reflected by the averaged P3 amplitude like working 
memory updating (e.g., Verleger, 1988), cannot explain the effect of age on the sensitivity for 
changes. Thus, further cognitive processes may contribute to age differences in change 
detection and change blindness. This hypothesis that that the negative relationship of age and 
the sensitivity for changes was only partially mediated by post-perceptual processes was 
tested in the following paragraph in more detail. 
9.3 Mediation analysis 
To further test the hypothesis whether age differences in the sensitivity for changes are 
mediated by post-perceptual stimulus processing as reflected by the P3 amplitude, we applied 
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a mediation model X ? Z ? Y (Baron & Kenny, 1986). This model indicates that the effect 
of the independent variable (X = age) on the dependent variable (Y = sensitivity d’) is, at least 
to a certain extent, mediated by a third variable (Z = P3 amplitude). Data from Pz were 
entered into this analysis because the effect of change blindness on the P3 amplitude was 
most pronounced at this electrode site. Because post-perceptual processes, as reflected by the 
P3 amplitude, differ between detected and undetected changes (e.g., Koivisto & Revonsuo, 
2003; L. Li et al., 2013; Niedeggen et al., 2001; Turatto et al., 2002), separate mediation 
analyses were performed for the P3 activity in trials in which participants detected changes 
and failed to detect them. We analyzed separately for each experimental condition (i.e., 
BASELINE, 4-MUDSPLASH, 8-MUDSPLASH, and HIGHLIGHTED condition) if the indirect effect of 
age on sensitivity d’ was mediated by the P3 amplitude with bootstrapped confidence 
intervals. This effect is significant if the confidence interval does not include zero. We used 
bootstrapped 95%-confidence intervals (2,000 bootstrap samples), based on a non-parametric 
bootstrap procedure provided in the SPSS script by Preacher and Hayes (2004). 
It should be noted, however, that a bootstrap-based mediation analysis does not take 
into account that models other than a complete or a partial mediation might exist, which could 
provide a better explanation for the observed covariance structure of age, sensitivity, and the 
P3 amplitude. Therefore, the fit of alternative models has to be tested (L. R. James, Mulaik, & 
Brett, 2006). Thus, we combined the bootstrap-based mediation analysis with structural 
equation modeling, following the recommendation of Danner, Hagemann, & Fiedler (2015), 
which is based on work by different other authors (e.g., MacKinnon & Luecken, 2008; 
MacCallum, Wegener, Uchino, & Fabrigar, 1993). With structural equation modeling the 
variances of the observed manifest variables can be decomposed into error-free latent 
variables, measurement errors, and residuals.  
As a first advantage, this approach allows for the representation the dependent variable 
and the mediator as latent variables, i.e. we used one set of variables as indicators of the 
dependent variable and one set of variables as indicators of the mediator and extract a latent 
factor for each of two sets of variables. The advantage here is that, on the one hand, in the 
present study the influence of different experimental conditions on the operationalization of 
sensitivity to changes and on P3-related post-perceptual processes is reduced and, on the other 
hand, measurement errors can be controlled (Bollen, 1989). Second, alternative causal models 
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of the trivariate system can be compared to each other (e.g., MacCallum et al., 1993). 
Statistically implausible models, which do not fit the empirical data, can be excluded  (e.g., L. 
R. James et al., 2006). In the current study, twelve predefined, theoretically plausible effect 
models were computed (cf. Figure 3).  
Thus, the relationship between the latent dependent variable Sensitivity (Y), measured 
by different manifest indicators of the single experimental conditions, the latent mediator P3 
Amplitude (Z), separately for detected or undetected changes, and the manifest independent 
variable Age (X) were assessed. We included only those experimental conditions as indicators 
for sensitivity and P3 amplitude (i.e. BASELINE, the 4-MUDSPLASH, THE 8-MUDSPLASH) which 
became significant in the bootstrap analyses. Age was treated as a manifest, continuous 
variable. We used the generalized least squares discrepancy function (GLS; Hu & Bentler, 
1998), implemented in AMOS 20.0 (Arbuckle, 2006) to estimate the model parameters. 
 
Figure 3. The twelve predefined effect models (cf. Danner et al., 2015). 
Overall, five missing values were replaced by the mean of the respective condition. The 
critical ratio and its standard error were used to assess the significance (α ≤ .05) of each model 
parameter. The general model fit was evaluated with the χ2 statistic, the comparative fit index 
(CFI; Bentler, 1990), and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA; Browne & 
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Cudeck, 1992). Finally, we compared nested models with χ2 difference scores to identify the 
model with the best fit (Danner et al., 2015). 
First, we analyzed with bootstrapped confidence intervals if the effect of age on the 
sensitivity for changes was mediated by the P3 amplitude X ? Z ? Y (Preacher & Hayes, 
2004). Eight analyses were computed with age (X) as independent variable, sensitivity for 
changes (Y) as dependent variable, and P3 amplitude (Z) as mediator, separately for each 
experimental condition and separately for detected and undetected changes (i.e., four analyses 
for detected changes: BASELINE, 4-MUDSPLASH, 8-MUDSPLASH, and HIGHLIGHTED condition; 
four analyses for undetected changes: BASELINE, 4-MUDSPLASH, 8-MUDSPLASH, HIGHLIGHTED 
condition). If the effect was significant, the respective condition has been used as an indicator 
in the following structural equation modeling. For detected changes, the effect was significant 
in the BASELINE condition, CI = [-.0091; -.0005], in the 4-MUDSPLASH condition, CI = [-.0188; 
-.0039], and in the 8-MUDSPLASH condition, CI = [-.0137; -.0010]. In the HIGHLIGHTED 
condition, however, no effect was observed, i.e., the confidence interval included zero, 
CI = [-.0065; .0026)]. For undetected changes, however, there was only a significant effect in 
the 4-MUDSPLASH condition, CI = [-.0129; -.0004], whereas it did not reach significance in the 
BASELINE condition, CI = [-.0084; .0000], in the 8-MUDSPLASH CONDITION, CI = [-.0063; 
.0004], and in the HIGHLIGHTED condition, CI = [-.0042; .0004)]. In summary, we found an 
effect in three experimental conditions (i.e. BASELINE, 4-MUDSPLASH, and 8-MUDSPLASH 
condition) for detected changes, whereas we only found an effect in the 4-MUDSPLASH 
condition for undetected changes.  
Because the bootstrap-based mediation analysis only tests for a complete or partial 
mediation, which might not fit the empirical data best, alternative models were assessed by 
structural equation modeling (cf. Figure 6). As the analysis of underlying effect models with 
latent variables requires at least two manifest indicators for each latent variable, only models 
for detected changes, but not for undetected changes were specified. The latent variable 
Sensitivity was decomposed into three manifest indicators, into three measurement errors that 
are specific for each indicator, and, in the case that Sensitivity was regressed on the P3 
Amplitude or on Age, into a latent residual. Because no mediation effect was observed in the 
bootstrap analysis of the highlighted condition, this condition was excluded from structural 
equation modeling. Consequently, only the following indicators of Sensitivity remained in the 
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model (cf. Figure 7): mean sensitivity d’ of the Baseline Condition (Y1), the 4-Mudsplash 
Condition (Y2), and the 8-Mudsplash Condition (Y3). Similarly, the latent variable P3 
Amplitude was decomposed into three manifest variables, into three measurement errors, and, 
in the case that the P3 Amplitude was regressed on Sensitivity or on Age, into a latent 
residual. Hence, for the P3 Amplitude, the Baseline Condition (Z1), the 4-Mudsplash 
Condition (Z2), and the 8-Mudsplash Condition (Z3) were set up as indicators.  
We followed the recommendations by Danner et al. (2015) and relaxed four path 
coefficients, first, between the mediator P3 Amplitude and its indicators 4-Mudsplash 
Condition and 8-Mudsplash Condition and, second, between Sensitivity and its indicators 4-
Mudsplash Condition and 8-Mudsplash Condition. All other path coefficients were set to one. 
As a consequence of insignificance, the variance of the measurement error of the P3 
amplitude for the 4-Mudsplash Condition (ε2) in all models was set to zero. 
In structural equation modeling some models are statistically but not theoretically 
plausible. Therefore, researchers always have to take into account which models can be 
excluded solely based on theoretical arguments (Danner et al., 2015). Table 1 shows the 
model fits of twelve predefined effect models. 
In the current experiment, participants always behaviorally responded after the 
occurrence of the P3 amplitude in the event-related potential. Thus, it seems plausible that 
cognitive processes, reflected by the P3 amplitude, influence the sensitivity d’ and not vice 
versa. Based on this theoretical assumption, the Single Effect model 5 (Sensitivity ? P3 
Amplitude), the Reflection model, the Common Effect on Z model, and the Inverse Mediation 
model were not considered further. The Partial Mediation model provided the best model fit, 
χ2(13) = 16.9, p = .205, CFI = .937, RMSEA = .064, BIC = 81.4. It differed significantly from 
all remaining models, i.e. the Independence model, ∆χ2Difference(3) = 18.5, p < .001, the Single 
Effect model No. 2 (Age ? Sensitivity), ∆χ2Difference(2) = 14.6, p < .001, the Single Effect 
model No. 3 (Age ? P3 Amplitude), ∆χ2Difference(2) = 18.5, p < .001, the Single Effect model 
No. 4 (P3 Amplitude ? Sensitivity), ∆χ2Difference(2) = 12.9, p = .002, the Complete Mediation 
model, ∆χ2Difference(1) = 7.0, p = .008, the Common Cause model, ∆χ2Difference(1) = 7.6, 
p = .006, and the Common Effect on Y model, ∆χ2Difference(1) = 7.9, p = .005. 
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Table 1. The fit of twelve predefined effect models, analyzed with structural equation 
modeling (cf. Danner et al., 2015). 
No Models χ2 df p CFI RMSEA BIC 
1  Independence Model(X,Y,Z) 35.4 16 .004 .685 .129 87.0 
2  Single effect (X?Y) 31.5 15 .007 .732 .123 87.5 
3  Single Effect (X?Z) 35.4 15 .002 .669 .136 91.3 
4  Single Effect (Z?Y) 29.9 15 .012 .759 .116 85.8 
5  Single Effect (Y?Z) 29.9 15 .012 .759 .116 85.8 
6  Complete Mediation (X?Z?Y) 23.9 14 .048 .840 .098 84.1 
7 Common Cause (X?Z,X?Y) 24.5 14 .039 .829 .102 84.8 
8 Common Effect On Y (X?Y,Z?Y) 24.8 14 .037 .825 .103 85.0 
9 Reflection Model (X?Y?Z) 19.1 14 .163 .918 .070 79.3 
10 Common Effect On Z (X?Z,Y?Z) 29.2 14 .010 .754 .122 89.4 
11 Partial Mediation (X?Z,Z?Y,X?Y) 16.9 13 .205 .937 .064 81.4 
12 Inverse Mediation  (X?Z, X?Y,Y?Z) 16.9 13 .205 .937 .064 81.4 
Note. X = age; Y = sensitivity d‘; Z = P3 amplitude size for detected changes. 
In summary, the Partial Mediation model was the best to explain the underlying 
covariance structure of the independent variable Age (X), the mediator P3 Amplitude (Z), and 
the dependent variable Sensitivity (X). That is, the observed effect of age on the sensitivity 
for changes is partially explained by age differences in post-perceptual processes, as reflected 
by the P3 amplitude. Figure 4 shows the final model. All path coefficients reached 
significance, all ps ≤ .05. 
Together, by means of an additional mediation analysis, we assessed to what extent 
post-perceptual processes (reflected by the P3 amplitude) contributed to age-related 
differences in the sensitivity for changes. This analysis further confirmed the interpretation 
that the P3 amplitude might reflect participants’ confidence in their own ratings. It showed 
that the effect of age on the sensitivity for changes was mediated by the P3 amplitude when 
changes were detected but not when they remained unnoticed. These results are in accordance 
with previous findings. First, the influence of confidence on undetected (or no) change trials 
was smaller than on detected change trials (cf. Eimer & Mazza, 2005). And second, the same  
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Figure 4. Partial 
mediation model. 
Three indicators were 
assessed for the latent 
mediator P3 
Amplitude (Z) for 
detected changes and 
three indicators for 
the latent dependent 
variable Sensitivity 
(Y). Besides, we set 
up the manifest 
independent variable 
Age (X), the residual 
of the P3 Amplitude 
(υ), the residual of 
Sensitivity (ω) and six 
measurement errors 
(ε1-6) (for details see 
text). 
 
authors also reported a relationship between confidence and performance in the change 
blindness task, namely that higher confidence led to a higher accuracy rate in a change 
detection task. However, confidence in change detection can explain only in part the effect of 
age on change detection performance only. Statistically, the partial mediation model fitted the 
observed covariance structure best. Thus, further cognitive processes contribute to age 
differences in change detection and change blindness, possibly attentional processes (cf. 
Wascher et al., 2012). 
Together, the present chapter showed that both attentional processes (cf. Wascher et al., 
2012) and postperceptual processes (manuscript 3) contribute to age differences in change 
blindness. In particular, the age-related decrease in the sensitivity for changes can be partially 
explained by confidence in the own ratings.  
10 Discussion 
 To conclude, the present work was the first to systematically investigate individual 
differences in change blindness in a longitudinal design. The results show a) the existence of 
systematic individual differences in the sensitivity for changes and b) that these differences 
are explainable by two distinct neurocognitive processes to a considerable amount: earlier 
attentional processes (N2pc) and later post-perceptual processes (P3). 
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A first fundamental study investigated the allocation of attention in change blindness. 
This study indicated that selective attention is a capacity-limited emergent property (cf. 
Desimone & Duncan, 1995), which is influenced by both bottom-up (e.g., Jonides & Yantis, 
1988) and top-down mechanisms (e.g., W. Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). Bottom-up 
mechanisms became visible only in the speed of attention (N2pc latency). However, top-down 
mechanisms were observable in both the processing speed (N2pc latency) and, in addition, in 
the amount of attention which was allocated onto the change (N2pc amplitude). Both 
mechanisms enhance the probability for a successful representation of the change in memory 
(Gazzaley, Cooney, McEvoy, Knight, & D'Esposito, 2005). Moreover, task difficulty was 
manipulated to explore how post-perceptual processes affected change detection. More 
mudsplashes as well as not highlighted change positions in comparison to highlighted 
positions led to difficulties in working memory updating (e.g., Verleger, 1988) for an aware 
representation of the change or to a more complex decision making process whether a change 
or not has occurred (O'Connell et al., 2012).  
In a second study, the trait-like characteristic of individual differences in change 
detection and its underlying processes were investigated. The results show that the sensitivity 
for changes is a trait, i.e. one person is consistently more sensitive to changes than another 
person, across time and experimental methods. Moreover, both attentional processes (N2pc 
amplitude) and post-perceptual processes (P3 amplitude) independently contributed to the 
explanation of individual differences in change blindness. Thus, I suggest, firstly, that 
individual differences in change blindness can be attributed to the observersʾ individual 
limitation of attentional capacity (cf. Masuda & Nisbett, 2006; Simons & Ambinder, 2005), 
which varies systematically between persons (e.g., Cowan, 2000; Rensink, 2000b). In contrast 
to bottom-up mechanisms, top-down biased attention reduced the effect of individual 
differences on change detection. Thus, the trait-like characteristic of the sensitivity for 
changes played a more subordinate role in change detection. For example, specific trainings 
(cf. Simons & Ambinder, 2005) might override the trait-specific effect on change detection to 
a certain extent and improve the sensitivity for changes, also for poor performers. Second, 
individual differences in the awareness of change detection are also explainable by 
differences in working memory capacity (cf. Ecker et al., 2010; Nittono, Nageishi, Nakajima, 
& Ullsperger, 1999; Schmiedek et al., 2009), necessary for the processing and evaluation of 
the change for ongoing decision making (Gold & Shadlen, 2007; cf. Koivisto & Revonsuo, 
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2003; O'Connell et al., 2012). The trait-specific influence of the sensitivity for changes was 
decreased when the task was much easier. Therefore, individual differences in the evaluation 
of a change or in decision making are slightly decreased when task demands are low. 
Critically, our model for individual differences in the P3 amplitude fitted only marginally 
with the data. For future research, I recommend manipulating post-perceptual processes 
differently, e.g. by systematically varying working memory load. Confounding effects of the 
attentional manipulation should be reduced that way.  
However, it should be noted that the attentional and post-perceptual change processing 
cannot completely explain individual differences in the sensitivity for changes. Further 
mechanisms could possibly contribute to the ability to detect changes. For example, it might 
be interesting to investigate individual differences not only in the N2pc and P3 amplitude, but 
also in the latency of these components in change blindness. In this way the influence of 
bottom-up biased activation on individual differences in change detection could be analyzed 
in more detail. Moreover, ERP latency measures are associated with general intelligence (e.g., 
Houlihan, Campbell, & Stelmack, 1994; Schubert, Hagemann, Voss, Schankin, & Bergmann, 
2015; Pelosi et al., 1992). Thus, these measures may account for the observed relationship 
between general intelligence and the sensitivity for changes. 
Practical implications of the present findings, e.g. for driving, navigation, or 
surveillance are obvious (cf. O'Regan et al., 1999; Simons & Levin, 1998). It can be 
concluded that (professional) operations demanding on change detection, may distinguish 
between low and high performers in a variety of different situations and across time. This in 
turn has implications for the improvement of the design of visual environments allowing 
changes, e.g. modified signs in road traffic, also to be detected by persons with low change 
detection ability, e.g. by car drivers who have more problems in detecting important changes 
on the road than others. Focusing the drivers’ attention to highlighted dangerous crossings 
before the vehicle passes these or conducting specific driver trainings to enhance drivers’ 
expertise might override the influence of low change detection ability leaving the trait effect 
to play only a subordinate role in safe driving. However, the link between a decision and a 
specific action is not mandatory (Gold & Shadlen, 2007). It is unclear whether the present 
conclusions about post-perceptual processes in the current simple decision making task can be 
transferred to more complex decision making in real-life, i.e. the deliberation of a variety of 
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alternatives (Gold & Shadlen, 2007). Together, further research about the predictive validity 
of change blindness tasks for real-life decision making in change detection is necessary. 
Ultimately, it might be possible to use change blindness tasks for the diagnosis of 
(professional) aptitude of operations demanding the sensitivity for changes, e.g., of surgeons, 
pilots, or truck drivers. 
In a third study, the present findings of individual differences in change blindness were 
applied to the example of cognitive aging. It is well known that with increasing age people 
have more difficulties to detect changes, e.g. in car driving (Caird et al., 2005). Former 
research has shown that attentional processes contribute to age differences in change 
blindness (Wascher et al., 2012). Thus, the current study investigated whether age-related 
individual differences in the sensitivity for changes (e.g., Rizzo et al., 2009) were mediated by 
post-perceptual processes. The results show that post-perceptual processes can explain age 
differences in change blindness in part. The interpretation of the P3 effect as reflecting an 
aware identification of the change or processes necessary for the report of a change did not fit 
the data very well. Therefore, it was interpreted as the observers’ confidence in their own 
ratings (cf. Eimer & Mazza, 2005). In particular, the age-related decline in change detection 
performance was partially due to older adults’ decreased confidence in the own ratings. Only 
in the easiest condition, i.e. when changes were highlighted in red color, the relationship 
between age and the sensitivity for changes was not mediated by post-perceptual processes. 
This is again in line with the observation that individual differences in change blindness are 
most pronounced in more demanding tasks. From a practical point of view, I suggest that a 
regular training of critical situations, e.g. in road traffic, should developed to improve older 
adults’ confidence in their own decision making and strengthen possible compensation 
mechanisms. 
11 Summary and conclusion  
The present work shows the existence of systematic individual differences in change 
blindness. It can be concluded that the sensitivity for changes is a trait. That is, persons differ 
in their ability to detect changes, independent from the situation or the measurement method. 
Moreover, there are two explanations for individual differences in change blindness: a) 
capacity differences in visual selective attention (cf. Cowan, 2000; Rensink, 2000b) that may 
be influenced by top-down activated attention helping to focus attention onto relevant stimuli 
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b) differences in working memory capacity (cf. Ecker et al., 2010) or in decision making (cf. 
O'Connell et al., 2012). In accordance with this, age-related individual differences in the 
sensitivity for changes can be explained by attentional processes (Wascher et al., 2012) and 
by confidence in the own ratings. Together, the present work might form the basis for a more 
application-oriented research on individual differences in change blindness and its underlying 
processes.  
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Abstract 
Visual change detection often fails when observersʾ attention is distracted by some 
other visual disruption in the environment that occurs simultaneously with the change. This 
phenomenon is called change blindness. For successful change detection, selective attention is 
necessary. The aim of the current experiment was to manipulate the allocation of attention in 
change blindness. Therefore, the number of distracting stimuli was varied (bottom-up) or 
possible change positions were highlighted (top-down). Participants were asked to report 
changes of colored dots. The N2pc component in the event-related potential was measured as 
an indicator of the allocation of attention. The sensitivity for changes increased when the 
number of mudsplashes was reduced or change positions were highlighted. Only for detected 
changes, an N2pc was found. The N2pc latency was delayed when the number of 
mudsplashes increased. Highlighted stimuli elicited an N2pc component with earlier latency 
and enhanced amplitude. Together, bottom-up processes become visible in the latency and 
top-down processes are mainly mirrored by the amplitude of the N2pc. That is, successful 
change detection depends on the properties of distracting and changing objects, which 
determine the speed and intensity of the allocation of attention toward a change. 
Keywords: Change blindness, Selective Visual Attention, Bottom-Up, Top-Down, 
N2pc Amplitude, N2pc Latency 
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The allocation of attention in change detection and change blindness 
The limited capacity of the visual system in perceiving and representing the 
environment has been impressively demonstrated by a phenomenon known as change 
blindness—the failure to detect even major changes in scenes when they occur simultaneously 
with other visual disruptions (Simons & Levin, 1997).  
Visual selective attention 
Most researchers agree that visual selective attention is the crucial process underlying 
change detection and change blindness (e.g., Beck, Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 2001; Eimer & 
Mazza, 2005; Rensink, O'Regan, & Clark, 1997; Simons, 2000). It has been shown, for 
example, that a change was detected the better the closer the eyes were to the location of a 
change (O'Regan, Deubel, Clark, & Rensink, 2000). Complementary, directing attention 
toward a change location by a cue presented before the occurrence of a change prevented 
from change blindness (Lamme, 2003). It is unclear however, how exactly visual-spatial 
attention is allocated in change blindness. Therefore, the aim of the present study was to 
investigate which mechanisms had an influence on the allocation of attention in change 
detection and change blindness. First, we show that there are two possible main mechanisms 
that affect the allocation of selective attention (bottom-up bias and top-down bias). Second, it 
is introduced how the allocation of attention in change blindness can be measured by means 
of the N2pc component in the event-related potential (ERP). 
Bottom-up and top-down mechanisms 
Attentional selection leads to faster and / or more accurate stimulus processing. How 
stimuli are selected depends on both a stimulus-driven bottom-up mechanism and a goal-
driven top-down mechanism (for reviews see e.g., Burnham, 2007; Corbetta & Shulman, 
2002). Perceptually salient stimuli attract observers’ attention bottom-up in a fast and 
automatic way, quite independent from observers’ intentions. For example, a unique or 
strikingly colored target in an otherwise homogeneous array of distractors or an object that 
appears suddenly in the visual field capture visual attention (e.g., Jonides & Yantis, 1988; 
Theeuwes, 1994). Attentional allocation is modulated by a top-down mechanism, which is 
deliberate and controlled in guiding attention toward information that is relevant for the 
current individual goal. Thus, contextual information, instructions, observers’ intentions, or 
expectancies bias voluntary control (e.g., Desimone & Duncan, 1995). It should be noted, 
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however, that top-down biased attention may be interrupted by stimulus characteristics 
(Müller & Rabbitt, 1989) as well as that bottom-up mechanisms can be modulated by goal-
oriented processes (Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992).  
In the context of change detection, knowing more about these processes would allow 
better predictions about which changes are perceived and how change blindness could be 
controlled in real life situations. We propose two mechanisms that determine the probability 
of change detection, namely features of the change a) relative to other visual disruptions and 
b) relative to other non-changing objects. In the following, we describe these mechanisms in 
more detail. Usually, changes in the visual environment produce a transient motion signal. 
This signal is so salient that it attracts attention automatically and thus increases the 
probability of an aware representation of the change. If, however, additional visual distractors, 
such as a blank screen (e.g., Rensink et al., 1997; Rensink, O'Regan, & Clark, 2000) or small 
mudsplashes (e.g., O'Regan, Rensink, & Clark, 1999) occur at the same time, the salience of 
the motion signal is reduced. In this case, change detection depends on how the visual 
environment is scanned by the observer. This scanning path again depends on the actual 
salience of a changing object. In this case, however, salience is defined by the similarity of 
the changing object relative to other objects in the environment. The probability that an 
observer directed its attention to the object while it is changing is the higher the more salient 
(i.e. outstanding) an object is. In addition, intentions, motivation, contexts, and previous 
experiences of the observer play an important role. To distinguish between these different 
mechanisms of attentional allocation in the current study, we refer to bottom-up processes 
whenever a process is related to the salience of the change and to top-down processes when a 
process is related to intentions and experiences of the observer. 
There is only some research, which proves the mechanisms of this model. First, the role 
of bottom-up processes becomes apparent when the salience of the change is manipulated. A 
few studies showed that change detection declined when the salience of the change was 
reduced. For example, the salience of the motion signal is smaller when the inter-stimulus 
interval (i.e. the blank) is longer. Accordingly, change detection performance was reduced 
with longer inter-stimulus intervals (Phillips & Singer, 1974). Similarly, observers performed 
worse when the duration of the change itself decreased (Rensink et al., 2000). Furthermore, 
local transient signals of mudsplashes cause a smaller change blindness effect than a global 
transient signal of a blank screen (cf. Rensink et al., 2000). 
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Second, change detection also depends on the way how observers search for a change 
(top-down). The search strategy depends on the task-relevance of objects within a scene. 
Accordingly, changes of objects of central-interest were detected faster than those of 
marginal-interest (e.g., O'Regan et al., 2000; Rensink et al., 1997, 2000). Also the semantical 
meaningfulness of the change to the observer had an impact on attentional allocation (e.g., 
Fletcher-Watson, Leekam, Turner, & Moxon, 2006; Werner & Thies, 2000). For example, 
semantic changes of meaningful football scenes were detected faster than non-semantic 
changes, and more interestingly, football experts were more sensitive to changes in domain-
related, semantic photographs than were novices (Werner & Thies, 2000). Finally, change 
detection performance also improved when attention was guided by a preceding cue which 
points to the change so that observers were able to allocate their attention intentionally to the 
change location (Becker, Pashler, & Anstis, 2000; Lamme, 2003). 
However, this research on bottom-up and top-down processes has some limitations that 
should be noted at this point. First, per definition the salience of the change depends on the 
properties of the distractors (i.e. the visual interruption that occurs simultaneously with the 
change). So far, these bottom-up effects have been investigated either by varying the duration 
of a blank screen (Phillips & Singer, 1974; Rensink et al., 2000) or by comparing the effects 
of local signals of mudsplashes with those of a global signal of a blank screen (Rensink et al., 
2000). These manipulations are confounded, however, with effects of iconic memory which 
provide an alternative explanation for the change blindness effect. When the presentation of 
the screen is interrupted, e.g. by a blank screen, the original image has to be stored in memory 
and finally be compared to the changed image (cf. Schankin & Wascher, 2008; Simons, 
2000). Second, when the transient signal of the change is perturbed, changes are detected only 
when attention is deployed onto the right location (top-down). Most studies that investigated 
top-down processes manipulated observers’ allocation of attention by varying the 
interestingness of the change (e.g., O'Regan et al., 2000) or the semantical importance or 
meaningfulness of the scene (e.g., Werner & Thies, 2000). However, these manipulations are 
confounded with observers’ characteristics, i.e. unwanted influences of long term experiences 
such as knowledge or personal interests. These unwanted influences may affect the focussing 
of attention between observers in an unsystematic way and lead to an underestimation of the 
observed effects of top-down processes on change blindness performance. In summary, it is 
still not fully understood how attention is allocated in change detection and change blindness. 
 
THE ALLOCATION OF ATTENTION IN CHANGE DETECTION AND CHANGE BLINDNESS            A1-6 
 
Therefore, the main purpose of the current study is to investigate the role of bottom-up 
and top-down processes in change detection and change blindness. This research question can 
only be answered if both mechanisms are manipulated separately within an otherwise highly 
similar paradigm. In the current study, we use mudsplashes to induce change blindness, 
whereby iconic memory should be left unaffected. We then manipulate either the number of 
mudsplashes to investigate the relationship between change and other visual distractions or 
highlight potential change positions to investigate the relationship between the change and 
other non-changing objects. First, increasing the number of mudsplashes should only reduce 
the salience of the change and thus diminish a more automatic capture of attention by the 
change. Accordingly, reducing the number of visual distractors should enhance the salience of 
the change and thus lead to an automatic capture of attention by the change. Second, guiding 
observers’ attention onto the change before its occurrence prevents from change blindness 
(Lamme, 2003). Thus, permanently highlighted potential change positions should help 
observers to focus attention already before the occurrence of a change in a top-down way and 
thus reduce effects of change blindness, but without involving observers’ individual 
motivation or expertise. 
The N2pc component 
However, manipulating different mechanisms of attentional allocation experimentally 
results in similar effects on a behavioral level, namely in a variation in change detection 
performance. Thus, it is unclear whether the experimental manipulation indeed tapped into the 
intended mechanism. ERPs allow a more fine-grained analysis of the specific processes 
underlying these effects. One component of the ERP, which is sensitive to the attentional 
selection of visual stimuli, is the N2pc. The N2pc occurs about 200 to 300 ms after stimulus 
onset contralateral to the stimulus location at posterior electrodes. Therefore, this component 
indicates that observers’ directed their attention to a particular location in space (Eimer, 1996; 
Luck & Hillyard, 1994a, 1994b). In change detection tasks, an N2pc is evoked by changed 
stimuli that received some attention. As attention is a prerequisite for visual awareness, an 
N2pc was observed, for example, when participants reported changes in face expressions 
(Eimer & Mazza, 2005), in meaningful objects (Busch, Dürschmid, & Herrmann, 2010), or in 
colored dots (Schankin & Wascher, 2007). 
The N2pc is also sensitive to effects of bottom-up and top-down mechanisms on the 
allocation of attention (e.g., Mazza, Turatto, & Caramazza, 2009; Zhao et al., 2011). So far, 
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these effects were mainly investigated in visual search tasks. In these tasks, participants are 
asked to find a target presented among a number of distractors. First, manipulations of 
bottom-up effects are reflected in a change in amplitude and / or latency of the N2pc 
component. For example, Zhao et al. (2011) manipulated the salience of the target by 
increasing the color disparity between target and distractors. They showed that the N2pc 
amplitude was greater when color disparity was higher, i.e. the salience of the target was 
enhanced. In contrast, differences in color intensity affected the latency but not amplitude of 
the N2pc component, with an earlier onset for more intense stimuli (Brisson, Robitaille, & 
Jolicœur, 2007). Other researchers found that the N2pc component was affected by display 
size and distractor color (Mazza et al., 2009). In particular, the N2pc amplitude was greater 
when the number of irrelevant stimuli was enhanced reflecting the identification of the target 
by its enhancement. Moreover, heterogeneous distractors compared to homogeneous arrays 
caused a smaller N2pc amplitude and a preponed and longer lasting N2pc, reflecting the 
withdrawal of attention before it is shifted to the actual target (Mazza et al., 2009).  
Second, the N2pc component was also modulated when the top-down guidance of 
attention was manipulated. Top-down mechanisms of attentional allocation are reflected by 
the N2pc amplitude. For example, Eimer (1996) investigated whether the attentional 
selection, as reflected by the N2pc component, is biased by bottom-up or top-down processes. 
Participants were asked to search for a target that differed with respect to its form, its color, or 
its word meaning from the distractors. Moreover, in the form and color discrimination task, 
the number of stimuli was varied: Either one target and three distractors or one target and one 
distractor were presented. The N2pc was elicited when the target item did not automatically 
pop out, i.e. when only one distractor was presented, indicating that it was not exclusively 
biased by stimulus-driven bottom-up effects. Most importantly, an N2pc was also elicited by 
the target when target and distractors differed semantically, that is with respect to their word 
meaning, reflecting the top-down controlled enhancement of the target (Eimer, 1996). 
Similarly, when a visual search task was combined with a spatial cueing paradigm, the 
contingency of cue and target was also obligatory for the top-down based elicitation of an 
N2pc component by the target (Eimer & Kiss, 2008, 2010; Kiss & Eimer, 2011). For 
example, in one study participants were asked to search for a small or a large target while 
some medium-sized distractors were presented (Kiss & Eimer, 2011). Before the presentation 
of the search displays, arrays of cues were shown. Uninformative with respect to the 
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succeeding target location, one of their items varied in its size just like the target or was 
entirely absent. When no cue was presented, both small targets and large targets automatically 
elicited an N2pc (bottom-up guided attention). When a cue was shown, however, an N2pc 
was triggered by the target only when the size of the cuing stimulus matched the size of the 
target (top-down guided attention). It was concluded that top-down activity, for example 
search goals and task settings, determined the size of the N2pc amplitude and thus the 
controlled attentional selection of the target (Kiss & Eimer, 2011).  
In summary, bottom-up mechanisms are reflected by the latency and / or amplitude of 
the N2pc component, whereas top-down mechanisms are mirrored by the N2pc amplitude 
only. Whether the latency or the amplitude of the N2pc component is affected by bottom-up 
mechanisms depends on the color disparity between target and distractors (N2pc latency; 
Brisson et al., 2007), on the number of distracting stimuli (N2pc amplitude; Mazza et al., 
2009), and on the homogeneity of the  distractor array (N2pc latency and N2pc amplitude; 
Mazza et al., 2009). 
The present study 
The main aim of the present study is to assess the role of bottom-up and top-down 
guidance of visual-spatial attention in a change blindness paradigm. The way of attentional 
allocation onto the change is manipulated experimentally: On a behavioral level, reducing the 
number of distracting mudsplashes should improve change detection performance because 
observers’ attention should be less distracted from the change location (bottom-up). 
Highlighting potential change positions and thus guiding observers’ attention before the 
occurrence of the change should also increase participants’ sensitivity for changes (top-
down). To assess whether this experimental manipulation indeed taps into different 
mechanisms of attentional allocation the electro-cortical activity is measured. Therefore, the 
N2pc component of the ERP is analyzed as an indicator of observers’ attentional allocation 
(e.g., Luck & Hillyard, 1994a, 1994b). On the basis of previous research we hypothesize that 
the bottom-up capture of attention is reflected by the latency and by the amplitude of the 
N2pc component, whereas top-down mechanisms are only observable in the N2pc amplitude 
(cf. Brisson et al., 2007; Kiss & Eimer, 2011; Mazza et al., 2009). In particular, we 
hypothesize that, firstly, if the number of mudsplashes indeed affects the salience of a change 
so that attention is shifted to the change in a rather bottom-up manner, the N2pc latency 
should be shorter and the N2pc amplitude should be smaller when fewer distracting 
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mudsplashes are presented. Second, if observers are able to focus their attention top-down on 
potential change locations, the amplitude of N2pc component should be larger. 
Methods 
Participants 
Seventy-eight paid (8€/hour) volunteers from a community sample participated in the 
experiment. Participants were recruited via newspaper advertisement and web portals. Only 
participants with at least 30 percent of correctly detected changes averaged across all 
conditions (.30 ≤ hit rate ≤ .82) were included into the analyses to ensure a high signal-to-
noise ratio by averaging across a sufficient number of trials for the N2pc per participant. 
Thus, 31 participants remained in the sample (15 women, 16 men, aged between 18 and 69, 
mean age 35.9 years). Three participants were left-handed, 27 were right-handed and one of 
them was bimanual. All of them reported normal or corrected to-normal vision and had 
normal color vision as measured with the Ishihara test of color blindness. Before the 
experiment started, all participants gave their written informed consent. The study was carried 
out in accordance with the ethical standards laid down in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki 
and its amendments. 
Apparatus & Stimuli 
Participants sat in a comfortable armchair in a sound-attenuated chamber, which was 
dimly lit and electrically shielded. Two keys on a keyboard served as response buttons. The 
left key was marked in red and the right key in green color. They were located under 
participants’ left and right index finger. Stimuli were presented on a 17-in. computer screen, 
placed 82 cm in front of the participants, at the center of their field of vision. The screen was 
set to a resolution of 1280 x 1024 pixels and a screen refresh rate of 60 Hz. 
Stimuli consisted of 81 dots which were arranged in an imaginary 9 x 9 matrix (3.42° x 
3.42° of visual angle) and presented on a black background (L = 0, a = 0, b = 0 in L*a*b color 
space). Forty of the dots were colored light gray (L = 73, a = 0, b = 0), 40 dots were colored 
dark gray (L = 42, a = 0, b = 0), and the dot in the center of the matrix was colored either 
green (L = 34, a = -38, b = 39) or blue (L = 34, a = 58, b = -105). The distance between single 
dots was .10° and their diameter was .28°. The distribution of the light and dark gray dots was 
balanced in the matrix so that accumulations of dots with equal luminance were avoided (cf. 
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Figure 1). In this way, nine matrices were created, which were used for all experimental 
conditions equally often. In Block 3 light red (L = 73, a = 38, b = 42) and dark red (L = 42, 
a = 61, b = 55) dots replaced six of the gray dots (cf. Figure 1). 
White squares (L = 100, a = 0, b = 0) served as mudsplashes, whose number (four, six, 
or eight) varied between conditions. Each mudsplash (.28° x .28°) occluded exactly one gray 
dot. The mudsplashes never appeared in immediate vicinity to each other or to a change. Half 
of the mudsplashes were presented to the left and half to the right visual hemifield. Relative to 
their distance to the center, they were always presented symmetrically, mirrored along the 
vertical axis. Fifteen possible arrangements of their spatial positions were constructed in 
advance and then quasi-randomly ordered per block so that the same arrangement of 
mudsplashes never appeared more than three times consecutively. 
Procedure 
Each trial began with a fixation cross in the center of the screen, which lasted 1,000 ms 
(cf. Figure 1). Then, the first matrix (S1) appeared for 400 ms. Subsequently, the second 
matrix (S2) was presented for 100 ms, simultaneously with the mudsplashes. Then, the 
mudsplashes disappeared and the matrix remained on the screen for another 400 ms. On about 
43% of the trials, S1 and S2 were identical (no change trial), on about 43% of the trials, one 
lateral dot changed its luminance at one of six possible locations (luminance change trial, cf. 
Figure 1), and on about 14% of all trials, the colored dot in the center changed its color (color 
change trial). Color changes were used to keep participants’ attention fixed to the center of the 
screen. These trials excluded from further analyses because in this condition no change 
blindness effect can be observed (cf. Schankin & Wascher, 2008). Figure 1 shows the three 
dots of position 1, 2, and 3, (left hemifield) and the three dots of position 4, 5, and 6 (right 
hemifield). On half of the luminance change trials, the dot changed from dark gray to light 
gray, on the other half from light gray to dark gray. Similarly, on half of the color change 
trials, the central dot changed from green to blue, on the other half from blue to green. 
Finally, an inter-trial interval (ITI) of variable length (2,000 – 3,000 ms) followed. 
Participants were instructed to indicate if they had seen a change or not by pressing the 
green or red key, respectively. The assignment of response keys was counterbalanced across 
participants. It was stressed that they should report a change only when they really saw it, and 
that guessing was not allowed. 
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There were four experimental conditions (cf. Table 1). First, in the LOW-NUMBER-OF-
MUDSPLASHES condition, four mudsplashes were presented. Second, in the HIGH-NUMBER-OF-
MUDSPLASHES condition, eight mudsplashes were shown. Third, in the NOT-HIGHLIGHTED 
condition, six mudsplashes were presented. Fourth, in the HIGHLIGHTED condition, also six 
mudsplashes were presented and in addition, the six possible positions of luminance changes 
were permanently marked in red color.  
These four experimental conditions were presented in three blocks. First, in the 
NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES block, either four (LOW-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition) or 
eight mudsplashes (HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition) were presented 
simultaneously with the change. Second, in the NOT-HIGHLIGHTED block, only the NOT-
HIGHLIGHTED condition was presented. Third, in the HIGHLIGHTED block, only the NOT-
HIGHLIGHTED condition was shown. The NOT-HIGHLIGHTED condition and the HIGHLIGHTED 
condition were presented in separate blocks to exclude interference effects by the highlighted 
change positions on following trials. This separation, however, was not considered necessary 
for the LOW- and HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES conditions, which were presented in one 
block therefore. Within a block, all trials were shown in random sequence with the following 
constraints. At maximum three luminance changes, three no changes, three changes of the 
same (left or right) side or two color changes appeared successively. Furthermore, the same 
matrix never appeared more than three times consecutively. In this way, four different trial 
sequences were created for each block and systematically assigned to participants. Short 
breaks of individual length always appeared after about seven minutes. After each block, there 
was a longer break. 
Overall, three measurement occasions were conducted. On each measurement occasion, 
the experiment started with a short demonstration of all possible changes. On each change 
position, one exemplary change appeared in slowed presentation time and without any 
mudsplashes to ensure that all possible changes had been seen once by the participants. Then 
participants passed a short exercise of 91 trials (42 luminance changes, 42 no changes and 7 
color changes). In the exercise, six mudsplashes were presented. Three experimental blocks 
followed. To prevent sequence effects, the sequential presentation of the experimental blocks 
was varied across measurement occasion.  At measurement occasion one, participants started 
with the NOT-HIGHLIGHTED block, continued with the number of mudsplashes block and 
finished with the HIGHLIGHTED block. On the second measurement occasion, first the 
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HIGHLIGHTED block was presented, then the not HIGHLIGHTED block, and finally THE-NUMBER-
OF-MUDSPLASHES block. Measurement occasion three started with the number of mudsplashes 
block, followed by the HIGHLIGHTED block and then by the NOT-HIGHLIGHTED block.  
Each of the four experimental conditions consisted of 9 (matrices) x [4 (color 
changes) + 12 (luminance changes) + 12 (no changes)] x 3 (measurement occasions) = 756 
trials with 316 luminance changes, 316 no changes and 108 color changes each. Altogether, 
this resulted in 3024 trials per participant. 
EEG Recording 
EEG was continuously recorded from 25 Ag-AgCl electrodes, placed according to the 
international 10–20 system. During recording, all electrodes (F3, Fz, F4, T7, C3, C4, T8, Tp9, 
Tp10, P7, P3, Pz, P4, P8, PO7, PO8, O1, Oz, O2) were referenced to Cz. Fpz was used as 
ground. Vertical electro-oculogram (EOG) was recorded bipolarly from above and below the 
right eye and horizontal EOG from the outer canthi of the eyes. Electrode impedances were 
kept below 5 kΩ. EEG was sampled with a rate of 1000 Hz. The signal was amplified by two 
BrainAmp DC amplifiers (Brain Products, Munich, Germany) with a band-pass of 0.1 –
 250 Hz. Data was filtered off-line with a band-pass filter of 0.1 – 12 Hz and re-referenced to 
linked mastoids. EEG data were segmented into time windows of 1,700 ms, starting 200 ms 
prior to S1 and ending 1,400 ms afterward. Baseline was corrected relative to the activity of 
the interval 200 ms prior to S1 to 0 ms (-600 to -400 ms prior to S2). Ocular artifacts were 
corrected according to the algorithm of Gratton, Coles, and Donchin (1983). Trials with 
amplitudes lower than .5 µV in an interval of 100 ms, exceeding +/- 70 µV, or with a voltage 
step of 100 µV/ms were excluded from the data as artifacts. 
Data Analysis 
Behavioral data. Hits (percentage of correctly detected luminance changes) and false 
alarms (percentage of reported changes on no-change trials) were computed separately for 
each of the four experimental conditions, averaged across all three measurement occasions. 
To distinguish between differences in sensitivity and response bias, d’ and c were calculated 
according to the signal detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966).  
Electrophysiological data. The N2pc was extracted from the ERP by computing the 
ipsilateral and contralateral activity for each of the four experimental conditions. This resulted 
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in eight ERP waveforms per participant. Grand average waveforms were inspected and the 
time window which reflected the maximal moment of contra-ipsilateral difference ± 25 ms 
was defined as measurement window for each condition. Table 1 shows the mean values for 
the N2pc onset and peak latencies and for the N2pc amplitude. The N2pc amplitude was 
measured as the mean amplitude difference between contra- and ipsilateral activity from 290 
to 340 for the LOW-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition, from 340 to 390 for the HIGH-
NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition, from 310 to 360 ms for the NOT-HIGHLIGHTED 
condition, and from 280 to 330 for the HIGHLIGHTED condition, relative to change onset (S2; 
cf. Eimer 1996; Luck & Hillyard, 1994a, 1994b; Schankin & Wascher, 2007, 2008). Data 
from PO7/PO8 were entered into further statistical analyses because the N2pc was maximal at 
these electrode positions. To determine both peak-latencies and 50% onset-latencies, we 
followed the recommendations by Miller, Patterson, and Ulrich (1998) and applied the 
jackknife method. This method estimates the between subjects’ variance by transiently 
excluding each participant from the computation (cf. Miller, Patterson, & Ulrich, 1998). 
Basically, it is based rather on peak detection of grand-average than on single-subject 
waveforms. Thus, it accurately estimates ERP latency differences between experimental 
conditions and has the advantage that it improves the signal-to-noise ratio. 
Statistical Analysis of Bottom-up Effects. Bottom-up processes were investigated by 
manipulating the number of mudsplashes. To assess the effect of bottom-up processes, the 
LOW-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition and HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition 
were compared. Effects on sensitivity and response bias were tested by separate repeated-
measures ANOVAs with the within-subjects’ factor condition (LOW- vs. HIGH-NUMBER-OF-
MUDSPLASHES), for d’ or c, respectively. The effects on the N2pc amplitude were assessed by 
a repeated-measures ANOVA with the within-subjects’ factors condition (LOW- vs. HIGH-
NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES) and change detection (detected vs. undetected). Effects on the 
N2pc latency were assessed on the basis of jackknifed data. Two repeated-measures 
ANOVAs were calculated with the within-subjects’ factor condition (LOW- vs. HIGH-NUMBER-
OF-MUDSPLASHES), separately for the N2pc peak latency and the N2pc onset latency.  
Statistical Analysis of Top-down Effects. The influence of top-down mechanisms on 
attentional allocation was assessed by comparing the NOT-HIGHLIGHTED with the 
HIGHLIGHTED condition. In both conditions, six mudsplashes were presented but potential 
change locations were highlighted or not. A repeated-measures ANOVA was calculated with 
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the within-subjects factor condition (NOT-HIGHLIGHTED, HIGHLIGHTED condition) for d’ or c, 
respectively. Effects of the N2pc amplitude were assessed by a repeated-measures ANOVA 
with the within-subjects factors condition (NOT-HIGHLIGHTED, HIGHLIGHTED condition) and 
change detection (detected, undetected). A repeated-measures ANOVA was calculated with 
the within-subjects factor condition (NOT-HIGHLIGHTED, HIGHLIGHTED condition) for the N2pc 
peak latency or the N2pc onset latency, respectively.  
All F-values of the ANOVAs on jackknife data were adjusted (Ulrich & Miller, 2001). 
Moreover, all statistics were adjusted by Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon correction for 
nonsphericity if the number of factor levels exceeded two. In this case, uncorrected degrees of 
freedom but corrected p values are reported. If indicated, additional post hoc analyses were 
calculated. In case of multiple comparisons, p was adjusted according to Bonferroni. Effect 
sizes were calculated by means of Hay’s ω or Cohen’s d. 
Results 
Bottom-up Effects on Change Detection  
Bottom-up processes of attentional selection were manipulated by the number of 
mudsplashes (four vs. eight mudsplashes). We hypothesized that the sensitivity for changes 
enhances with decreasing number of mudsplashes because observers’ attention should be less 
distracted from the change location. This effect should be reflected by the amplitude and 
latency of the N2pc component. 
Behavioral data. In the LOW-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition, participants 
detected 51.0% (SEM = 2.9%) of the luminance changes and responded correctly to 96.2% 
(SEM = .7%) of the no changes. In the HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition, they 
detected 35.6% (SEM = 2.7%) of the luminance changes and rejected 95.5% (SEM = .7%) 
correctly as no changes. With increasing number of mudsplashes, participants were less 
sensitive for changes, F(1,30) = 112.1, p < .001, ω² = .79, and responded more conservatively, 
F(1,30) = 46.8, p < .001, ω² = .60 (Figure 2). However, sensitivity d’ and response bias c were 
not related to each other in both conditions, as indicated by insignificant correlations (LOW-
NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES: r = -.19, p = .300; HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES: r = .03, 
p = .892). 
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Electrophysiological data. Figure 3 shows grand-averaged ERP waveforms evoked by 
the second stimulus display at posterior electrodes (PO7/PO8) contralateral and ipsilateral to 
the side where the change was presented, separately for detected and undetected changes. In 
Figure 4, difference waveforms of the N2pc are displayed. 
The amplitude of the N2pc differed between detected and undetected changes, as 
indicated by a main effect of change detection, F(1,30) = 17.5, p < .001, ω² = .36. The N2pc 
did not differ in its amplitude when the number of mudsplashes changed. That is, the main 
effect of condition was not significant, F(1,30) < 1.0. The interaction of condition and change 
detection did not reach significance, F(1,30) < 1.0. Next, it was tested whether the N2pc 
component was observable for undetected changes at all. A t-test showed that an N2pc was 
only present for detected changes, t(30) = 5.0, p < .001, d = .87, but absent for undetected 
changes, t(30) < 1.0. Thus, the following analyses refer to detected changes only. Both the 
peak latency, Fc(1,30) = 6.2, p = .019, ω² =.15, and the onset latency, Fc(1,30) = 5.7, p = .023, 
ω² = .14, were delayed with a larger number of mudsplashes. 
Top-down Effects on Change Detection 
The influence of top-down processes on change blindness and on the N2pc component 
was assessed by comparing the NOT-HIGHLIGHTED with the HIGHLIGHTED condition. We 
hypothesized that when change positions are permanently highlighted, observers should be 
more sensitive to changes because they should be able to better focus their attention on 
potential change locations. This effect should be reflected by the N2pc amplitude only. 
Behavioral data. In the HIGHLIGHTED condition participants responded correctly to 
87.5% (SEM = 1.9%) of the luminance changes and to 96.9% (SEM = .6%) of the no 
changes. In the NOT-HIGHLIGHTED condition participants responded correctly to 46.3% 
(SEM = 2.5%) of the luminance changes and to 93.7% (SEM = 1.2%) of the no changes.  
Comparing both conditions, participants were more sensitive, F(1,30) = 352.2, p < .001, 
ω² = .92, and responded more liberally when potential change positions were permanently 
highlighted in red color, F(1,30) = 56.7, p < .001, ω² = .65. However, sensitivity d’ and 
response bias c were not related to each other in both conditions, as indicated by insignificant 
correlations (NOT-HIGHLIGHTED condition, r = .27, p = .142; HIGHLIGHTED condition, r = -.13, 
p = -.488). 
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Electrophysiological data. The amplitude of the N2pc differed between detected and 
undetected changes, as indicated by a significant main effect of change detection, 
F(1,30) = 42.2, p < .001, ω² = .58. The main effect of condition was marginal significant, 
F(1,30) = 3.7, p = .065, ω² = .08. However, the interaction of condition and change detection 
was significant, F(1,30) = 4.6, p = .040, ω² = .11. Post hoc tests indicated that the N2pc 
amplitude for detected changes was enhanced for highlighted change positions compared to 
not highlighted change positions, F(1,30) = 11.5, p = .004, ω² = .13. For undetected changes, 
however, no difference between both conditions was observed, F(1,30) < 1.0. Next, it was 
tested whether the N2pc component was elicited by undetected changes at all. A t-test showed 
that an N2pc was only present for detected changes, t(30) = 8.3, p < .001, d = 1.50, but absent 
for undetected changes, t(30) < 1.0. Thus, the following analyses of the N2pc refer to detected 
changes only. The N2pc peaked earlier when positions were highlighted, Fc(1,30) = 18.7, 
p < .001, ω² = .37, whereas the effect on the onset latency did not become significant, 
Fc(1,30) < 1. 
Discussion 
Previous research has shown that changes in our visual environment are detected only 
when they receive some attention (e.g., Beck et al., 2001; Eimer & Mazza, 2005; Rensink et 
al., 1997; Simons, 2000). The allocation of visual selective attention is biased by two 
mechanisms, a stimulus-driven bottom-up mechanism and a goal-driven top-down mechanism 
(e.g., Burnham, 2007; Desimone & Duncan, 1995). In the current study we wanted to 
investigate the role of these mechanisms in the allocation of attention in a change blindness 
paradigm in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of this phenomenon. Both 
mechanisms were manipulated experimentally within an otherwise highly similar paradigm. 
Change blindness was induced by distracting stimuli (i.e., mudsplashes) that occurred 
simultaneously with the change (cf. O'Regan et al., 1999). By using mudsplashes, 
confounding effects of iconic memory were avoided (cf. Schankin & Wascher, 2008). In 
order to experimentally manipulate the allocation of visual selective attention, either the 
number of mudsplashes was varied (bottom-up mechanism) or possible change locations were 
highlighted (top-down mechanism).  
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Bottom-up and top-down mechanisms 
Observers’ sensitivity for changes should be modulated by both bottom-up and top-
down mechanisms. Increasing the salience of the change by reducing the number of 
mudsplashes or attracting observers’ attention onto possible change positions before the 
occurrence of the change should decrease the effect of change blindness. This was indeed the 
case in the current experiment: On the behavioral level, participants’ sensitivity for changes 
increased both when the number of distracting mudsplashes was reduced (bottom-up) and 
when potential change positions were permanently highlighted in red color (top-down).  
The N2pc component 
If these experimental manipulations affected the sensitivity for changes via different 
mechanisms, this should be reflected by the N2pc component as an indicator of observers’ 
attentional allocation (e.g., Luck & Hillyard, 1994a, 1994b). On the basis of previous 
findings, we hypothesize that the bottom-up capture of attention is reflected by the latency 
and by the amplitude of the N2pc (Mazza et al., 2009) whereas top-down mechanisms should 
mainly be observable in the N2pc amplitude (e.g., Kiss & Eimer, 2011). In particular, we 
hypothesized that, first, if the number of mudsplashes indeed affected the salience of a change 
in a bottom-up way, the N2pc latency should preponed and the size of the N2pc amplitude 
should be smaller when fewer distracting mudsplashes are presented. Second, if observers are 
able to focus their attention top-down onto potential change locations, the amplitude of the 
N2pc component should be greater. 
This was partly the case in the present study. Varying the number of mudsplashes was 
reflected by the (peak and onset) latency of N2pc, with a delayed occurrence of the N2pc 
component with an increasing number of distracting stimuli. In contrast, when potential 
change locations were highlighted, the amplitude and peak latency were affected, with a 
greater amplitude and an earlier peak latency. That is, different features of the N2pc were 
sensitive to the experimental manipulation, indicating that, as intended, different mechanisms 
of attentional allocation were affected. However, it should be stressed that the way how these 
features varied across experimental conditions were only partially as expected. These findings 
are discussed in more detail in the following. 
First, we manipulated bottom-up processes by the salience of the changing stimuli 
relative to distracting ones. As hypothesized an increased salience of the change was 
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associated with an earlier onset and peak latency of the N2pc component (e.g., Brisson et al., 
2007; Zhao et al., 2011), whereas the N2pc amplitude was not affected. That is, the allocation 
of selective attention toward the change was delayed with a larger number of irrelevant 
stimuli. Obviously, attention was attracted by the distractors before it was shifted to the 
relevant change (cf. Mazza et al., 2009). 
Second, we hypothesized that top-down mechanisms that determine the way how 
observers search for the change are mirrored by the N2pc amplitude only (Eimer, 1996). Our 
results show that the N2pc amplitude was enhanced when change positions were permanently 
highlighted. Interestingly, also the peak latency of the N2pc appeared earlier. This finding can 
be compared to a study that manipulated top-down activity by varying the instructions of a 
task (Gazzaley, Cooney, McEvoy, Knight, & D'Esposito, 2005). Participants had to remember 
and / or ignore pictures of sequentially presented faces and / or scenes. The N170 in the ERP 
was measured, reflecting the attentional processing of faces. The results show that the 
amplitude of the N170 was enhanced and the latency was preponed when observers had to 
remember faces compared to when they had to ignore faces. Similar to our findings, top-down 
activity affected both the magnitude and the speed of attention. A greater magnitude of 
attention allows amplifying the neural information which can be gathered from the relevant 
stimulus (cf. Gazzaley et al., 2005; Hillyard, Vogel, & Luck, 1998). The speed of attention, 
which is influenced by task demands, mirrors processing speed that further enhances the 
neural efficiency and thus also the probability that relevant information can be successfully 
represented in memory (Gazzaley et al., 2005). Therefore, we suggest that also in change 
blindness, top-down activity influences the perceptual competition of the stimuli for further 
processing and thus alleviating ongoing memory encoding a) by enhancing the magnitude of 
attention that is allocated onto the change and b) by increasing the processing speed of 
attention. 
One may argue that the top-down manipulation may be a mixture of top-down and 
bottom-up activity in the present study. When change positions were permanently highlighted 
in red color, participants were asked to detect luminance changes from light red to dark red or 
vice versa. In all remaining conditions, however, observers should detect luminance changes 
from light gray to dark gray or vice versa. There is a small probability that the luminance of 
gray changes differed from that of red changes. This might have incorporated additional 
bottom-up processes. Thus, for future studies we suggest to manipulate top-down activity not 
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by varying the characteristics of the stimuli, but for example by instructing participants 
differently. To investigate the interplay between bottom-up and top-down mechanisms (Folk 
et al., 1992; Müller & Rabbitt, 1989) it would be interesting to simultaneously vary the 
number of mudsplashes and highlight potential change positions in one experimental 
condition. Together, the results point to the competitive function of visual attention in change 
blindness that is based on two different mechanisms: First, bottom-up processes delay the 
allocation of attention onto the changes. Second, top-down delay the allocation of attention 
and, in addition, reduce the effort which is necessary to detect changes.  
Interestingly, an N2pc was present for detected changes only. This contradicts former 
studies (Schankin, Hagemann, & Wascher, 2009; Schankin & Wascher, 2007, 2008) who 
observed an N2pc for detected changes and an N2pc of smaller amplitude also for undetected 
changes with a nearly identical change blindness paradigm. We suggest that this deviant 
finding might be due to a different sample composition with a lower average age, mainly 
students in the studies by Schankin and colleagues. In contrast, in the present study an older 
community sample was recruited via newspaper advertisement and web portals.  
Limitations 
Before strong conclusions might be drawn, some further limitations of the current 
experiment have to be considered. First, Eimer and Mazza (2005) reported that the N2pc 
latency was related to how fast observers detected the change. They proposed that RTs should 
be measured to control for these effect. In the current study, however, reaction times were nor 
related to the N2pc onset latency (LOW-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition, r = .043, 
p = .819; HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition, r = .093, p = .618; NOT-HIGHLIGHTED 
condition, r = .212, p = .252; HIGHLIGHTED condition, r = .167, p = .370) nor to the N2pc peak 
latency (LOW-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition, r = -.142, p = .447; HIGH-NUMBER-OF-
MUDSPLASHES condition, r = .098, p = .618; NOT-HIGHLIGHTED condition, r = .213, p = .251; 
HIGHLIGHTED condition, r = .134, p = .471). 
Second, not only participants’ sensitivity for changes, but also their response behavior 
varied between experimental conditions. In particular, observers responded more 
conservatively with an enhanced number of mudsplashes and when change positions were not 
highlighted compared to highlighted positions. This observation is in line with former 
research that indicated that conservative response 
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Woodward, Meier, Tipper, & Graf, 2003). In the present study, however, the sensitivity for 
changes was not related to participants’ response behavior. Nevertheless, response behavior 
could have affected magnitude and speed of attention. Thus, the relationship between the 
allocation of attention and response bias in change blindness needs to be examined in future 
research by keeping participants’ sensitivity for changes constant and varying only their 
response behavior.  
Conclusion 
Despite these limitations, the results of the current study show that the allocation of 
attention in change detection and change blindness and thus the probability to detect a change 
depends on the relationship between the changing object and other visual disturbances as well 
as the relationship between the changing object and other non-changing objects. Irrelevant 
distractors perturb the allocation of attention to the change (bottom-up). 
Electrophysiologically, this mechanism is reflected by the latency of the N2pc component. 
How attention is intentionally focused to potentially changing objects (top-down) is reflected 
by the amplitude peak latency of the N2pc. That is, bottom-up mechanisms are fast and 
mainly affect the speed of attentional allocation, whereas top-down mechanisms mainly affect 
the magnitude of attention, which is allocated onto the change in a change detection task. 
Thus, successful change detection depends on the properties of distracting as well as non-
changing objects, which both determine the speed and intensity of the allocation of attention 
toward a change.  
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Tables 
Table 1.Overview of the different experimental analyses (bottom-up and top-down) and the 
conditions (LOW-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES, HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES, NOT-
HIGHLIGHTED, HIGHLIGHTED). Mean accuracy rates in percentage, mean N2pc latency (onset 
and peak), and mean N2pc amplitude (SEM = standard error of mean) as a function of 
condition. 
Analysis Condition   Muds. High.  Luminance 
Changes 
(SEM) 
No 
Changes 
(SEM) 
Onset 
Latency 
(SEM) 
Peak 
Latency 
(SEM) 
Amplitude 
(SEM) 
Bottom-
Up  
LOW-NUMBER-OF-
MUDSPLASHES 
4 No 43.5 
(3.4) 
95.0 
(1.1) 
208.0 
(.3) 
326.2 
(.3) 
-1.2 
(.2) 
Bottom-
Up 
HIGH-NUMBER-
OF-MUDSPLASHES 
8 No 30.7 
(2.8) 
93.7 
(1.1) 
317.7 
(1.6) 
367.6 
(.3) 
-1.4 
(.5) 
Top-
Down 
NOT-
HIGHLIGHTED 
6 No 35.8 
(2.8) 
90.0 
(1.9) 
223.3 
(.5) 
333.5 
(.2) 
-1.4 
(.2) 
Top-
Down 
HIGHLIGHTED 6 Yes 87.5 
(1.9) 
96.7 
(.8) 
231.2 
(.1) 
302.3 
(.1) 
-2.1 
(.3) 
Note. Muds. = Number of Mudsplashes; High. = Highlighted change positions. 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. Example for an experimental trial. After a fixation cross (1000ms), matrix S1 
appeared (400 ms), then matrix S2 with a possible change (lateral luminance or central color 
change)  followed (100 ms), simultaneously with the mudsplashes. Subsequently, S2 
remained on the screen for another 400 ms without the mudsplashes. Afterwards, participants 
indicated whether they had seen a change or not. Finally an inter-trial interval (ITI) of 2000 – 
3000 ms appeared. In this example, six mudsplashes were presented as in the NOT-
HIGHLIGHTED block and in the HIGHLIGHTED block. In the NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES block, 
four or eight mudsplashes appeared in intermingled sequence. The dot in the center of the 
matrix was colored in either red or green. In the matrix below, the six possible luminance 
change positions are marked in white color (not visible in the experiment). In Block 3 these 
positions were permanently marked in red color. 
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Figure 2. Mean values and standard errors of behavioral data for sensitivity d’ (A) and 
response bias c (B) for the bottom-up analysis and the top-down analysis; LOW-NUMBER-OF-
MUDSPLASHES (Low Muds); HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES (High Muds). 
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Figure 3. Difference waveforms. The N2pc for detected changes was extracted from the ERP 
by subtracting the ispilateral from the contralateral activity evoked by the onset of the change. 
The bottom-up analysis shows the difference waveforms of the LOW-NUMBER-OF-
MUDSPLASHES condition (Low Muds) and the HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition 
(High Muds). The top-down analysis shows the difference waveforms of the NOT-
HIGHLIGHTED condition and the HIGHLIGHTED condition. 
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Figure 4. Grand-averaged ERP waveforms separately for detected changes and for undetected 
changes, evoked by the change at posterior electrodes (PO7/PO8) contralateral (solid line) 
and ipsilateral (dashed line) to the change location. 
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Abstract 
Observers often miss visual changes in the environment when they co-occur with other 
visual disruptions. This phenomenon is called change blindness. The first aim of the current 
study was to investigate whether individual differences in change blindness are due to a trait. 
The second aim was to assess which neurocognitive processes contributed to these individual 
differences. Participants performed a change detection task at three measurement occasions. 
The N2pc was measured as an indicator of the allocation of attention and the P3 amplitude as 
an indicator of post-perceptual processes. For data analysis, we applied latent state-trait 
models. The results suggest that the sensitivity for changes is a consistent and valid 
personality trait. This finding has a high practical relevance, e.g. for the design of adaptive 
visual environments. Distinct processes explain these individual differences in change 
blindness. Both attentional mechanisms and post-perceptual processes contribute to and 
amplify the individual sensitivity for changes.  
Keywords: Change blindness, Individual Differences, Latent State-Trait-Models, 
Selective Visual Attention, Post-Perceptual Processes, N2pc, P3 
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Inter-individual differences in change detection and change blindness 
What makes a soccer goalkeeper one of the best of his profession? Among other 
prerequisites, e.g. motoric skills, he or she has to possess the ability to stay focused and to 
detect even slight changes in the environment. It is known that persons differ in their goal-
keeping performance. Does this imply that a professional goal keeper’s excellent ability to 
detect changes is consistent across time, different situations, and methods, i.e. is change 
detection a latent trait (cf. McAdams, 1994, 1995; McCrae & Costa, 2003; Steyer et al., 
1992).  
Change blindness 
Like the goalkeeper, observers do not perceive all details of our visual environment, 
like objects, scenes or motion pictures from one view to the next (e.g., Simons, 2000). It is 
possible that they miss changes in a visual scene when the transient motion signal of the 
change that normally attracts observersʼ attention automatically is simultaneously perturbed 
by some other signals. This phenomenon is known as change blindness (e.g., Simons & 
Levin, 1997). In an experimental setting, the motion signal of the change can be interrupted, 
e.g. by the presentation of a short blank (e.g., Rensink et al., 1997), by the presentation of 
mudsplashes (e.g., Schankin & Wascher, 2007, 2008; O'Regan et al., 1999), or by a film-cut 
(e.g., Levin & Simons, 1997; Simons, 1996), but the phenomenon may even occur in in real-
life interactions (Simons & Levin, 1998).  
Asked for their own ability to detect changes, the majority of people are convinced to 
perform well in change detection (Levin et al., 2000). For example, it seems to be common to 
use a mobile phone while driving because people overestimate their ability to watch the traffic 
attentively while they are simultaneously distracted by talking to someone else (cf. Simons & 
Ambinder, 2005). In contrast to common believes, a surprisingly large percentage of 
observers do not detect visual changes (e.g., Levin & Simons, 1997; Levin et al., 2002; 
Simons & Levin, 1998). For example, real-life experiments show that about 50% of naive 
participants did not notice the exchange of their conversation partner when a door, carried by 
construction workers, separated participant and experimenter from each other (Simons & 
Levin, 1998) or when the participant was taking a photograph of the experimenter (Levin et 
al., 2002; Davies & Hine, 2007). Application-oriented research reveals similar results. For 
example, in an eyewitness task 35% of the participants who watched videos of a house 
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burglary did not realize that the person who was acting the burglar was replaced by a different 
actor (Davies & Hine, 2007). The metacognitive error that people extremely overrate their 
own and others sensitivity to detect even highly salient changes has been named change 
blindness blindness, i.e. observers’ unability to correctly estimate their own extent of change 
blindness (Levin et al., 2000). With reference to this, it is not possible to simply assess 
observers’ sensitivity for changes by asking them, because they are not able to evaluate 
themselves properly. Some observers are able to detect changes, whereas a great percentage is 
change blind. Therefore, research on individual differences in change blindness has a great 
practical relevance. It is important to know why persons are change blind, whereas others 
seem to detect changes easily, e.g., in driving, navigation, surveillance, or eyewitness 
testimony (cf. O'Regan et al., 1999; Simons & Levin, 1998).  
There are several examples for individual differences in change blindness. They are 
associated with long-term patterns of behavior or expertise (e.g., Jones, Jones, Smith, & 
Copley, 2003; Werner & Thies, 2000), by dependence on group membership (e.g., Simons & 
Levin, 1998), by dispositional anxiety (e.g, McGlynn et al., 2008), by age (e.g., Caird et al., 
2005), or by cultural background (e.g., Humphreys et al., 2005; Masuda & Nisbett, 2006). For 
example, one study analyzed different change types as a function of expertise in American 
football (Werner & Thies, 2000). Participants were asked to detect changes in action scenes 
and scenes of playing formations. Two types of changes could occur, either semantic changes 
with meaningful information (e.g., the exchange of an important football player in the scene) 
or non-semantic changes without meaningful information (e.g., a color change). Traffic-
related scenes were used as control scenarios. Football experts were more sensitive to changes 
of domain-related, semantic photographs than novices, whereas for the control scenes no such 
effect of context was found. Similarly, also cultural differences became visible in change 
detection performance (Masuda & Nisbett, 2006). Japanese or American observers had to 
detect contextual changes presented in the background (e.g., a change of the position of 
clouds) or focal changes presented in the foreground of photographs or movie films. Japanese 
were more sensitive to contextual changes, whereas Americansʾ performance was better for 
focal changes. 
These studies show that individual differences in change blindness exist. They have 
been assessed in different experimental settings and across different situations. However, it is 
unclear whether individual differences in change blindness reflect a trait-like characteristic, 
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i.e. whether a person is able to detect changes better than others, independently of situation 
and measurement method. Alternatively, change detection might simply rely on situational 
effects. That is, observers’ sensitivity for changes may, for example, differ from day to day, 
due to motivation or fatigue or it may be specific for certain situations. Moreover, 
methodological effects might play a role in change detection. For example, the presentation of 
a short blank (e.g., Rensink et al., 1997, 2000) or the presentation of mudsplashes (e.g., 
O'Regan et al., 1999) both reduce the transient motion signal of the change, but with a 
different degree of change blindness. Finally, unsystematic measurement errors contribute to 
unintended variance in change blindness, e.g., when observers accidentally make mistakes. A 
possible consequence of this is a low reliability of observers’ sensitivity for changes. An 
attempt to systematically integrate these findings and to find a consistent explanation for these 
findings has not been made yet. It is still unclear if change blindness is a trait, which is 
independent from the situation and the measurement method. Therefore, it is necessary to 
separate confounding effects of the person, the situation and the method on change detection 
performance.  
Latent state trait models 
The effects of the person, the situation, the method, and the measurement error on the 
performance measure can be estimated and separated with the help of structural equation 
models. In particular, the latent state-trait (LST) theory takes into account that not only 
persons, but also situations and the interaction between persons and situations are important 
sources of variance in psychological measurement (Hagemann & Meyerhoff, 2008; Steyer et 
al., 1999). The core of LST models is based on two main variance decompositions: First, the 
variances of the observed variables can be decomposed into the variances of the latent states 
and of the measurement errors. And second, the variances of the latent state components can 
be decomposed into the variances of the latent state residuals and of a latent trait. For the 
separation of trait effects from situational effects several repeated measurements are 
necessary. Additional, so-called latent method factors can be included into the model. These 
factors indicate the proportion of variance that is due to the application of different methods. 
Unlike manifest variables, latent variables have the advantage that they measure error-free 
variables and measurement errors can be controlled (cf. Bollen, 1989). 
The aim of the present study is to investigate whether change blindness is a trait by 
estimating its trait specific variance. Apart from this, it is important to investigate which 
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processes underlie individual differences in change blindness. Past research indicated that 
both attentional change processing (e.g., Rensink et al., 1997) and post-perceptual change 
processing (e.g., Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2003) play a major role in change detection and 
change blindness. 
Selective attention 
Visual attention is the core mechanism of the selective processing of visual objects 
and events in the environment. It helps to resolve the competition of these stimuli for 
preferred processing by selecting salient or relevant stimuli while ignoring irrelevant, 
unimportant ones. For successful change detection, selective attention is necessary (e.g., 
Rensink et al., 1997; Schankin & Wascher, 2008; Simons, 2000). For example, past research 
indicated that only stimuli in the focus of attention can be reported consciously, as measured 
with eye-tracking (e.g., O'Regan et al., 2000). Furthermore, when attention is directed to a 
change location by a cue presented before the occurrence of a change, change blindness is 
prevented (Lamme, 2003). It was suggested that attentional processing is associated with 
individual differences in change blindness. For example, change blindness may result from 
capacity limitations of attention (e.g., Masuda & Nisbett, 2006; Simons & Ambinder, 2005; 
Cowan, 2000). Individual differences, e.g. in dipositional anxiety, also guide the focus of 
attention and influence the way how changes are seen and encoded (McGlynn et al., 2008). 
One component of the event-related potential (ERP) that is sensitive to the attentional 
selection of visual stimuli, is the N2pc. The N2pc is a difference wave, which occurs about 
200 to 300 ms after stimulus onset contralateral to the stimulus location at posterior 
electrodes. It indicates the allocation of observers’ selective attention (Eimer, 1996; Luck & 
Hillyard, 1994a, 1994b; Woodman & Luck, 1999). Some findings showed individual 
differences in the size of the N2pc amplitude that reflected systematic differences in self-
esteem (H. Li et al., 2012) or anxiety (Fox et al., 2008) in spatial cueing tasks. 
In a majority of change detection tasks, an N2pc is evoked by stimuli that reached 
visual awareness, e.g. when participants reported changes in face expressions (Eimer & 
Mazza, 2005), in meaningful objects (Busch, Dürschmid, et al., 2010; Busch, Fründ, et al., 
2010), or in colored dots (Schankin & Wascher, 2007). Sometimes, an N2pc with a smaller 
amplitude was also found for undetected changes (Schankin & Wascher, 2007, 2008; 
Schankin et al., 2009). In the current study, the amplitude of the N2pc component is used as 
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an indicator of selective attention. If individual differences in change detection rely on 
differences in attentional selection, this should be reflected by the N2pc amplitude. 
Post-perceptual processing 
In addition to rather early processing that is indicated by the N2pc some post-
perceptual change processing is necessary for ongoing decision making and action planning 
(e.g., Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2003). This processing in a later phase of conscious change 
evaluation may contribute to individual differences in change blindness. Post-perceptual 
cognitive processes are reflected by relatively late ERP components, such as the P3. This 
component is a large positive peak about 300 ms after stimulus onset with maximal amplitude 
at parietal and central midline scalp sites. It has first been described by Sutton et al. (1965) as 
a reaction to an unexpected event. Context or working memory updating is the most common 
interpretation of its meaning (e.g., Donchin & Coles, 1988; Verleger, 1988). There is some 
evidence for individual differences in the P3 amplitude (Polich & Kok, 1995; Polich, 2007). 
For example, in a variety of visual tasks the size of the P3 amplitude depended on 
participants’ extraversion (e.g., Brocke et al., 1997; Daruna et al., 1985; Stenberg, 1994) or on 
participants’ age (e.g., Fjell & Walhovd, 2003, 2004, 2005; D. Friedman, 2008). 
Several studies have shown that successful change detection is mirrored by an 
enhanced P300 or P3 component (e.g., Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2003; Niedeggen et al., 2001; 
Turatto et al., 2002). In particular,Koivisto and Revonsuo (2003) suggested that the difference 
between detected changes and undetected changes in the P3 amplitude reflects post-perceptual 
processes of conscious change evaluation, e.g. the P3 may indicate a process which is 
necessary for ongoing decision making. Similarly, in a study by O'Connell et al. (2012), the 
ERP showed a single, centro-parietal positivity, which was elicited by the gradual onset of a 
change. This positivity grew in amplitude with accumulating sensory evidence and peaked 
simultaneously with participants’ response. The authors conclude that this positivity equals 
the P3 component and mirrors a goal-oriented decision process, determined by threshold-
bound accumulation of perceptual evidence. It was suggested that the starting level of the 
perceptual accumulation process might vary as a function of individual differences (O'Connell 
et al., 2012). 
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The present study 
Research on individual differences in change blindness has a high practical relevance, 
e.g. for car driving or eyewitness testimonies. Why are some persons change blind, whereas 
others perform well in change detection tasks? The first aim of the present study was to 
investigate whether the ability to detect changes in the visual environment is a trait, i.e. a 
variable that is stable across time, different situations, and methods (e.g., McCrae & Costa, 
2003; Steyer et al., 1992). This question was assessed by applying the ideas of LST models 
(cf. Steyer et al., 1999). Therefore, change detection performance was measured at three 
measurement occasions with four different methods in order to assess the portion of variance 
that is attributable to the trait, situations, methods, and errors. If the sensitivity for changes 
were a trait a high proportion of variance would be explained by a latent trait variable in the 
LST model, whereas the effects of methods, situations, and measurement errors should be 
low. Furthermore, the convergent and discriminant validity of individual differences in the 
sensitivity for changes should be evaluated with respect to standard measures of personality 
and intelligence. 
A second aim of the current study was to explore which cognitive processes might be 
associated with individual differences in change detection and change blindness. Two 
processes are of interest here, selective attention and post-perceptual processes.  In the current 
study we used abstract dot patterns to measure the event-related brain activity. If selective 
attention or post-perceptual change processing were underlying mechanisms of the ability to 
detect changes, this should be reflected by individual differences in the N2pc or the P3 
component of the ERP, respectively. 
Methods 
Participants 
Sixty paid (8€/hour) volunteers (33 women, 27 men, aged between 18 and 73, mean age 
40.5 years) from a community sample participated in the experiment. Participants were 
recruited via newspaper advertisement and web portals. Five participants were left-handed, 54 
were right-handed and one of them was bimanual. When asked for their educational 
background, one participant indicated to have finished a degree of German lower secondary 
school, six participants had an intermediate school leaving certificate, seven a vocational 
diploma, 18 a college degree, 24 a university degree and four a degree of doctorate. Four 
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participants were unemployed, two attended school, eight were students, 29 employees, 
twelve freelancers, and five retired. Before the experiment started, participants were informed 
that it was required that they were not under psychiatric or neurological treatment. 
Participants reported normal or corrected to-normal vision and had normal color vision as 
measured with the Ishihara test of color blindness. All of them gave their written informed 
consent. The study was carried out in accordance with the ethical standards laid down in the 
1964 Declaration of Helsinki and its amendments.  
Measurement Occasions 
Overall, four measurement occasions were conducted. A mean of 15 weeks passed 
between measurement occasion one and two, a mean of 14 weeks between measurement 
occasion two and three, and a mean of four weeks between measurement occasion three and 
four. At measurement occasion one to three behavioral and electrophysiological data were 
recorded while the change blindness task was conducted. At measurement occasion four 
further measures were collected to assess the validity of the change blindness measures. 
Apparatus & Stimuli 
Participants were individually tested in a comfortable chair in a sound-attenuated 
chamber, which was dimly lit and electrically shielded. Two keys on a keyboard served as 
response buttons. The left key was marked in red and the right key in green color. They were 
located under participants’ left and right index finger. Stimuli were presented on a 17-in. 
computer screen, placed 82 cm in front of them, at the center of their field of vision. The 
screen was set to a resolution of 1280 x 1024 pixels and a screen refresh rate of 60 Hz.  
Stimuli consisted of 81 dots which were arranged in a 9 x 9 matrix (3.42° x 3.42° of 
visual angle) and presented on a black background (L = 0, a = 0, b = 0 in L*a*b color space). 
Forty of the dots were colored light gray (L = 73, a = 0, b = 0), 40 dots were colored dark gray 
(L = 42, a = 0, b = 0), and the dot in the center of the matrix was colored either green (L = 34, 
a = -38, b = 39) or blue (L = 34, a = 58, b = -105). The distance between single dots was .10° 
and their diameter .28°. The positions of the light and dark gray dots in the matrix were 
balanced so that accumulations of dots with equal luminance were avoided (cf. Figure 1). In 
this way, nine matrices were created, which were used for all experimental conditions equally 
often. In the BLOCK 3 light red (L = 73, a = 38, b = 42) and dark red (L = 42, a = 61, b = 55) 
dots replaced six of the gray dots (cf. Figure 1). 
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White squares (L = 100, a = 0, b = 0) served as mudsplashes. The number of 
mudsplashes (four, six, or eight) varied between conditions. Each mudsplash (.28° x .28°) 
occluded exactly one gray dot. The mudsplashes never appeared in immediate vicinity to each 
other or to a change location. Half of the mudsplashes were presented to the left and half to 
the right visual hemifield. Relative to their distance to the center, they were always presented 
symmetrically, mirrored along the vertical axis. Fifteen possible arrangements of their spatial 
positions were constructed in advance and then quasi-randomly ordered per block so that the 
same arrangement of mudsplashes never appeared more than three times consecutively. 
Procedure 
 Each trial began with a fixation cross in the center of the screen, which lasted 
1,000 ms (cf. Figure 1). Then, the first matrix (S1) appeared for 400 ms. Subsequently, the 
second matrix (S2) was presented for 100 ms, simultaneously with the mudsplashes. Then, the 
mudsplashes disappeared and the matrix remained on the screen for another 400 ms. On about 
43% of the trials, S1 and S2 were identical (no change trial), on about 43% of the trials, one 
lateral dot changed its luminance at one of six possible locations (luminance change trial), and 
on about 14% of all trials, the colored dot in the center changed its color (color change trial). 
Color changes were used to keep participants’ attention fixed to the center of the screen and 
were excluded from further analyses because in this condition no change blindness effect can 
be observed (cf. Schankin & Wascher, 2008). Figure 1 shows the three dots of position 1, 2, 
and 3, (left hemifield) and the three dots of position 4, 5, and 6 (right hemifield). On half of 
the luminance change trials, the dot changed from dark gray to light gray, on the other half 
from light gray to dark gray. Similarly, on half of the color change trials, the central dot 
changed from green to blue, on the other half from blue to green. Finally, an inter-trial 
interval (ITI) of variable length (2,000 – 3,000 ms) followed. 
Participants were instructed to indicate if they had seen a change or not by pressing the 
green or red key, respectively. The assignment of response keys was counterbalanced across 
participants. It was stressed that they should report a change only when they really saw it, and 
that guessing was not allowed. 
There were four experimental conditions (cf. Table 1). First, in the LOW-NUMBER-OF-
MUDSPLASHES condition, four mudsplashes were presented. Second, in the HIGH-NUMBER-OF-
MUDSPLASHES condition, eight mudsplashes were shown. Third, in the NOT-HIGHLIGHTED 
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CONDITION, six mudsplashes were presented. Fourth, in the HIGHLIGHTED condition, also six 
mudsplashes were presented and in addition, the six possible positions of luminance changes 
were permanently marked in red color.  
These four experimental conditions were presented in three blocks. In BLOCK 1, either 
four (LOW-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition) or eight mudsplashes (HIGH-NUMBER-OF-
MUDSPLASHES condition) were presented simultaneously with the change. In BLOCK 2, only 
the NOT-HIGHLIGHTED condition was presented. In BLOCK 3, only the NOT-HIGHLIGHTED 
condition was shown. The NOT-HIGHLIGHTED and HIGHLIGHTED conditions were presented in 
separate blocks to avoid interference effects by the highlighted change positions on 
consecutive trials. This separation, however, was not considered necessary for the LOW- and 
HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES conditions, which were presented in one block. Within a 
block, all trials were shown in random sequence with the following constraints. At maximum 
three luminance changes, three no changes, three changes of the same (left or right) side or 
two color changes appeared successively. Furthermore, the same matrix never appeared more 
than three times consecutively. In this way, four different trial sequences were created for 
each block and systematically assigned to participants. Short breaks of individual length 
always appeared after about seven minutes. After each block, there was a longer break.  
Overall, three measurement occasions were performed. On each measurement 
occasion, the experiment started with a short demonstration of all possible changes. On each 
change position, one exemplary change appeared in slowed presentation time and without any 
mudsplashes to ensure that all possible changes had been seen once by the participants. Then 
participants passed a short exercise of 91 trials (42 luminance changes, 42 no changes and 
seven color changes). In the exercise, six mudsplashes were presented. The procedure of a 
trial was the same as described above, six mudsplashes were presented as distractors. To 
prevent sequence effects, the sequential presentation of the experimental blocks was varied 
per measurement occasion.  At measurement occasion one, the exercise was followed by 
BLOCK 2, then by BLOCK 1 and finally by the BLOCK 3. On the second measurement occasion, 
first BLOCK 3 was presented, then BLOCK 2 and finally BLOCK 1. Measurement occasion three 
started with BLOCK 1, followed by the BLOCK 3 and then by BLOCK 2. 
Each of the four experimental conditions consisted of 9 (matrices) x [4 (color changes) 
+ 12 (luminance changes) + 12 (no changes)] x 3 (measurement occasions) = 756 trials with 
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316 luminance changes, 316 no changes and 108 color changes each. Altogether, this resulted 
in 3024 trials per participant.  
EEG Recording 
EEG was continuously recorded from 25 Ag-AgCl electrodes, placed according to the 
international 10–20 system. During recording, all electrodes (F3, Fz, F4, T7, C3, C4, T8, Tp9, 
Tp10, P7, P3, Pz, P4, P8, PO7, PO8, O1, Oz, O2) were referenced to Cz. Fpz was used as 
ground. Vertical electro-oculogram (EOG) was recorded bipolarly from above and below the 
right eye and horizontal EOG from the outer canthi of the eyes. Electrode impedances were 
kept below 5 kΩ. EEG was sampled with a rate of 1000 Hz. The signal was amplified by two 
BrainAmp DC amplifiers (Brain Products, Munich, Germany) with a band-pass of 0.1 - 250 
Hz. Data was filtered off-line with a band-pass filter of 0.1 – 12 Hz and re-referenced to 
linked mastoids. EEG data were segmented into time windows of 1,700 ms, starting 200 ms 
prior to S1 and ending 1,400 ms afterward. Baseline was corrected relative to the activity of 
the interval 200 ms prior to S1 to 0 ms (-600 to -400 ms prior to S2). Ocular artifacts were 
corrected according to the algorithm of Gratton et al. (1983). Trials with amplitudes lower 
than .5 µV in an interval of 100 ms, exceeding +/- 70 µV, or with a voltage step of 100 µV/ms 
were excluded from the data as artifacts. 
Data Analysis 
Behavioral data. Hits (percentage of correctly detected luminance changes) and false 
alarms (percentage of reported changes in no change trials) were computed separately for 
each of the four experimental conditions and the three measurement occasions. To distinguish 
between effects due to sensitivity and response bias, sensitivity d’ and response bias c were 
calculated according to the signal detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966). To investigate 
whether the sensitivity for changes or the response bias differed between conditions four 
repeated-measures ANOVAs were calculated with the within-subjects factor condition (a): 
LOW- VS. HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition1 (manipulation of the number of 
mudsplashes) or (b) HIGHLIGHTED vs. NOT-HIGHLIGHTED condition (manipulation of 
highlighted change positions), separately for d’ and c. 
Latent state-trait model of sensitivity d’. We applied an LST model for sensitivity dʾ in 
order to test the hypothesis whether the sensitivity for changes is based on a trait, which is 
stable across different situations and methods (cf. Steyer et al., 1999). Four manifest variables 
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(low- and high-number-of-mudsplashes, highlighted and not-highlighted change positions) 
were set up at three different measurement occasions. Following the recommendation of Eid 
(2000), a M-1 model allows a LST model with only three method factors (i.e., LOW- and 
HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES and HIGHLIGHTED condition) to assess that portion of 
variance caused by different measurement methods. The NOT-HIGHLIGHTED conditions was 
used as a baseline, i.e. a reference condition, for the following reasons: First, the NOT-
HIGHLIGHTED condition (six mudsplashes) served as a neutral condition to the LOW-NUMBER-
OF-MUDSPLASHES condition (four mudsplashes) and the HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES 
condition (eight mudsplashes). Second, the NOT-HIGLIGHTED condition served as a 
comparison condition to the HIGHLIGHTED condition, which both included the presentation of 
six mudsplashes and differed only with respect to (not) highlighted change positions. Thus, 
the NOT-HIGHLIGHTED condition can be regarded as the most neutral reference condition in the 
current experimental design.  
The LST model was fitted by minimalizing the generalized least squares discrepancy 
function (GLS; Hu & Bentler, 1998), implemented in AMOS 20.0 (Arbuckle, 2006). The 
general model fit was evaluated by indices of the χ² statistics, the comparative fit index (CFI; 
Bentler, 1990) and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA; Browne & Cudeck, 
1992). The critical ratio was used to assess the significance (p ≤ .05) of the single model 
parameters. 
Next, the portion of variances of the manifest variables that are determined by their 
latent components were analyzed with the help of standard LST parameters, based on the 
estimated parameters (for formulae, see Deinzer et al., 1995; Steyer et al., 1992). A coefficient 
of trait specifity shows the portion of variance that is due to the latent trait. A coefficient of 
occasion specifity reflects the portion of variance of the manifest variable that is due to the 
influence of the measurement occasion (situation) or the interaction of the situation and the 
person. Finally, a coefficient of method specifity describes that portion of variance of the 
manifest variable that is due to the influence of the method or to the interaction of the method 
and the person. The closer the value of these parameters is to 1, the greater the specifity. 
Finally, a coefficient of reliability describes the error-free portion of variance of the latent 
components.  
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Electrophysiological data. The N2pc was extracted from the ERP by subtracting the 
activity ipsilateral from those contralateral relative to the position of a change. The amplitude 
was measured as the mean activity at posterior electrodes (cf. Eimer, 1996; Luck & Hillyard, 
1994a; Schankin & Wascher, 2007, 2008) in different time windows after change onset, 
because its maximum varied between conditions: LOW-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES: 290 to 340 
ms, HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES: 340 to 390 ms; NOT HIGHLIGHTED change positions: 310 
to 360 ms, HIGHLIGHTED change positions: 280 to 330 ms.  Data from PO7/PO8 were entered 
into further statistical analyses because the N2pc was maximal at these electrode positions. To 
test if the N2pc amplitude was elicited by detected changes and by undetected changes, t-tests 
were calculated, separately for the experimental conditions (LOW-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES 
condition, HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition, NOT-HIGHLIGHTED condition, 
HIGHLIGHTED condition) 
The P3 amplitude was maximal about 500 ms after change onset (S2) in all conditions. 
For statistical analyses, the P3 amplitude was measured as mean activity in the time window 
from 400 to 600 ms after change onset. Data from Pz were entered into further analyses 
because the P3 was maximal at this electrode position. This observation is in accordance with 
other studies that found maximal P3 amplitude sizes for posterior electrode sides (D. 
Friedman, Kazmerski, & Fabiani, 1997b; Polich & Heine, 1996). To test whether the P3 
amplitude is increased for detected changes in comparison to undetected changes, as 
suggested by Koivisto and Revonsuo (2003), t-tests were calculated, separately for the 
experimental conditions (LOW-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition, HIGH-NUMBER-OF-
MUDSPLASHES condition, NOT-HIGHLIGHTED condition, HIGHLIGHTED condition). Similarly, 
undetected and no changes should not differ from each other.  
We analyzed the association between attentional processes (as reflected by the N2pc 
amplitude), post-perceptual processes of successful change detection (as reflected by the P3 
component for detected changes) and the sensitivity d’ (measured with d’) with Pearson 
correlations. To test whether the N2pc and the P3 could predict the sensitivity for changes, 
additional stepwise multiple regression analyses were performed with the manifest sensitivity 
d’ serving as dependent variable and the manifest N2pc amplitude and the manifest P3 
amplitude serving as independent variables. For these regression analyses each variable was 
averaged across conditions (LOW-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition, HIGH-NUMBER-OF-
MUDSPLASHES condition, NOT-HIGHLIGHTED condition, HIGHLIGHTED condition). 
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In case of multiple comparisons, p was adjusted according to Bonferroni. Effect sizes 
were calculated by means of Hay’s ω or Cohen’s d. 
Latent state-trait model of the N2pc and the P3. Subsequently, we applied an LST 
model for the N2pc amplitude for detected changes in order to test to what extent individual 
differences in the allocation of attention in change blindness are due to the person, to the 
situation, to the method, or to measurement errors (cf. Steyer et al., 1999). To assess 
influences on individual differences in successful and aware post-perceptual change 
processing, we applied another LST model for the P3 amplitude for detected changes. 
Similarly to the LST model of d’, in both models, three measurement occasions were included 
and three method factors, for the LOW-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition, the HIGH-
NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition and the HIGHLIGHTED condition, were set up. 
The LST model for the N2pc and the P3 were by using the maximum likelihood 
algorithm (ML), because some values were missing (N2pc: elven values at measurement 
occasion one, ten values at measurement occasion two, and thirteen values at measurement 
occasion three thirteen; P3: two values at measurement occasion one, one value at 
measurement occasion two, and one value at measurement occasion three). This happened 
because in some conditions no changes were detected and thus no N2pc or no P3 for detected 
changes could be analyzed. Again, the general model fits were evaluated by indices of the χ² 
statistics, the CFI and the RMSEA. The critical ratio and its standard error were used to assess 
the significance (α ≤ .05) of the single model parameters. Next, coefficients of trait specifity, 
coefficients of occasion and method specifity and the reliabilities of the measurements were 
assessed for the N2pc amplitude and the P3 amplitude. 
Latent correlations. Finally, we analyzed the latent trait correlation between the 
sensitivity dʾ, the N2pc, and the P3 to assess the true relation of participants’ sensitivity for 
changes and attentional and post-perceptual change processing. The LST models were fitted 
to their covariance matrices by using the maximum likelihood algorithm (ML), because some 
values for the N2pc amplitude and the P3 amplitude were missing (see above). 
Further measures 
To assess the discriminative validity of the sensitivity for changes, its relation to 
further constructs was tested: general intelligence, assessed with the APM (Advanced 
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Progressive Matrices; Raven, Court, & Raven, 1994), mental speed, assessed with the Hick 
Paradigm (Neubauer, Bauer, & Höller, 1992) and the ZVT (Zahlenverbindungstest; Oswald & 
Roth, 1987), and the Big Five personality traits, assessed with the NEO-FFI (Costa & 
McCrae, 1992b). We analyzed correlations of the manifest measure of sensitivity d’ and the 
respective manifest further measures. Then correlations of latent sensitivity d’ and the 
respective manifest further measures were computed. 
Advance Progressive Matrices (APM). A computer adapted version of the APM was 
applied to assess participants’ general intelligence. We followed the recommendation of the 
test manual and used the number of correct items of the second set (36 items) as indicator of 
participants’ performance. Internal consistency was high in the current study (Cronbach’s 
alpha = .88). 
Hick Paradigm. The Hick paradigm is a simple choice and reaction time task, which 
measures the speed of information processing (e.g., A. R. Jensen, 1987). Reaction time is 
linearly related to the amount of information in a reaction time task (Hick, 1952). No choice is 
necessary when no information is presented in the simple reaction condition (0-bits of 
information), when observers have to choose between two or four alternatives, a binary 
decision decision (1-bit) or two binary decisions (2-bit) are necessary, respectively (e.g., 
Neubauer, 1991, 1997). Reaction time should be negatively related to psychometric 
intelligence. A modified version of the paradigm by Neubauer et al. (1992) was applied, 
adapted for use on the computer without a home button. We implemented a 1-bit condition 
and a 2-bit condition. In the 1-bit condition, two squares appeared on the screen at fixed 
position, whereas in the 2-bit condition these two squares varied pseudo-randomly in two of 
four locations. Participants were asked to indicate the appearance of the squares as fast as 
possible. In each condition, participants passed a short exercise. Spearman-Brown corrected 
reliabilities, measured with odd-even split, ranged from .98 in the 1-bit condition to .99 in the 
2-bit condition. 
Zahlenverbindungstest (ZVT). The ZVT, a paper and pencil test, was used as a 
second marker of the mental speed component of general intelligence. This measure includes 
four number matrices (A to D); each consists of numbers 1 to 90 in random order. Participants 
are asked to connect the numbers in sequence as fast as possible. Mean execution time serves 
as dependent measure. In the present study, the ZVT yielded a high internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .96). 
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NEO Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI). Finally, a 60-item version of the NEO-FFI 
was used to assess participants’ Big Five personality with the indices Openness to Experience, 
Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism. In line with former 
research, these scales yielded good internal consistencies, with Cronbachs’ alphas ranging 
from  .73 for Agreeableness to .86 for Neuroticism. 
Results 
Behavioral data 
Participants responded correctly to 43.11% of the luminance changes (standard error 
of mean =2.38%) and to 95.23 % (standard error of mean = .59%) of the no changes, 
averaged across measurement occasions and conditions. Table 2 displays the mean accuracy 
rates for no changes and or luminance changes and values of sensitivity dʾ and response bias c 
as a function of condition and of the single three measurement occasions.  
First, we investigated whether the sensitivity for changes d’ and or the response bias c 
differed between conditions. Data were analyzed separately for number of mudsplashes (LOW- 
vs. HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES) and highlighted change positions (NOT-HIGHLIGHTED 
condition vs. HIGHLIGHTED condition). Participants were more sensitive to changes with 
increasing number of mudsplashes, F(1,59) = 112.4, p < .001, ω² = .65, and when change 
positions were highlighted in red color compared to not-highlighted change positions, 
F(1,59) = 408.3, p < . 001, ω² = .87. Moreover, participants answered more conservatively 
with increasing number of mudsplashes, F(1,59) = 38.4, p < .001, ω² = .39, and when change 
positions were not-highlighted compared to highlighted change positions, F(1,59) = 112.2, 
p < .001, ω² = .65. 
Electrophysiological data 
Electrophysiological correlate of selective attention (N2pc). The N2pc was 
analyzed as an electrophysiological correlate of selective attention (e.g., Eimer, 1996; Luck & 
Hillyard, 1994a), averaged across all three measurement occasions. Figure 2 displays 
difference waveforms of the N2pc component in the ERP elicited by the onset of a change at 
posterior electrodes (PO7/PO8), contralateral and ipsilateral to the change location for 
detected and undetected changes. 
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We tested if the N2pc amplitude was elicited by detected changes and by undetected 
changes. T-tests showed that the N2pc was only elicited for detected changes in all four 
conditions, i.e. low-number-of-mudsplashes, t(59) = 4.6, p < .001, d = .59, NOT-HIGHLIGHTED, 
t(59) = 6., p < .001, d = .47, HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES, t(59) = 3.6, p = .003, d = .84, 
and HIGHLIGHTED, t(59) = 10.2, p < .001, d = 1.03. It was absent, however, for undetected 
changes in all conditions, all ts ≤ 1.2, all ps ≥ 233.  
Electrophysiological correlate of post-perceptual processes (P3). The P3 was 
analyzed as an electrophysiological correlate of post-perceptual change processing (e.g., 
Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2003). Figure 3 shows grand-averaged ERP waveforms elicited by the 
onset of a change at posterior central electrode Pz, for detected changes, undetected changes, 
and no changes.  
We tested if the P3 amplitude was increased for detected changes in comparison to 
undetected changes (cf. Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2003). T-tests showed that the P3 was 
increased for detected changes in all four conditions, i.e. LOW-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES, 
t(59) = 5.8, p < .001, d =.55, NOT-HIGHLIGHTED, t(59) = 5.6, p < .001, d =.46, HIGH-NUMBER-
OF-MUDSPLASHES, t(59) = 4.7, p < .001, d = .45, and HIGHLIGHTED, t(59) = 8.1, p < .001, 
d = .77. Undetected changes and no changes, however, did not differ from each other in all 
conditions, all ts ≤ 1.0. 
Manifest correlations. The relationship of sensitivity dʾ, the N2pc for detected 
changes, and the P3 for detected changes was analyzed with correlational analyses (cf. Table 
3). The N2pc amplitude and the sensitivity for changes were related to each other in all 
conditions with the lowest correlation in the HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES, r = -.26, 
p = .041, and the highest correlation in the HIGHLIGHTED condition, r = -.44, p < .001. Also 
the P3 amplitude and the sensitivity for changes were related to each other in the condition 
with a low number of mudsplashes, r = .49, p < .001, with a high number of mudsplashes, 
r = .47, p < .001, and when change positions were not highlighted, r = .40, p = .003. When 
change positions were highlighted the correlation reached marginal significance, r = .30, 
p = .076. Moreover, the N2pc was moderately related to the P3 in the condition with high 
number of mudsplashes, r = -.31, p = .016, whereas the correlation did not reach significance 
in the remaining three conditions. These correlations might serve as a first empirical evidence 
of the relation of the sensitivity for changes and attentional selection and post-perceptual 
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processing as its underlying processes. Attentional selection and post-perceptual processing 
may be seen as rather distinct processes. 
Manifest regression analyses. Regression analyses showed that the N2pc amplitude 
for detected changes predicted sensitivity d’, F(1,58) = 14.5, β = -.45, β = -.45, p < .001, 
R² = .19. Similarly, also the P3 amplitude predicted sensitivity d’, F(1,58) = 14.7, β = .45, 
p < .001, R² = .19 with β = .45, p < .001. When both predictors were included into the 
regression analysis, the N2pc, β = -.23, p = .004, and the P3, β = .05, p = .004, predicted 
sensitivity d’, F(2,57) = 12.8, p < .001, R² = .29. Thus, both attentional selection and post-
perceptual processing independently contribute to the sensitivity for changes.  
 Manifest correlations of further measures. Table 4 shows the manifest correlations 
of sensitivity d’ with further performance measures. Sensitivity for changes was related with 
general intelligence, mental speed, neuroticism, and extraversion, but with the latter only in 
the HIGHLIGHTED condition. 
Latent state-trait models 
To assess the latent influence of the person, the situation, the method and of 
measurement error, LST models were set up, separately for the three variables the sensitivity 
for changes d’, the N2pc amplitude (detected changes only), and the P3 amplitude. Stable 
inter-individual differences are reflected by a high proportion of variance in a latent trait 
variable, whereas the influence of methods and situations should be low. If selective attention 
and/or post-perceptual change processing are underlying mechanisms of the ability to detect 
changes, this should be reflected by the N2pc and the P3 in the ERP. Figure 4, Figure 5, and 
Figure 6 show the final versions of the LST models for sensitivity dʾ, the N2pc, and the P3, 
respectively. Table 5 presents the estimated variances with their standard errors and the 
critical ratios of the model parameters of sensitivity dʾ, the N2pc amplitude, or the P3 
amplitude in the LST models.  
Latent state-trait model of sensitivity dʾ. We began with setting up a maximally 
restricted model by setting all path coefficients to one and by equalizing the variances of the 
measurement errors (ei) and of the state residuals (SRk). Afterwards, the number of free 
parameters was gradually increased to improve acceptance of the model fit. All variances of 
the measurement errors (ei) and the path coefficients between the single measurement 
occasions (Si) and the observed variables of the HIGHLIGHTED condition were relaxed. The 
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variances of the state residuals SR1 and SR2, were equalized, because differences between 
these state residuals were minimal. As a consequence of insignificance, the variance of the 
state residual at measurement occasion two (SR2), the method factor of the HIGH-NUMBER-OF-
MUDSPLASHES condition (M1) and the measurement error of the LOW-NUMBER-OF-
MUDSPLASHES condition (e9) at measurement occasion three were set to zero (cf. Figure 4). 
This model could be accepted, χ2(60) = 72.6, p = .128, CFI = .74, RMSEA = .06. Based on 
the observed variables in the accepted model, standard LST parameters were computed. Table 
6 shows the LST model parameters for the observed variables, separately for sensitivity dʾ, the 
N2pc amplitude, and the P3 amplitude. All measurements of the sensitivity for changes were 
highly reliable, ranging between .80 and .98, and all occasion specifities were low, ranging 
between .00 and .14. In the LOW-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition, the NOT-HIGHLIGHTED 
condition, and the HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition trait specifities were great, 
ranging between .63 and .86, whereas method specificities were low, ranging between .00 
and .10. In the HIGHLIGHTED condition, however, trait specifities were smaller, ranging 
between .43 and .52, and method specifities increased, ranging between .28 and .37.  
Latent state-trait model of the N2pc. We used the same procedure to model the 
N2pc. As a consequence of insignificance, the variance of the state residuals at measurement 
occasion one (SR1), two (SR2), and three (SR3), and the variance of the method factors of THE 
LOW-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition (M1) and the HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES 
condition (M2) were set to zero. This model could be accepted, χ2(61) = 65.9, p = .311, 
CFI = .95, RMSEA= .04 (cf. Figure 5). Based on the observed variables in the accepted 
model, standard LST parameters were computed. As indicated in Table 6, occasion specifities 
of the N2pc were low in all conditions, i.e. all occasion specifities were .00. All reliabilities 
ranged between .11 and .46, the trait specifities ranged between .11 and .27, and all method 
specifities were .00 in the LOW-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition, the NOT-HIGHLIGHTED 
condition and the HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition. In the HIGHLIGHTED condition, 
however, reliabilities, ranged between .50 and .59, trait specifities ranged between .28 and 
.32, and method specifities ranged between .22 and .29. 
Latent state-trait model of the P3. We used the same procedure to model the P3. As 
a consequence of insignificance, the variance of the state residual at measurement occasion 
two (SR2), the variance of the method factors of the LOW-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES 
condition (M1) and the HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition (M2) were set to zero. To 
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improve the model fit, correlations between measurement error one with two, r = .564, p = 
.004, and between measurement error nine with ten, r = .455, p = .007, had to be relaxed. The 
model showed a marginally acceptable fit, χ2(57) = 94.4, p = .001, CFI = .95, RMSEA = .11, 
(cf. Figure 6). As the RMSEA may underestimates the model fit for small sample sizes 
(Kenny, Kaniskan, & McCoach, 2014), we accepted the model. Based on the observed 
variables in the accepted model, standard LST parameters were computed (cf. Table 6). Trait 
specifities ranged between .46 and .83. All occasion specifities ranged between .00 and .16, 
and all method specifities ranged between .00 and .09, whereas reliabilities ranged 
between .55 and .99. 
Latent correlations. The relationship of the latent trait variables sensitivity for 
changes, selective attention (N2pc amplitude), and post-perceptual processes (P3 amplitude) 
were investigated. Latent sensitivity dʾ and the amplitude of the latent N2pc component were 
moderately correlated, r = -.49, p = .004 (model fit was acceptable, χ2(264) = 386.3, p < .001, 
CFI = .89, RMSEA = .09), as well as latent sensitivity dʾ and the amplitude of the latent P3 
component, r = .41, p = .005 (model fit was marginally acceptable, χ2(261) = 476.2, p < .001, 
CFI = .88, RMSEA = .12). That is, selective attention and post-perceptual processes are 
related to individual differences in change detection performance. Moreover, latent N2pc and 
latent P3 were also correlated, r = -.41, p = .014 (model fit was acceptable, χ2(261) = 361.1, 
p < .001, CFI = .90, RMSEA = .08). 
Latent correlations of further measures. Finally, correlations of latent sensitivity d’ 
and the manifest variables general intelligence, mental speed and the Big Five were computed 
to assess the validity of the sensitivity for changes. Table 7 displays the underlying model fits. 
The relation of latent sensitivity d’ and mainfest general intelligence, as measured with the 
APM, was significant, r = .43, p = .020. Latent sensitivity d’ was not related to the manifest 
variable mental speed, as assessed with the ZVT, r = -.18, p = .388, and it was only 
marginally related to the manifest variable mental speed, as assessed with the Hick Paradigm, 
r = -.33, p = .071. Latent d’ was not related to the manifest Big Five personality traits 
(openness, r = .12, p = .446; conscientiousness, r = .23, p = .196; extraversion, r = -.15, 
p = .429; agreeableness, r = -.07, p = .704; neuroticism, r = -.13, p = .465).  
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Discussion 
The first aim of the present study was to assess whether individual differences in 
change blindness are a trait-like characteristic of the person. A longitudinal design allowed 
investigating the consistency of individual differences in change blindness across several 
measurement occasions. The results show that the sensitivity for changes is a stable trait, i.e. a 
person is consistently able to detect changes better than others, across different situation and 
measurement methods.  
First, the portion of the trait specific variance of the sensitivity for changes is high, 
ranging from .63 to .86. Thus, 63% to 86% of the variance in the manifest measure of the 
sensitivity for changes is due to consistent individual differences in a latent trait. This trait 
specifity corresponds to a trait specifity that is seen in standard personality variables, i.e. the 
Big Five personality traits (Deinzer et al., 1995), which are characterized by a high validity 
and stability (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1992a). It is somewhat lower than the trait specifity of a 
standard general intelligence measure (Danner, Hagemann, Schankin, Hager, & Funke, 2011).  
 Second, the portion of the occasion specific variance ranged between .00 and .14. 
Thus, 0% to 14% of the variance of the manifest variables are due to effects of the situation or 
the interaction between person and situation. This occasion specifity corresponds to an 
occasion specifity that is seen in a standard personality variables (Deinzer et al., 1995). 
However, this latent source of variance was zero for a standard intelligence measure (Danner 
et al., 2011). The small effect might be due to fatigue or participants’ motivation to perform 
adequately in the task. Only few studies addressed the effects of situational variables on 
change blindness. For example, Sänger and Wascher (2011) investigated the effects of 
extrinsic motivation, in the form of a monetary reward, on change detection. In a competitive 
task, participants were instructed to detect either a location change or an orientation change 
and to ignore irrelevant stimuli in a competitive task. The researchers reported an influence of 
motivation on change detection performance. Therefore, we recommend systematically 
assessing motivation or fatigue or other possible situational factors on individual differences 
in change blindness in future studies.  
Third, the portion of the method specific variance, which ranged between .00 and .10, 
was rather low and reliability, which was between .77 and .98, was rather high. Both 
psychometric parameters suggest that technical measurement problems played a subordinate 
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role for the assessment of individual differences in change blindness. However, the effect of 
the experimental method increased and the trait specific effect on change blindness decreased 
when change positions were permanently highlighted. This finding can be explained by a 
decreased task difficulty. Task demands can be manipulated by the characteristics of the 
stimuli (Pringle et al., 2001). We suggest that tasks that are too easy do not differentiate 
sufficiently between persons that are high or low change blind because of a ceiling effect due 
to a restriction of variances.  
Complementing these psychometric analyses, we also investigated the convergent and 
discriminant validity of change blindness measures with respect to standard measures of 
personality and intelligence. We found a negative manifest relation between the sensitivity for 
changes and neuroticism, extraversion, and mental speed. These correlations were not 
explained by individual differences in the sensitivity for changes suggesting that they might 
be due to variations in the measurement errors, in the measurement occasions, or in the 
experimental methods. Thus, there were essentially null relations of the trait sensitivity for 
changes with all personality traits, which suggest discriminant validity of change blindness 
measures. Furthermore, there was a positive association between individual differences in the 
sensitivity for changes and general intelligence with a size of .42. This finding may tentatively 
suggest that measures of individual differences in change blindness and intelligence may tap 
at least in part the very same cognitive process, although the magnitude of this overlap is 
rather small. Below we will discuss some preliminary evidence that may help to shed some 
light on the nature of this overlapping process.  
To conclude, this is the first paper which showed that individual differences in change 
blindness are a trait-like characteristic of the person. Practical consequences are obvious. 
Individual differences in change blindness may be related to performance in real life task that 
make a demand on the detection of changes in a multitude of circumstances, e.g. in 
navigation, surveillance, or driving (cf. O'Regan et al., 1999; Simons & Levin, 1998). In 
particular, future change blindness tasks may, e.g. help to ensure that changed rules of the 
road or modified traffic signs are so salient that they can be detected by every car driver, also 
by those with low change detection abilities. Furthermore, e.g. the detection of newly 
developed lung cancer is an important task for a pulmonologist. As the doctor has to scan 
several X-ray images a day, he or she has to possess a high ability in the detection of even 
small changes in the pictures. The application of further developed change detection tasks 
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might also be useful in addition to standard measures, such as general intelligence tests, for 
the diagnosis of (professional) aptitude, e.g., of car drivers, airplane pilots, or surgeons. 
Future research may investigate to which extent individual differences in change blindness 
can predict the performance in these tasks.  
The second aim of the current study was to assess which neurocognitive processes 
contribute to individual differences in change blindness. We can say that there are individual 
differences in distinct neurocognitive processes that are associated with the sensitivity for 
changes. One of these processes is related to the N2pc component in the ERP and the other is 
related to the P3 component.  
First, there was a negative relationship between the magnitude of the N2pc and the 
sensitivity for changes. Individuals who showed a rather large N2pc amplitude at about 330 
ms afters stimulus onset also showed a better change detection with mean reaction times of 
about 1190.5 ms after stimulus onset (SD = 255.4). This finding suggests that individual 
differences exist in the allocation of selective attention in change detection (cf. Eimer, 1996). 
This conclusion is in accordance with former research, which showed that individual 
differences in attentional stimulus processing facilitate or complicate the detection of changes 
(e.g., Byrne & Eysenck, 1995; McGlynn et al., 2008). Furthermore, it has been suggested that 
the N2pc amplitude is greater in more difficult tasks when more attention has to be allocated 
onto the change (e.g., Luck & Hillyard, 1994b). Thus, we suggest that individual differences 
in change blindness are associated with observersʾ individual limitation of attentional 
resources (cf. Masuda & Nisbett, 2006; Simons & Ambinder, 2005), which vary 
systematically between persons (e.g., Cowan, 2000; Rensink, 2000b). Moreover, there was a 
small situational effect on the N2pc amplitude, again explainable, e.g. by motivation (Sänger 
& Wascher, 2011). When change positions were highlighted, however, the effect of the 
method increased, i.e., the task became too easy to differentiate sufficiently between persons. 
It should be noted that a great measurement error variance was observed, possibly due to the 
fact that the N2pc component is computed from the difference from ipsilateral and 
contralateral activity, subtracting the true scores from each other (for a review on difference 
scores see Zumbo, 1999).  
Second, there was a positive relationship between the magnitude of the P3 and the 
sensitivity for changes. Individuals who showed an increased P3 amplitude at about 500 ms 
afters stimulus onset also showed a better sensitivity for changes after stimulus onset. This 
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finding suggests that post-perceptual cognitive processes are also related to the ability to 
detect changes. Thus, later phases, e.g. the aware processing and evaluation of the change for 
ongoing decision making (cf. Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2003; O'Connell et al., 2012), can 
explain some part of individual differences in change detection. This finding extends former 
research, which indicated that the P3 component is influenced by individual differences, e.g. 
in extraversion  or in age (e.g., D. Friedman, 2008). Moreover, we found a small influence of 
the situation. It is well known that situational determinants, e.g., fatigue, exercise or menstrual 
cycle, affect the P3 component (Polich & Kok, 1995).  
Furthermore, attentional change processing and post-perceptual change processing can 
be regarded as related, but distinct processes. This is in line with the finding that only 
attended changes can be reported consciously (e.g., O'Regan et al., 2000). Moreover, a 
stepwise regression indicated that the inclusion of the N2pc amplitude as a first predictor 
allowed explaining 19 % of the variance in the sensitivity for changes, whereas the amount of 
explained variance increased significantly to 29% after inclusion of the P3 amplitude as a 
second predictor. This finding suggests that the N2pc and the P3 essentially tap distinct 
neurocognitive processes which both contribute to and amplify the individual sensitivity for 
changes. 
Supplementing these findings, there was a small overlap of measures of individual 
differences in change blindness and intelligence, which may tap at least in part the very same 
cognitive process. To shed some light on the nature of this overlapping process, the N2pc and 
the P3 component were correlated with general intelligence, as measured with the APM. We 
found a significant relation of individual differences in the N2pc amplitude and general 
intelligence, r = -.44, p = .008 (acceptable model fit, χ2(72) = 80.0, p < .242, CFI = .92, 
RMSEA = .04). Also the relation of the P3 amplitude with general intelligence reached 
significance, r = .40, p = .005 (marginally acceptable model fit, χ2(68) = 106.7, p = .002, 
CFI = .95, RMSEA = .10). Moreover, a stepwise regression indicated that the inclusion of the 
N2pc amplitude as a first predictor allowed explaining 19 % of the variance in the sensitivity 
for changes, whereas the amount of explained variance increased significantly to 29% after 
inclusion of the P3 amplitude as a second predictor. Together, these results show a relation of 
both attentional and post-perceptual change processing with intelligence. Former research 
offers possible explanations for this observation. For example, individual differences in 
working memory capacity, which are strongly related to intelligence (Engle, Tuholski, 
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Laughlin, & Conway, 1999) and become apparent in the size of the P3 amplitude (Nittono et 
al., 1999), might explain this relationship. Moreover, increased working memory load might 
also increase the inference of distractors (Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 2004) and thus 
complicate the allocation of attention onto the change. Thus, our findings suggest mainly one 
common neurocognitive factor in individual differences in change blindness and general 
intelligence. 
Conclusion 
The present study showed that individual differences in change blindness are due to a 
trait. That is, persons differ systematically in their sensitivity for changes. A talented pilot, 
race driver, surgeon, or soccer goal keeper – they all have one thing in common: the ability to 
detect changes in the environment better than the average. Future studies should clarify 
predictive validity and applicability of change blindness tasks for real-life and the diagnosis 
of (professional) aptitude which make a demand on the ability to detect changes in the 
environment. Moreover, change blindness is a multiple-cause phenomenon. There are least 
two distinct mechanisms which contribute to individual difference in the sensitivity for 
changes: An earlier attentional phase and a later post-perceptual phase of change processing, 
necessary for ongoing change evaluation and decision making. 
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Footnotes 
1In this analysis we only compare the LOW-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition with 
the HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition (both presented in one block), but we did not 
include the not-highlighted condition, to avoid a confound between the number of 
mudsplashes with the way of presentation. Because the LOW-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES 
condition and THE HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition were presented mixed together, 
i.e., the number of mudsplashes was not predictable from trial to trial, task demands increased 
in general and participants’ uncertainty might be higher than in the NOT-HIGHLIGHTED 
condition. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Overview of the different experimental conditions. 
Condition Number of 
Mudsplashes  
Highlighted  Trials per 
measurement 
occasion 
Trials  
overall 
LOW-NUMBER-OF-
MUDSPLASHES 
4 No 252 756 
HIGH-NUMBER-OF-
MUDSPLASHES 
8 No 252 756 
NOT-HIGHLIGHTED 
change positions 
6 No 252 756 
HIGHLIGHTED 
change positions 
6 Yes 252 756 
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Table 2. Mean accuracy rate in percentage for no changes and luminance changes and 
values of sensitivity dʾ and response bias c as a function of condition (LOW-NUMBER-OF-
MUDSPLASHES, HIGH-NUMBER OF MUDSPLASHES, NOT-HIGHLIGHTED, and HIGHLIGHTED) and 
of the single three measurement occasions (SE = standard error of mean). 
Measurement  
occasion Condition 
No Change 
(SE) 
Luminance 
Change (SE) 
Sensitivity 
d’ (SE) 
Response 
bias c (SE) 
S1 
Low Muds 95.10(.74) 31.65(2.61) 1.26(.11) 1.21(.06) 
High Muds 94.30(.80) 22.57(2.03) .89(.08) 1.30(.06) 
Not High 89.83(.13) 26.70(2.08) .77(.09) 1.10(.06) 
High 96.13(.54) 75.37(2.90) 2.78(.12) .55(.06) 
S2 
Low Muds 95.95(.57) 41.90(2.95) 1.65(.11) 1.08(.05) 
High Muds 95.30(.65) 31.50(2.59) 1.23(.10) 1.25(.05) 
Not High 94.08(.94) 35.25(2.47) 1.35(.10) 1.10(.05) 
High 96.48(.78) 70.62(3.08) 2.70(.12) .66(.06) 
S3 
Low Muds 96.40(.57) 38.95(2.76) 1.65(.11) 1.15(.05) 
High Muds 95.70(.70) 25.72(2.62) 1.15(.10) 1.34(.05) 
Not High 96.98(.49) 39.73(2.77) 1.72(.11) 1.17(.05) 
High 96.48(.65) 77.35(2.88) 2.95(.12) .54(.06) 
Overall 
Low Muds 95.82(.49) 37.50(2.53) 1.54(.10) 1.13(.04) 
High Muds 95.10(.56) 26.59(1.99) 1.10(.09) 1.27(.04) 
Not High 93.63(.75) 33.89(2.17) 1.24(.09) 1.08(.04) 
High 96.37(.56) 74.44(2.84) 2.78(.12) .58(.05) 
Note. LOW-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition (Low Muds); HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES 
condition (High Muds). 
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Table 3. Manifest correlations of sensitivity d’, the N2pc amplitude for detected changes, and the P3 amplitude for detected changes. 
  Sensitivity dʾ N2pc P3 
 Stimulation 
Low 
Muds 
High 
Muds 
Not 
High 
High Low 
Muds 
High 
Muds 
Not 
High 
High Low 
Muds 
High 
Muds 
Not 
High 
High 
Sensitivity 
dʾ 
Low Muds 1            
High Muds .93** 1           
Not High .92** .93** 1          
High .75** .71** .76* 1         
N2pc 
Low Muds -.30* -.18 -.28* -.26* 1        
High Muds -.28* -.26* -.28* -.26* .20 1       
Not High -.38* -.30* -.36* -.35* .48** .29* 1      
High -.32* -.23+ -.33* -.44** .43* .28* .53** 1     
P3 
Low Muds .49** .48** .43* .41* .06 -.36** -.25+ -.31 1    
High Muds .46** .47** .42* .42* .14 -.31* -.16 -.27* .94** 1   
Not High .44** .42* .40* .44** -.00 -.34* -.20 -.32* .32** .88** 1  
High .29* .27* .22+ .30* .05 -.36* -.15 -.20 .86** .83** .88** 1 
Note. LOW-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition (Low Muds), HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition (High Muds), NOT-HIGHLIGHTED condition (Not 
High), HIGHLIGHTED condition (High); **p < .001; *p < .005; +p < .010. 
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Table 4. Manifest correlations of sensitivity d’ and further performance measures (general intelligence, mental speed, Big Five). 
  Sensitivity dʾ Intelligence Mental speed Big Five 
 Stimulation 
Low 
Muds 
High 
Muds 
Not 
High 
  High APM ZVT Hick Open Consc Extra Agree Neuro 
Sensitivity 
dʾ 
Low Muds 1            
High Muds .93** 1           
Not High .92** .93** 1          
High .75** .71** .76* 1         
Intelligence APM .45** 45** . 46** .33* 1        
Mental 
speed 
ZVT -.46** -.38* -.38* -.58** -.19 1       
Hick -.47** -.46** -.45** -.51** -.22+ .43* 1      
Big Five 
Open .15 .09 .05 .02 .08 -.01 .18 1     
Consc .12 .21 .21 .24+ .06 -.10 -.01 -.13 1    
Extra .18 .15 .15 .34* .07 -.48** -.17 -.04 .27* 1   
Agree .08 -.04 .11 .23+ -.03 -.26* .08 .15 .24+ .46** 1  
Neuro -.39* -.37* -.36* -.36* -.28* .42* .28* .15 -.25+ -.40* -.13 1 
Note. LOW-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition (Low Muds), HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition (High Muds), NOT-HIGHLIGHTED condition (Not 
High), HIGHLIGHTED condition (High); APM (Advanced Progressive Matrices; Raven et al., 1994); Hick (Hick paradigm; Neubauer et al., 1992); ZVT 
(Zahlenverbindungstest; Oswald & Roth, 1987)  Open (openness); Consc (conscientiousness); Extra (extraversion); Agree (agreeableness); Neuro 
(neuroticism); **p < .001; *p < .005; +p < .010. 
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Table 5. Estimated variances (SE = standard error of mean) and critical ratios (CR) of 
sensitivity dʾ, the N2pc amplitude for detected changes, and the P3 amplitude for detected 
changes. 
Model 
parameter 
Sensitivity dʾ N2pc P3 
Var (SE) CR Var (SE) C.R. Var (SE) CR 
Trait .24(.06) 3.88** .83(.23) 3.56** 24.93(4.89) 5.10** 
M1 (Low Muds) .03(.01) 2.50* .00(.00)  .00(.00)  
M2 (High Muds) .00(.00)  .00(.00)  .00(.00)  
M3 (Highlighted) .14(.04) 3.21* .68(.28) 2.43* 2.76(.88) 3.14* 
SR1 .04 (.01) 3.48** .00(.00)  6.73(1.94) 3.47** 
SR2 .00(.00)  .00(.00)  .00(.00)  
SR3 .04(.01) 3.48** .00(.00)  4.76(1.49) 3.19* 
e1 .07(.02) 3.23* 2.30(.49) 4.73** 13.09(2.94) 4.46** 
e2 .03(.01) 2.36* 4.67(.94) 4.95** 10.48(2.46) 4.26** 
e3 .08(.02) 4.17** 3.42(.68) 5.02** 10.65(2.45) 4.35** 
e4 .07(.03) 2.63* 1.14(.29) 3.92** 2.19(1.10) 2.00* 
e5 .08(.02) 3.59** 6.63(1.30) 5.11** 6.12(1.41) 4.36** 
e6 .04(.01) 3.08* 6.77(1.34) 5.07** 9.04(1.94) 4.67** 
e7 .06(.02) 3.70** 1.80(.39) 4.64** 8.02(1.74) 4.62** 
e8 .08(.03) 2.90** .96(.25) 3.76** 2.52(.92) 2.74* 
e9 .00(.00)  4.26(.85) 5.01** .96(2.02) 4.44** 
e10 .05(.02) 3.25* 5.37(1.01) 4.89** 24.10(4.79) 5.03** 
e11 .08(.02) 4.06** 3.40(.69) 4.94** 3.60(1.22) 2.95* 
e12 .05(.02) 2.00* 1.59(.37) 4.37** 4.88(1.38) 3.53** 
Note: ** p < .001, *p < .050: + p < .10; dʼ  = sensitivity dʼ ; variances (Var); method factors (M1 
– M3); state residuals (SR1 – SR3); LOW-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition (Low Muds.); 
HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition (High Muds). 
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Table 6. Reliabilities, trait specifities, measurement specifities, and occasion specifities for the observed variables of sensitivity dʾ, the N2pc 
amplitude for detected changes, and the P3 amplitude for detected changes. 
  Sensitivity dʾ N2pc P3 
 Stimulation 
Trait 
Spe(Y) 
Occ 
Spec(Y) 
Meth 
Spe(Y) Rel(Y) 
Trait 
Spe(Y) 
Occ 
Spec(Y) 
Meth 
Spe(Y) Rel(Y) 
Trait 
Spe(Y) 
Occ 
Spec(Y) 
Meth 
Spe(Y) Rel(Y) 
S1  
Low Muds .63 .11 .08 .82 .27 .00 .00 .27 .56 .15 .00 .71 
High Muds .77 .13 .00 .90 .15 .00 .00 .15 .59 .16 .00 .75 
Not High .67 .11 .00 .77 .20 .00 .00 .20 .59 .16 .00 .75 
High .50 .08 .28 .86 .32 .00 .25 .57 .72 .19 .08 .99 
S2 
Low Muds .69 .00 .09 .78 .11 .00 .00 .11 .80 .00 .00 .80 
High Muds .86 .00 .00 .86 .11 .00 .00 .11 .73 .00 .00 .73 
Not High .80 .00 .00 .80 .46 .00 .00 .46 .76 .00 .00 .76 
High .52 .00 .30 .82 .30 .00 .29 .59 .83 .00 .09 .92 
S3 
Low Muds .77 .11 .10 .98 .16 .00 .00 .16 .81 .12 .00 .93 
High Muds .73 .14 .00 .94 .13 .00 .00 .13 .46 .09 .00 .55 
Not High. .67 .13 .00 .80 .20 .00 .00 .20 .75 .14 .00 .89 
High .43 .07 .37 .87 .28 .00 .22 .50 .67 .13 .08 .88 
Note. dʼ = sensitivity dʼ; N2pc = amplitude of the N2pc for detected changes; P3 = amplitude of the P3 for detected changes; measurement 
occasion or situation (S1 –S3); LOW-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition (Low Muds), HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition (High Muds), 
NOT-HIGHLIGHTED condition (Not High), HIGHLIGHTED condition (High), observed variable (Y); trait specifity (Trait Spe); occasion specifity (Occ 
Spe); method specifity (Meth Spe); reliability (Rel). 
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Table 7. Model fits of the single LST-models including correlations of sensitivity d’ with the 
respective manifest variables for general intelligence, mental speed, and the Big Five 
personality traits. 
  Model fit 
  χ2(df) p CFI RMSEA 
Manifest variable     
Intelligence APM 83.2(71) .153 .75 .05 
Mental speed 
ZVT 82.3(71) .169 .74 .05 
Hick 77.4(71) .282 .84 .04 
Big Five 
Openness 80.0(71) .217 .79 .05 
Extraversion 86.5(71) .102 .67 .06 
Agreeableness  83.7(71) .144 .74 .06 
Conscientiousness 83.1(71) .155 .71 .05 
Neuroticism 81.4(71) .187 .78 .05 
Note: PM (Advanced Progressive Matrices; Raven et al., 1994); Hick (Hick paradigm; Neubauer et al., 
1992); ZVT (Zahlenverbindungstest; Oswald & Roth, 1987). 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. Example for an experimental trial. After a fixation cross (1000ms), matrix S1 
appeared (400 ms), then matrix S2 with a possible change (lateral luminance or central color 
change)  followed (100 ms), simultaneously with the mudsplashes. Subsequently, S2 
remained on the screen for another 400 ms without the mudsplashes. Afterwards, participants 
indicated whether they had seen a change or not. Finally an inter-trial interval (ITI) of 2000 – 
3000 ms appeared. In this example, six mudsplashes were presented as in the not-highlighted 
block and in the highlighted-block. In the NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition, four or eight 
mudsplashes appeared in intermingled sequence. The dot in the center of the matrix was 
colored in either red or green. In the matrix below, the six possible luminance change 
positions are marked in white color (not visible in the experiment). In the HIGHLIGHTED 
condition these positions were permanently marked in red color. 
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Figure 2. Difference waveforms, separately for the experimental conditions (LOW-NUMBER-OF-
MUDSPLASHES, HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES, NOT-HIGHLIGHTED, HIGHTLIGHTED). The N2pc 
was extracted from the ERP by subtracting the ispilateral from the contralateral activity evoked 
by the onset of the change.  
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Figure 3. P3 amplitude for detected, undetected, and no changes changes, separately for the 
experimental conditions (LOW-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES, HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES, 
NOT-HIGHLIGHTED, HIGHLIGHTED). 
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Figure 4. Latent state-trait model for sensitivity dʾ. The variance of the observed variables in 
the four conditions (Low Muds = LOW-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition, High Muds = 
HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition, Not High = NOT-HIGHLIGHTED condition, 
High = HIGHLIGHTED condition) was decomposed into situation (S1–S3), method (M1–M3) and 
measurement error (e). The variance of the situations was decomposed into state residuals 
(SR1–SR3) and into the latent trait (Trait Sensitivity d’). 
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Figure 5.  Latent state-trait model for the N2pc amplitude for detected changes. The variance 
of the observed variables in the four conditions (Low Muds = LOW-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES 
condition, High Muds = HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition, Not High = NOT-
HIGHLIGHTED condition, High = HIGHLIGHTED condition) was decomposed into situation (S1–
S3), method (M1–M3) and measurement error (e). The variance of the situations was 
decomposed into state residuals (SR1–SR3) and into the latent trait (Trait N2pc). 
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Figure 6.  Latent state-trait model for the P3 amplitude for detected changes. The variance of 
the observed variables in the four conditions (Low Muds = low-number-of-mudsplashes 
condition, High Muds = HIGH-NUMBER-OF-MUDSPLASHES condition, Not High = NOT-
HIGHLIGHTED condition, High = HIGHLIGHTED condition) was decomposed into situation (S1–
S3), method (M1–M3) and measurement error (e). The variance of the situations was 
decomposed into state residuals (SR1–SR3) and into the latent trait (Trait P3). 
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Abstract 
Observers often miss visual changes in the environment when they co-occur with other 
visual disruptions. This phenomenon is called change blindness. Previous research has shown 
that change blindness increases with age. The aim of the current study was to explore the role 
of post-perceptual stimulus processing in age differences. Therefore, the P3 component of the 
event-related potential was measured while younger, middle-aged, and older participants 
performed a change detection task under different task demands. Older adults detected fewer 
changes than younger adults, even when the task was very easy. Detected changes elicited 
greater P3 amplitudes than undetected changes in younger adults. This effect was reduced or 
even absent for middle-aged and older participants, irrespective of task demands. Because this 
P3 effect is supposed to reflect participants’ confidence in change detection, less confidence 
in own responses may explain the decline of change detection performance in normal aging. 
Keywords: Change Blindness, Aging, Event-Related Potentials, P3, Post-perceptual 
Processing, Confidence 
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Age-related differences on the P3 amplitude in change blindness 
Our visual environment consists of an abundance of details. However, we do not 
perceive all the details of objects and scenes from one view to the next (e.g., Henderson, 
1997; Rensink, 2000b). Consequently, it may happen that we do not detect visual changes in a 
scene – a phenomenon that is known as change blindness (Simons & Levin, 1997). In a 
typical change blindness experiment an original image is presented, followed consecutively 
by a slightly different image. This difference usually produces a transient motion signal that 
attracts observers’ attention. When this motion signal is perturbed, e.g. by the presentation of 
a short blank (Rensink et al., 1997) or by the presentation of mudsplashes (e.g., O'Regan et 
al., 1999; Schankin & Wascher, 2007, 2008), change blindness may result. This phenomenon 
is not restricted to figures or photographs in a laboratory setting but may also occur when 
watching a movie (Simons, 1996) or even in real-life interactions (Simons & Levin, 1998). 
There is evidence that older adults perform worse in a change blindness task than 
younger adults (Rizzo et al., 2009). For example, older participants were less accurate in 
detecting changes in driving scenes taken from inside a car (Batchelder et al., 2003) or when 
they were shown photographs of traffic intersections (Caird et al., 2005). The explanations for 
this age effect are manifold, ranging from deficits in perception, over problems in focusing 
selective attention to relevant objects, to deficits in tracking and controlling cognitive 
resources (Batchelder et al., 2003; Caird et al., 2005; Rizzo et al., 2009). For example, older 
adults may detect fewer changes in driving scenes because they scan more meaningless traffic 
control devices (e.g., traffic lights) while disregarding meaningful objects (e.g., pedestrians 
and vehicles; Caird et al., 2005). 
Behavioral and neurophysiological studies suggest that evaluative processes play an 
important role in change detection performance (Rensink, 2000a; Rensink et al., 1997). For 
the final decision whether or not a change has occurred, the original and the altered image 
must be encoded, stored in working memory, and compared to each other. The conscious 
evaluation of this comparison leads to the decision of signaling a change or not (Block, 1996, 
1995; Eimer & Mazza, 2005). Theoretically, a change in any or all cognitive processes 
involved in ongoing decision making may lead to a decline of change detection performance 
in normal aging. 
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Neurophysiological methods can be used to identify the cognitive processes involved in 
a specific task. So far, a broad range of functional neuroimaging studies investigated the 
change of cognitive processes in normal aging, e.g. in temporal order memory (Cabeza, 
Anderson, Houle, Mangels, & Nyberg, 2000) in working memory (Johnson, Mitchell, Raye, 
D'Esposito, & Johnson, 2007; for a review see Hedden & Gabrieli, 2004). Measuring event-
related potentials (ERP), however, which allows a high temporal resolution for a more fine-
grained analysis of neurocognitive processes, is less common than functional magnet 
resonance imaging (fMRI) (e.g., Polich, 1996, 1997). It remains disputable, however, which 
cognitive processes change with age and, thus, lead to a decline of change detection 
performance with age. 
Post-perceptual cognitive processes are reflected by relatively late ERP components. 
Several studies have shown that successful change detection is reflected by an enhanced P300 
or P3 component (e.g., Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2003; L. Li et al., 2013; Niedeggen et al., 2001; 
Turatto et al., 2002). The P3 is a large positivity peaking about 300 ms after stimulus onset 
with maximal amplitude at parietal and central midline scalp sites. It has first been described 
by Sutton et al. (1965) as reaction to an unexpected event. Context or working memory 
updating is the most common interpretation of its meaning (e.g., Donchin & Coles, 1988; 
Verleger, 1988). It has been stated that the P3 component reflects a mediating process 
between perception and response that helps to transform a decision into action (Verleger et 
al., 2005). 
In the context of change detection, O'Connell et al. (2012) investigated the role of the 
P3 component and the formation of decisions. The ERP showed a single, centro-parietal 
positivity that was elicited by the gradual onset of a change. It grew in amplitude with 
accumulating sensory evidence and peaked simultaneously with participants’ response. The 
authors conclude that this component, which is equal to the P3 component, mirrors a goal-
oriented decision process, determined by threshold-bound accumulation of perceptual 
evidence. Similarily, Koivisto and Revonsuo (2003) suggested that the greater P3 amplitude 
for detected relative to undetected changes reflects post-perceptual processes of conscious 
change evaluation. However, the starting level of the perceptual accumulation process might 
also vary as a function of task demands, stimulus characteristics, or individual differences, 
such as cognitive aging. 
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Cognitive aging includes, amongst others, a less efficient working memory, a decreased 
working memory capacity, and an increased susceptibility to distracting inferences 
(Dempster, 1992; Dobbs & Rule, 1989). Because these processes play a major role in change 
detection, elderly might evaluate a change differently than younger participants. However, the 
effect of aging on post-perceptual cognitive processes has not been investigated in change 
detection yet. In the current study we use simple visual stimuli in order to measure the 
electrophysiological brain activity. The main purpose of the present study is to investigate 
whether age differences in change blindness depend on differences in post-perceptual 
processes as reflected by the amplitude of the P3 component. Because the P3 amplitude 
becomes smaller with increasing age across a variety of visual tasks (Fjell & Walhovd, 2003, 
2004, 2005; L. Li et al., 2013; Lorenzo-López et al., 2008; for a review see D. Friedman, 
2008), this should also be the case in the current study. This effect should be visible 
particularly in the P3 difference between detected and undetected changes.  
Age differences in change blindness may also depend on task demands. Because task 
demands have an effect on the difficulty of a task, they are supposed to affect the sensitivity 
for changes. For example, task demands can bias the relevance of a visual change for the 
observers (Duncan, 1984; O'Regan et al., 2000). As task demands depend on the properties of 
the perceptual stimulus, such as color (Yu 2010), they can be manipulated by varying the 
characteristics of stimuli (Pringle et al., 2001). In the current experiment, we varied the 
number of distracting stimuli (i.e., mudsplashes) or highlighted possible change locations. We 
propose that fewer distracting mudsplashes as well as highlighted change positions simplify 
the task and enhance participants’ sensitivity for changes. This should be reflected by a larger 
P3 amplitude (cf. L. Li et al., 2013; Pringle et al., 2001; Verleger, 1988). Moreover, age 
differences should be more pronounced in highly demanding tasks. 
Methods 
Participants 
Seventy-four paid (8€/hour) volunteers participated in the experiment (38 women, 36 
men, age between 18 and 73, mean age 40.1 years). Participants were recruited via newspaper 
advertisement and web portals. Five participants were left-handed, 61 were right-handed, one 
was bimanual and seven did not make any entry. When asked for their educational 
background, one participant indicated to have finished a degree of German lower secondary 
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school, nine participants had an intermediate school leaving certificate, ten a vocational 
diploma, 19 a German high-school graduation, 31 a university degree, and four a degree of 
doctorate. Four participants were unemployed, three attended school, nine were students, 39 
employees, twelve freelancers, and seven retired. Before the experiment started, participants 
were informed that it was preconditioned that they were not under psychiatric or neurological 
treatment. All participants reported normal or corrected to-normal vision and had normal 
color vision as measured with the Ishihara test of color blindness. Before the experiment 
started, all of them gave their written informed consent. The study was carried out in 
accordance with the ethical standards laid down in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki and its 
amendments. 
Participants were divided into three groups on the basis of tertiles: younger participants 
(N = 25, 11 women, 14 men, aged between 18 and 29, mean age 25.24 years), middle-aged 
participants (N = 24, 11 women, 13 men, aged between 29 and 46, mean age 37.17 years) and 
older participants (N = 25, 16 women, 9 men, aged between 47 and 73, mean age 57.64 
years). 
Apparatus and Stimuli 
Participants sat in a comfortable chair in a sound-attenuated chamber, which was dimly 
lit and electrically shielded. Two keys on a keyboard served as response buttons. The left key 
was marked in red and the right key in green color. They were located under participants’ left 
and right index finger. Stimuli were presented on a 17-in. computer screen, placed 82 cm in 
front of them, at the center of their field of vision. The screen was set to a resolution of 1280 x 
1024 pixels and a screen refresh rate of 60 Hz. 
Stimuli consisted of 81 dots which were arranged in an imaginary 9 x 9 matrix (3.42° x 
3.42° of visual angle) and presented on a black background (L = 0, a = 0, b = 0 in a L*a*b 
color space). Forty of the dots were colored light gray (L = 73, a = 0, b = 0), 40 dots were 
colored dark gray (L = 42, a = 0, b = 0), and the dot in the center of the matrix was colored 
either green (L = 34, a = -38, b = 39) or blue (L = 34, a = 58, b = -105). The distance between 
single dots was .10° and their diameter .28°. The positions of the light and dark gray dots in 
the matrix were balanced so that accumulations of dots with equal luminance were avoided 
(cf. Figure 1). In this way, nine matrices were created, which were used for all experimental 
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conditions equally often. In Block 3 light red (L = 73, a = 38, b = 42) and dark red (L = 42, 
a = 61, b = 55) dots replaced six of the gray dots. 
White squares (L = 100, a = 0, b = 0) served as mudsplashes, whose number (four, six, 
or eight) varied between conditions. Each mudsplash (.28° x .28°) occluded exactly one gray 
dot. The mudsplashes never appeared in immediate vicinity to each other or to a change. Half 
of the mudsplashes were presented to the left and half to the right visual hemifield. Relative to 
their distance to the center, they were always presented symmetrically, mirrored along the 
vertical axis. Fifteen possible arrangements of their spatial positions were constructed in 
advance and then quasi-randomly ordered per block so that the same arrangement of 
mudsplashes never appeared more than three times consecutively. 
Procedure 
Each trial started with a fixation cross in the center of the screen, which lasted 1,000 ms 
(cf. Figure 1). Afterward, the first matrix (S1) appeared for 400 ms. Then the second matrix 
(S2) was presented for 100 ms, simultaneously with the mudsplashes. Subsequently, the 
mudsplashes disappeared and the matrix remained on the screen for another 400 ms. On about 
43% of the trials, S1 and S2 were identical (no change trial), on about 43% of the trials, one 
lateral dot changed its luminance at one of six possible locations (luminance change trial, cf. 
Figure 1), and on about 14% of all trials, the colored dot in the center changed its color (color 
change trial). Color changes were used to keep participants’ attention fixed to the center of the 
screen. Trials with color changes were excluded from further analyses because in this 
condition no change blindness effect can be observed (cf. Schankin and Wascher 2008). 
Figure 1 shows the three dots of position 1, 2, and 3 (left hemifield) and the three dots of 
position 4, 5, and 6 (right hemifield). On half of the luminance change trials, the dot changed 
from dark gray to light gray, on the other half from light gray to dark gray. Similarly, on half 
of the color change trials, the central dot changed from green to blue, on the other half from 
blue to green. Finally, an inter-trial interval (ITI) of variable length (2,000 – 3,000 ms) 
followed. 
Participants were instructed to indicate if they had seen a change or not by pressing the 
green or red key, respectively. The assignment of response keys was counterbalanced across 
participants. It was stressed that they should report a change only when they really saw it and 
that guessing was not allowed. 
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The experiment started with a short demonstration of all possible changes. On each 
position one exemplary change appeared in slowed presentation time and without any 
mudsplashes to ensure that all possible changes had been seen once by the participants. Then 
participants passed 91 practice trials (42 luminance changes, 42 no changes and 7 color 
changes). In the practice trials, six mudsplashes were presented. The procedure was the same 
as described above. The practice was followed by Block 1, the baseline condition. The 
procedure was exactly the same as in the practice. Participants were asked to detect a possible 
luminance change from light gray to dark gray or vice versa at one of six predefined change 
positions in the matrix. Change blindness was induced by the presentation of six mudsplashes, 
simultaneously with the change. In Block 2, the number of mudsplashes was varied. Again, 
participants were asked to detect a possible luminance change from light gray to dark gray or 
vice versa at six predefined change positions. In contrast to Block 1, either four (4-mudsplash 
condition) or eight mudsplashes (8-mudsplash condition) were presented simultaneously with 
the change. Thus, Block 2 contained two different conditions. In Block 3, possible change 
positions were permanently marked in red color (highlighted condition). Participants were 
asked to detect a possible luminance change from light red to dark red or vice versa at the 
same predefined positions as in Block 1 and Block 2. As in Block 1, six mudsplashes were 
presented. Overall, three blocks that contained four experimental conditions were presented: 
the baseline condition (Block1, 6 mudsplashes, not-highlighted change positions), the 4-
mudsplash condition (Block 2, 4 mudsplashes, not highlighted change positions) in mixed 
sequence with the 8-mudsplash condition in one block (Block 2, 8 mudsplashes, not 
highlighted change positions), and the highlighted condition (6-mudsplashes, highlighted 
change positions) (cf. Table 1). 
Each of the four experimental conditions consisted of [4 (color changes) + 12 (luminance 
changes) + 12 (no changes)] x 9 (matrices) = 252 trials with 108 luminance changes, 108 no 
changes and 36 color changes each. Altogether, this resulted in 1008 trials per participant. 
Within a block, all trials were presented in random sequence with the following 
constraints. At maximum three luminance changes, three no changes, three changes of the 
same (left or right) side or two color changes appeared consecutively. Furthermore, the same 
matrix never appeared more than three times consecutively. In this way, four different trial 
sequences were created for each block and systematically assigned to participants. 
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There were always short breaks of individual length after about seven minutes. After 
each block, there was a longer break. 
EEG Recording 
EEG was continuously recorded from 25 Ag-AgCl electrodes, placed according to the 
international 10–20 system. During recording, all electrodes (F3, Fz, F4, T7, C3, C4, T8, TP9, 
TP10, P7, P3, Pz, P4, P8, PO7, PO8, O1, Oz, O2) were referenced to Cz. Fpz was used as 
ground. Vertical electro-oculogram (EOG) was recorded bipolarly from above and below the 
right eye and horizontal EOG from the outer canthi of the eyes. Electrode impedances were 
kept below 5 kΩ. EEG was sampled with a rate of 1000 Hz. The signal was amplified by two 
BrainAmp DC amplifiers (Brain Products, Munich, Germany) with a band-pass of 0.1 - 250 
Hz. Data was filtered off-line with a band-pass filter of 0.1 – 12 Hz and re-referenced to the 
average of the mastoid electrodes offline. EEG data were segmented into time windows of 
1,700 ms, starting 200 ms prior to S1 and ending 1,400 ms afterward. Baseline was corrected 
relative to the activity of the interval 200 ms prior to S1 to 0 ms (-600 to -400 ms prior to S2). 
Ocular artifacts were corrected according to the algorithm of Gratton et al. (1983). Trials with 
minimum-maximum amplitudes of 100 ms intervals smaller than .5 µV, exceeding +/- 70 µV, 
or with a voltage step of 100 µV/ms were excluded from the data as artifacts. 
Data Analysis  
Behavioral Data. We computed hits (percentage of correctly detected luminance 
changes) and false alarms (percentage of reported changes on no change trials) for each of the 
four experimental conditions: the baseline condition, the 4-mudsplash condition, the 8-
mudsplash condition, and the highlighted condition. To distinguish between differences in 
sensitivity and response bias, d’ and c were calculated according to the signal detection theory 
(Green & Swets, 1966). Color changes were excluded from further statistical analyses 
because in this condition no change blindness effect is observed (cf. Schankin & Wascher, 
2008). 
Because task demands were manipulated in two ways, two separate statistical analyses 
were calculated. First, the effect of highlighted change positions was assessed. Therefore, 
differences between younger, middle-aged, and older adults were analyzed by comparing the 
baseline condition (Block 1) with the highlighted condition (Block 3). A repeated-measures 
ANOVA was calculated with the within-subjects factor condition (baseline vs. highlighted 
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condition) and the between-subjects factor age group (younger, middle aged, and older 
participants) for d’ or c, respectively. Second, the effect of the number of distracting 
mudsplashes was evaluated. Therefore, differences between younger, middle-aged and older 
adults were analyzed by comparing the 4-mudsplash condition with the 8-mudsplash 
condition (Block 2). We run a repeated-measures ANOVA with the within-subjects factor 
condition (4 vs. 8 mudsplashes; Block 2) and the between-subjects factor age group (younger, 
middle aged, and older participants) for d’ or c, respectively.  
Electrophysiological Data. The P3 amplitude was maximal about 500 ms after change 
onset (S2) with a maximum at centro-parietal electrodes. For statistical analyses, the P3 
amplitude was measured as mean activity in the time window from 400 to 600 ms after 
change onset. Data from a 3 x 4 electrode grid (F3, Fz, F4; C3, Cz, C4; P3, Pz, P4; O1, Oz, 
O2) were entered into further statistical analyses. In all conditions participants responded after 
the P3 time window (mean RT = 1337.15, SD = 403.78). In a few conditions some 
participants did not detect any changes so that no ERP was recorded for detected changes. 
These values were indicated as missing in all following analyses. 
Again two different statistical analyses were calculated. First, the effect of highlighted 
change positions was evaluated. Therefore, differences between younger, middle-aged, and 
older adults were analyzed by comparing the baseline condition (Block 1) and the highlighted 
condition (Block 3). A repeated-measures ANOVA was calculated with condition (baseline 
condition vs. highlighted condition; Block 1 vs. Block 3), change type (detected, undetected, 
and no change), caudality (frontal, central, parietal, and occipital), and laterality (left, middle, 
and right) as within-subjects factor and age group (younger, middle-aged, and older 
participants) as between-subjects factor. Second, to test for age differences when task 
demands were manipulated by varying the number of distracting mudsplashes, we performed 
a repeated-measures ANOVA with condition (4 vs. 8 mudsplashes; Block 2), change type 
(detected, undetected, and no change), caudality (frontal, central, parietal, and occipital), and 
laterality (left, middle, and right) as within-subjects factor and age group (younger, middle-
aged, and older participants) as between-subjects factor. Only effects involving the factors age 
group, change type, and condition are reported. For the analysis of general topographic age 
differences, we focused on the three- and four-way interaction of age group, change type, and 
caudality and / or laterality. 
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All statistics were adjusted by Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon correction for nonsphericity 
if the number of factor levels exceeded two. In this case, uncorrected degrees of freedom but 
corrected p values are reported. If indicated, additional post hoc analyses were calculated. In 
case of multiple comparisons, p was adjusted according to Bonferroni. 
To assess the linear effect of age on change detection, we computed correlations 
separately for each experimental condition (i.e., baseline condition, 4-mudsplash condition, 8-
mudsplash condition, and highlighted condition). The relationships between participants’ age, 
their sensitivity for changes dʼ, and effects of post-perceptual cognitive processes as reflected 
by the P3 amplitude (i.e., the amplitude difference between detected and undetected changes) 
were analyzed. These analyses were restricted to electrode Pz because the effect of change 
blindness on the P3 amplitude was most pronounced at this electrode site. 
Results 
Age had a substantial effect on behavioral and electrophysiological data. Younger, 
middle-aged, and older participants’ accuracy rates for luminance changes and no changes are 
displayed in Table 1. Mean values of sensitivity d’ and response bias c are presented in Figure 
2. Grand averages of event-related potential waveforms for younger, middle-aged, and older 
participants are exemplarily shown at electrode Fz (Figure 3), Cz (Figure 4), and Pz 
(Figure 5). Figure 6 shows the topographical maps for detected and undetected changes, 
separately for each experimental condition. 
Highlighted Change Positions 
In a first analysis, task demands were assessed by comparing the baseline condition 
with the highlighted condition. 
Behavioral Data. In the baseline condition participants responded correctly to 27.9% 
(standard error of mean = 2.3%) of the luminance changes and to 90.4% (standard error of 
mean = 1.1%) of the no changes. In the highlighted condition participants responded correctly 
to 74.1% (standard error of mean = 2.9%) of the luminance changes and to 94.7% (standard 
error of mean = 1.3%) of the no changes. 
Age Effects. We found a significant main effect of age group on sensitivity d’, 
F(2,71) = 19.4, p < .001, ω² = .341. Post hoc tests indicated that younger and middle-aged 
participants did not differ in their sensitivity for changes, F(1,47) = 3.7, p = .183, ω² = .054, 
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whereas younger participants F(1,48) = 35.7, p < .001, ω² = .420, as well as middle-aged 
participants, F(1,47) = 20.8, p < .001, ω² = .296, were more sensitive to changes than older 
participants. The interaction of age group and condition was significant, F(2,71) = 3.2, 
p = .048, ω² = .058. In the baseline condition younger participants, F(1,48) = 28.4, p < .001, 
ω² = .363, and middle-aged participants, F(1,47) = 11.2, p = .006, ω² = .178, were more 
sensitive to changes than older participants. The difference between younger and middle-aged 
participants was marginally significant, F(1,47) = 5.0, p = .090, ω² = .078. As in the baseline 
condition younger participants F(1,48) = 30.7, p < .001, ω² = .382, and middle-aged 
participants, F(1,47) = 20.8, p < .001, ω² = .296, were more sensitive to changes than older 
participants in the highlighted condition. However, the difference between younger and 
middle-aged participants did not reach significance, F(1,47) = 1.7, p = .594, ω² = .015. 
The response bias c did not differ significantly between age groups, F(2,71) = 2.0, 
p = .138, ω² = .027. The interaction of age group and condition was significant, F(2,71) = 5.0, 
p = .009, ω² = .101. In the highlighted condition the response bias c did not differ between 
younger and middle-aged participants, F(1,47) < 1.0, whereas older participants responded 
more conservatively than younger participants, F(1,48) = 8.4, p = .018, ω² = .134, and more 
conservatively than middle-aged participants, F(1,47) = 10.4, p = .006, ω² = .167. In the 
baseline condition, however, the main effect of response bias did not reach significance, 
F(2,71) < 1.0. 
Further Statistical Effects. Participants were more sensitive to changes in the 
highlighted condition than in the baseline condition, F(1,71) = 642.4, p < .001, ω² = .900. 
Furthermore, participants responded more conservatively in the baseline condition than in the 
highlighted condition. F(1,71) = 67.5, p < .001, ω² = .484.  
Electrophysiological Data. Age differences in change blindness should also be visible 
in the ERP. 
Age Effects. The main effect of age group on the P3 amplitude did not reach 
significance, F(2,69) = 1.1, p = .345, ω² = .003 (cf. Figure 5). Participants’ age group and the 
type of change (detected, undetected, and no changes) interacted with one another, 
F(4,138) = 5.6, p = .001, ε = .872, ω² = .118. The effect of change type on the P3 amplitude 
was most pronounced in younger participants, F(2,48) = 38.8, p < .001, ε = .991, ω² = .612, 
smaller but also present in older participants, F(2,46) = 13.0, p < .001, ε = .708, ω² = .343, 
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whereas it was absent in middle-aged participants, F(2,44) = 1.1, p = .981, ε = .802, 
ω² = .005.  
Participants’ age group and the experimental condition did not interact with each other, 
F(2,69) = 1.6, p = .214, ω² = .017. The three-way interaction of age group with change type 
and condition was not significant, F(4,138) < 1.0.1 
Furthermore, we observed a significant three-way interaction of change type with 
caudality and age group, F(12,414) = 2.8, p = .017, ε = .453, ω² = .050. In younger 
participants, the effect of change type was most pronounced at parietal electrode sites, 
F(2,48) = 51.7, p < .001, ε = .975, ω² = .679, though it was present at all other electrode lines 
(frontal: F(2,48) = 5.0, p = .044, ε = .995, ω² = .143; central: F(2,48) = 27.1, p < .001, 
ε = .971, ω² = .521; and occipital: F(2,48) = 30.3, p < .001, ε = .935, ω² = .550). The 
interaction was absent in middle-aged and older participants, all Fs ≤ 1.9, all ps ≥ .525. 
Moreover, the three-way interaction of change type with laterality and age group 
reached significance as well, F(8,276) = 2.5, p = .023, ε = .766, ω² = .042. In older 
participants, the effect of change type was most pronounced at right electrode sites, 
F(2,46) = 14.8, p < .001, ε = .738, ω² = .375, but it was also present at midline electrodes, 
F(2,46) = 14.0, p < .001, ε = .666, ω² = .361, and left electrode sites, F(2,46) = 7.6, p = .012, 
ε = .727, ω² = .223. The interaction was absent in younger and middle-aged participants, all 
Fs ≤ 2.7, all ps ≥ .228. 
Further Statistical Effects. We observed a significant main effect of change type, 
F(2,138) = 32.6, p < .001, ε = .872, ω² = .314. Post hoc tests showed that the P3 amplitude 
was enhanced for detected changes compared to no changes, F(1,72) = 49.8, p < .001, 
ω² = .404, and to undetected changes, F(1,71) = 27.9, p < .001, ω² = .275, but no difference 
was found between no changes and undetected changes, F(1,72) = 2.3, p = .399, ω² = .018. 
Furthermore, the P3 amplitude was larger in the highlighted condition than in the baseline 
condition, F(1,69) = 21.4, p < .001, ω² = .228. The interaction of change type with condition 
was significant as well, F(2,138) = 10.3, p < .001, ε = .869, ω² = .119. This effect was more 
pronounced in the highlighted condition, F(2,144) = 48.4, p < .001, ε = .866, ω² = .397. 
However, it was also present in the baseline condition, F(2,144) = 4.3, p = .033, ε = .636, 
ω² = .044. 
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Correlational Analysis. Age and sensitivity dʾ were negatively correlated in the 
baseline condition, r = -.52, p < .001, and in the highlighted condition, r = -.59, p < .001. 
Furthermore, the correlation of dʾ and the P3 amplitude (detected minus undetected changes) 
reached marginal significance in the highlighted condition, r = .20, p = .087, but not in the 
baseline condition, r = .18, p = .118. We observed a significant negative relationship of age 
and the P3 amplitude in the highlighted condition, r = -.36, p = .002, whereas it was only 
marginally significant in the baseline condition, r = -.21, p = .081. 
Number of Mudsplashes 
In a second analysis, we manipulated task demands by varying the number of irrelevant 
mudsplashes in Block 2.2 
Behavioral Data. In the 4-mudsplash condition participants responded correctly to 
32.8% (standard error of mean = 2.8%) of the luminance changes and to 95.1% (standard 
error of mean = .1%) of the no changes. In the 8-mudsplash condition they were correct on 
24.7% (standard error of mean = 2.3%) of the luminance changes and on 94.4% (standard 
error of mean = .7%) of the no changes. 
Age Effects. We found a significant main effect of age group on sensitivity d’, 
F(2,71) = 10.2, p < .001, ω² = .206. Post hoc tests indicated that younger participants 
responded marginally more sensitive to changes than middle-aged participants, F(1,47) = 5.6, 
p = .066, ω² = .089, and older participants, F(1,48) = 20.1, p < .001, ω² = .285, whereas 
middle-aged participants did not differ in their sensitivity from older participants, 
F(1,47) = 4.8, p = .126, ω² = .075. The interaction of age group and condition was not 
significant, F(1,71) < 1.0. 
The response bias c did not differ significantly between age groups, F(2,71) = 2.1, 
p = .129, ω² = .030. The interaction of age group and condition did not reached significance, 
F(2,71) <1.0.  
Further Statistical Effects. Participants were more sensitive to changes in the 
4-mudsplash condition than in the 8-mudsplash condition, F(1,71) = 35.4, p < .001, ω² = .326. 
Furthermore, they responded more conservatively in the 8-mudsplash condition than in the 
4-mudsplash condition, F(1,71) = 9.5, p = .003, ω² = .107. 
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Electrophysiological Data. These age differences in change blindness should also be 
observable in the ERP.  
Age Effects. The main effect of age group on the P3 amplitude did not reach 
significance, F(2,67) < 1.0. (cf. Figure 5). Participants’ age and the type of change (detected, 
undetected, and no changes) interacted with one another, F(4,134) = 7.9, p < .001, ε = .667, 
ω² = .171. Post hoc tests showed that the effect of change type was most pronounced in 
younger participants, F(2,48) = 15.4, p < .001, ε = .672, ω² = .375, but it was also observable 
in middle-aged participants, F(2,42) = 8.3, p < .001, ε = .785, ω² = .258, whereas it was 
absent in older participants, F(2,44) < 1.0.  
Participants’ age group and the experimental condition did not interact with each other, 
F(2,67) < 1. The three-way interaction of age group with change type and condition was not 
significant, F(4,134) = 1.5, p = .218, ε = .953, ω² = .015.3 
Furthermore, we observed a significant three-way interaction of change type with 
caudality and age, F(12,402) = 2.9, p = .036, ε = .269, ω² = .054. In younger participants, the 
effect of change type was most pronounced at parietal electrodes, F(2,48) = 21.1, p < .001, 
ε = .669, ω² = .456, but it was also present at all other electrode lines (frontal: F(2,48) = 6.2, 
p = .040, ε = .719, ω² = .178; central: F(2,48) = 12.2, p < .001, ε = .685, ω² = .318; and 
occipital: F(2,48) = 15.1, p < .001, ε = .607, ω² = .370). The interaction of change type and 
caudality did not reach significance in middle-aged participants, F(6,126) < 1.0, and in older 
participants, F(6,132) = 1.7, p = .368, ε = .402, ω² = .031. 
Moreover, a significant three-way interaction of change type with laterality and age 
group was found. In younger participants, the effect was most pronounced at midline 
electrodes, F(2,48) = 17.1, p < .001, ε = .629, ω² = .401, though it was also present for right 
electrode sites, F(2,48) = 14.1, p < .001, ε = .689, ω² = .353, and left electrode sites, 
F(2,48) = 13.3, p < .001, ε = .717, ω² = .339. The interaction was absent in middle-aged and 
older participants, all Fs ≤ 3.2, all ps ≥ .105. 
Further Statistical Effects. The P3 amplitude differed significantly between detected, 
undetected, and no changes, F(2,134) = 13.0, p < .001, ε = .667, ω² = .152. Post hoc tests 
showed that the P3 amplitude was enhanced for detected changes compared to no changes, 
F(1,67) = 13.4, p < .001, ω² = .156, and to undetected changes, F(1,67) = 15.1, p < .001, 
ω² = .167, but no difference was found between no changes and undetected changes, 
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F(1,71) = 2.1, p = .465, ω² = .015. Furthermore, The P3 amplitude was larger in the 
4-mudsplash condition than in the 8-mudsplash condition, F(1,67) = 10.1, p = .002, ω² = .120. 
The interaction of change type with condition was significant as well, F(2,134) = 4.5, 
p = .014, ε = .953, ω² = .005. This effect was more pronounced in the 4-mudsplash condition, 
F(2,140) = 9.9, p = .001, ε = .675, ω² = .113, but it was also present in the 8-mudsplash 
condition, F(2,142) = 6.2, p = .007, ε = .717, ω² = .068. 
Correlational Analysis. Sensitivity dʾ and age were negatively correlated in the 
4-mudsplash condition, r = -.43, p < .001, and in the 8-mudsplash condition, r = -.50, 
p < .001. Furthermore, dʾ and the P3 amplitude (detected minus undetected changes) were 
correlated in the 4-mudsplash condition, r = .39, p = .001, and in the 8-mudsplash condition, 
r = .39, p = .001. Furthermore, we observed a negative relationship of age and the P3 
amplitude in the 4-mudsplash condition, r = -.29, p = .017, and in the 8-mudsplash condition, 
r = -.53, p < .001.  
Discussion 
Previous research has shown that older adults detect fewer changes in change blindness 
tasks than younger adults (e.g., Costello et al., 2010). We wanted to investigate whether this 
age difference in change detection performance may rely on differences in post-perceptual 
cognitive processes. If this were the case, the effect should be reflected by the P3 component 
of the ERP as an electrophysiological correlate of late cognitive stimulus processing (e.g., 
Donchin & Coles, 1988; Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2003; Verleger, 1988). Change blindness was 
induced by mudsplashes presented simultaneously with the change (cf. O'Regan et al., 1999). 
Because age differences might be modulated by the demands of a task, the number of 
distracting stimuli (i.e., mudsplashes) was varied or possible change locations were 
highlighted, respectively. We hypothesized that task demands are higher with a larger number 
of mudsplashes and become lower when change positions are highlighted. Age effects in the 
P3 amplitude should become visible in particular when task demands are high. When task 
demands are low, however, we expected to find small or no age differences. It should be 
stressed that we, in contrast to most previous aging studies, included a group of middle age to 
analyze a trajectory of age effects in the current study. 
In line with previous research (e.g., Costello et al., 2010), younger adults were more 
sensitive to changes than older adults. Importantly, younger and middle-aged participants did 
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not differ in their sensitivity for changes. That is, a decrease in change detection performance 
came into effect only in older age. This is in accordance with former research, which showed 
that the sensitivity for changes begins to decline at about 68 years (Rizzo et al., 2009). 
Electrophysiologically, this effect was not reflected by the mean amplitude of the P3 
component, i.e., there was no general decline in the P3 amplitude with age when averaged 
across detected, undetected, and no changes. Statistically, the main effect of age group in any 
analyses was insignificant, with negligible small effect sizes close to zero. That is, a general 
change in post-perceptual cognitive processes that are reflected by the averaged P3 amplitude, 
like working memory updating (e.g., Verleger, 1988), cannot explain the effect of age on the 
sensitivity for changes. This finding seems to contradict most previous studies, which report a 
decrease in the P3 amplitude with age, e.g. in visual search (e.g., L. Li et al., 2013; Lorenzo-
López et al., 2008). It has to be mentioned, however, that a few studies found similar or even 
increased amplitudes for older adults compared to younger adults (Daffner, Alperin, Mott, & 
Holcomb, 2014; Fabiani, 2012; Wiegand et al., 2014). In these studies, the amplitude of the 
P3 component was dependent on the experimental paradigm, on task requirements (Daffner et 
al., 2011; Daffner et al., 2014; Luck, 2005), or on individuals' performance (Daffner et al., 
2011). Daffner et al. (2011) even observed increased P3 amplitudes for older adults compared 
to younger adults although both groups showed the same performance in a working memory 
task. These larger amplitudes were explained by a compensation mechanism in older adults.  
Thus, further cognitive processes may contribute to age differences in change detection 
and change blindness. One promising candidate is the spatial allocation of selective attention 
– a process that is necessary for successful change detection (e.g., Eimer & Mazza, 2005; 
Rensink et al., 1997; O'Regan et al., 1999; Schankin & Wascher, 2007, 2008). 
Electrophysiologically, attentional processes are reflected by the N2 and N2pc component in 
the ERP, which peak about 200 to 300 ms after stimulus onset at posterior electrode sites. If 
attention played an important role in explaining age differences in a change detection task, 
this should be reflected by the N2 or N2pc component. This was indeed the case in a recent 
change blindness study by Wascher et al. (2012). The authors reported enhanced amplitudes 
of the N2pc component toward more salient changes in older adults. In contrast, the effect in 
the N2 amplitude was not affected by age. According to the authors, older adults seem to have 
more difficulties in maintaining an intentional allocation of attention toward relevant 
characteristics of the stimuli than younger adults, whereas the executive control of attention 
does not change with age. 
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Previous research has shown that detected changes elicit greater P3 amplitudes than 
undetected changes (e.g., Eimer & Mazza, 2005; Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2003; Schankin & 
Wascher, 2007; Turatto et al., 2002). This was also the case in the present experiment. The 
enlarged positivity for detected changes has been interpreted as reflecting the aware 
identification of the change (Niedeggen et al., 2001) or post-perceptual mechanisms necessary 
for decision making or action planning, e.g. the formation of the decision per se (O'Connell et 
al., 2012). 
The size of this change blindness effect in the P3 amplitude, i.e. the difference between 
detected and undetected (or no) changes, depended on age: The effect was greater in younger 
participants in comparison to middle-aged and older participants. It should be stressed that 
this electrophysiological finding only partly fits to the behavioral data. Behaviorally, the 
sensitivity for changes began to decline not before older age, whereas the P3 effect was 
already observable in middle-aged participants. We suppose that during lifetime, the decrease 
of the P3 amplitude begins before it is observable in participants’ behavior. Importantly, the 
negative relation between age and the P3 amplitude was not consistently found in all 
experimental conditions, but depended on task demands (see below for a discussion). Thus, 
the interpretation of the P3 effect as reflecting an aware identification of the change or 
processes necessary for the report of a change do not fit the data very well. 
Alternatively, it has been suggested by Eimer and Mazza (2005) that the P3 reflects 
observers’ confidence in the presence or absence of a change. In their change blindness 
experiment, one of four faces could change its identity across displays. Participants were 
asked to indicate their subjective confidence regarding the presence of a change at the end of 
each trial. The P3 amplitude did not differ between detected and undetected changes when 
participants were low in confidence. When participants were high in confidence, however, the 
P3 was enhanced in detected compared to undetected changes. According to the authors, 
confidence but not change detection was the underlying cause for an increase in the P3 
amplitude. This interpretation is in accordance with the finding that older adults are less 
overconfident with respect to their own ratings than younger adults, e.g. in knowledge tests 
(Kovalchik, Camerer, Grether, Plott, & Allman, 2005; Pliske & Mutter, 1996). In the current 
experiment younger participants might have been more confident in reporting a change than 
middle-aged or older participants. 
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Finally, the topography of the P3 effect changed with age. In younger participants, the 
P3 effect of change detection versus change blindness was most pronounced at parietal and 
midline electrodes. This finding is in accordance with other studies (D. Friedman, Kazmerski, 
& Fabiani, 1997a; Polich & Heine, 1996). In older adults, however, the activation was 
stronger over the right hemisphere. This change in distribution has been observed before (e.g., 
Daffner et al., 2011; Wiegand et al., 2014). It has been interpreted as being indicative for a 
stronger reliance on executive control processes, which are helpful in storing information in 
working memory (e.g., Fjell & Walhovd, 2001; Wiegand et al., 2014). In a change blindness 
task, older adults could shift their search strategy and attempt to compensate, e.g. sensory 
deficits that would otherwise reduce change detection performance. This assumption is 
confirmed by a part of our analyses. Older adults responded more conservatively than 
younger and middle-aged participants, in particular when the task became easier in the 
highlighted condition. This observation is in line with previous research that has shown that 
aging goes along with a more cautious response strategy (L. Li et al., 2013; Rizzo et al., 
2009). This finding could also be related to a decrease in participants’ confidence in their own 
ratings. However, the relationship between confidence and response bias needs to be 
examined in future research. 
A second aim of the current study was to investigate whether age differences in change 
detection performance are modulated by task demands. Age differences may become greater 
when task demands are high. Therefore, two further experimental conditions were introduced. 
First, the number of mudsplashes was varied to investigate the influence of irrelevant stimuli. 
As expected, more changes were detected when four mudsplashes were presented compared 
to eight mudsplashes, i.e. the task became easier. Second, possible change locations were 
highlighted by permanently marking them in red color. In comparison to the baseline 
condition participants detected more changes when change locations were marked. In all 
conditions, older participants detected fewer changes than younger ones. In contrast to our 
predictions, this age difference was visible in particular when change positions were 
highlighted, i.e. when task demands were lowest. We suppose that older adults benefited less 
from highlighting change positions than middle-aged or younger adults, possibly due to 
difficulties in the intentional allocation of attention toward the change (cf. Wascher et al., 
2012), but further research is necessary to test this hypothesis. 
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Electrophysiologically, task demands were reflected by the P3 amplitude. The easier the 
task became, the more the amplitude of the P3 increased, with the largest amplitude in the 
highlighted condition. This finding is in accordance with former studies that reported an 
increase in the P3 amplitude for less demanding tasks (e.g., Verleger, 1988). The effect of 
task demands on the P3 amplitude was not modulated by participants’ age, i.e. post-perceptual 
processes were modulated by task demands similarly in younger and older adults. 
Before strong conclusions might be drawn, some limitations of the current experiment 
have to be considered. First, one may argue that age differences might simply be caused by a 
rising sensory deficit with age. For example, older adults have a reduced useful field of view 
(UFOV), i.e. the visual area in which information can be gathered when eyes are fixated (Ball, 
Beard, Roenker, Miller, & Griggs, 1988; Rizzo et al., 2009). A smaller UFOV might hinder 
the successful evaluation of the change and thus indirectly affect the size of participants’ P3 
amplitude. In the present study, however, a smaller UFOV can be excluded as a cause of age 
differences in sensitivity because all to-be-detected changes were presented within a critical 
cutoff point of 40° of visual angle (Ball, Beard, Roenker, Miller, & Griggs, 1993).  
Second, the sequence of the experimental conditions could have influenced the results. 
All participants started the experiment with the baseline condition (Block 1), followed by the 
4-mudsplash and 8-mudsplash condition (Block 2), and finished with the highlighted 
condition (Block 3). That is, the sequence of the three different blocks is confounded with 
practice or fatigue, which both might have an effect on the sensitivity for changes. Indeed, the 
sensitivity for changes was significantly greater in Block 3 than Block 1. This result might be 
due to practice, at least to a certain extend. It has also taken into account that in the ongoing 
course of the experiment older and middle-aged adults probably had more difficulties in 
maintaining a vigilant state than younger ones (e.g., Deaton & Parasuraman, 1993), possibly 
due to increased mental fatigue (cf. Boksem, Meijman, & Lorist, 2005). It cannot be excluded 
that these processes and their interactions have influenced participants’ sensitivity for 
changes, the confidence in their own rating, and thus the size of the P3 amplitude. In Block 2, 
however, four and eight mudsplashes were presented in mixed sequence. Therefore, effects of 
practice and fatigue can be excluded in this comparison. 
Third, the findings on the P3 amplitude suggest that confidence might be one of the key 
variables explaining the decline in change detection performance in normal aging. To 
strengthen this interpretation, individual confidence ratings need to be measured in future 
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aging studies on change blindness. For example, Eimer and Mazza (2005) asked their 
participants to indicate after each trial how confident they felt in their own response with 
regard to the presence of a change. 
Despite these limitations, the current experiment shows that post-perceptual processes 
change with age. In particular, the confidence in the presence of a visual change explains why 
older adults report fewer changes than younger or middle-aged adults. Interestingly, 
differences in confidence begin to occur in midlife, whereas change detection performance 
begins to decline not before older age. Further cognitive processes might contribute to an age-
related decline in change detection performance, e.g. the allocation of visual-spatial attention 
(Wascher et al., 2012). Possibly, compensation mechanisms or participants’ search strategies 
also play a major role here. 
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Footnotes 
1An analysis with extreme age groups, i.e., with the outer quartiles of the age 
distribution (N = 19 per age group), yielded similar results: When highlighted change 
positions were analyzed, the main effect of age group did not reach significance, 
F(1,35) < 1.0. Participants’ age group and the type of change (detected, undetected, and no 
changes) interacted with one another, F(2,70) = 7.5, p = .002, ε = .921, ω² = .157. 
Participants’ age group and the experimental condition did not interact with each other, 
F(1,35) = 1.3, p = .257, ω² = .008. The three-way interaction of age group with change type 
and condition was not significant, F(2,70) < 1.0. 
2In this analysis we only compare the 4-mudsplash condition with the 8-mudsplash 
condition (both presented in Block 2), but did not include the 6-mudsplash (presented in 
Block 1), to avoid a confound between the number of mudsplashes with the way of 
presentation. Because in Block 2 the 4-mudsplash and the 8-mudsplash condition were 
presented mixed together, i.e., the number of mudsplashes was not predictable from trial to 
trial, task demands increased in general and participants’ uncertainty might be higher than in 
Block 1. 
3Similar results were found when the number of mudsplashes was analyzed with 
extreme age groups, i.e., with the outer quartiles of the age distribution (N = 19 per age 
group). The main effect of age group did not reach significance, F(1,34) = 1.0. Participants’ 
age group and the type of change (detected, undetected, and no changes) interacted with one 
another, F(2,68) = 13.0, p < .001, ε = .619, ω² = .261. Participants’ age group and the 
experimental condition did not interact with each other, F(1,34) < 1.0. The three-way 
interaction of age group with change type and condition was not significant, F(2,68) = 1.1, 
p = .336, ε = .999, ω² = .003. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Mean accuracy rate in percentage (standard error of mean) as a function of condition 
and age. 
 Block Stimulation  No Change Luminance Change 
Younger 
Participants 
Block 1 6 Mudsplashes  90.4 (1.0) 35.4 (5.0) 
Block 2 
4 Mudsplashes  95.1 (.8) 45.0 (5.4) 
8 Mudsplashes  94.4 (.9) 34.2 (4.7) 
Block 3 Highlighted  94.7 (.8) 85.5 (3.8) 
Middle-aged 
Participants 
Block1 6 Mudsplashes  90.1 (2.0) 27.3 (3.4) 
Block2 
4 Mudsplashes  95.1 (.9) 32.9 (4.7) 
8 Mudsplashes  94.1 (1.2) 23.7 (3.6) 
Block3 Highlighted  92.0 (3.7) 82.4 (2.8) 
Older 
Participants 
Block1 6 Mudsplashes  85.9 (2.2) 21.1 (2.8) 
Block2 
4 Mudsplashes  93.6 (1.6) 20.1 (2.9) 
8 Mudsplashes  92.9 (1.6) 15.2 (2.3) 
Block3 Highlighted  95.0 (1.0) 54.8 (5.3) 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of an experimental trial. After a fixation cross (1000 ms), matrix S1 
appeared (400 ms), followed by matrix S2 with a possible change (lateral luminance or 
central color change) (100 ms), simultaneously with the mudsplashes. S2 remained on the 
screen for another 400 ms without the mudsplashes. Afterward, participants indicated whether 
they had seen a change or not. Finally an inter-trial interval (ITI) of 2000 – 3000 ms appeared. 
In this example, six mudsplashes were presented as in Block 1 and 3. In Block 2, four or eight 
mudsplashes appeared in mixed sequence. The dot in the center of the matrix was colored in 
either red or green. In the matrix below, the six possible luminance change positions are 
marked in white color (not visible in the experiment). In Block 3 these positions were 
permanently marked in red color. 
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Figure 2. Mean values and standard errors of behavioral data (A = sensitivity d’; 
B = response bias c) for all four conditions, separately for younger, middle-aged, and older 
participants. 
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Figure 3. Grand averages of event-related brain potential waveforms as measured at electrode 
Fz, separately for younger, middle-aged, and older participants and each condition. S2 
(change and mudsplashes) was presented at Time 0. 
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Figure 4. Grand averages of event-related brain potential waveforms as measured at electrode 
Cz, separately for younger, middle-aged, and older participants and each condition. S2 
(change and mudsplashes) was presented at Time 0. 
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Figure 5. Grand averages of event-related brain potential waveforms as measured at electrode 
Pz, separately for younger, middle-aged, and older participants and each condition. S2 
(change and mudsplashes) was presented at Time 0. 
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Figure 6. Topographical maps which show the activity in the P3 time window between 400 
and 600 ms, separately for each condition and age group (YP = younger participants; MP = 
middle-aged participants; OP = older participants) for detected and undetected changes as 
well as their difference waves (detected minus undetected). 
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